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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I present a new paradigm in human evolutionary theory: the 
relevance of track-ways reading (TWR) to the evolution of human 
cognition, culture and communication. Evidence is presented that strongly 
indicates hominins were exploiting conspecific track-ways 4 million years 
ago. For a non-olfactory ape that was a specialized forager in open, 
featureless wetland environments, they were the only viable natural signs 
to exploit for safety, orienteering, and recognizable social markers. Due to 
the unique cognitive demands of reading track-ways, as compared to scent-
trails all other animals use to find each other and preferred prey species, 
social TWR triggered the evolution of a unique faculty for narrative 
elsewhere-and-when cognition in the hominin mind. Two million years 
later, this narrative faculty was entrenched enough to enable the rather 
sudden „explosion‟ of co-operative Oldowan Lithic Culture that began at 
2.6mya. This cultural adaptation was a highly successful response to 
catastrophic environmental change. Thereafter selection for 
encephalization to increase neural capacity to store and co-operatively 
exploit socio-ecological knowledge gained from the hominin narrative 
faculty (via co-evolving, increasingly efficient modes of intentional 
communication) drove all further biological and cultural developments in 
the hominin trajectory towards H.sapiens and behavioural modernity. 
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PREFACE 
As a child growing up in the wilderness of N.W. Canada I was encouraged to set snares for 
snowshoe hares to add to the family meat supply in winter. Hence, like any other hunter-
gatherer child, I had begun to learn track-ways reading skills before the age of six. By the age 
of eight I was setting leg-traps for small fur-bearing mammals and selling their dried and 
stretched skins for pocket money. By then I could recognize the footprints of most local 
species of both small and large mammals, and discern from their track-ways what they had 
been up to during their daily routines. Most modern humans never need to learn how to read 
track-ways. But for two to three million years before sedentary horticultural civilizations 
began to emerge (roughly 10,000 yrs ago) all hominins were hunter-gatherers, and therefore 
must have begun to learn how to read track-ways from the earliest age possible. 
Here is a personal anecdote that I believe begins to capture the cognitive and psychological 
import as well as the possible evolutionary significance of track-ways reading as a 
cognitive/behavioural niche. At the age of twelve I once went snow-shoeing
1
 in late winter to 
investigate a certain local copse of evergreen spruce trees. There had just been a fresh fall of 
snow the night before, and I wanted to read the tracks in the fine dusting of fresh snow 
underneath their protective cover because I was looking for new sites for my traps. One 
purposefully reads tracks at such times (another example is after a period of rain in areas of 
sand or mud) because all tracks and other traces of target animals to be found must be very 
recent: one can be sure their perpetrators or „authors‟ are still in the territory being explored. 
There were tracks of some smaller fur-bearing species, but „something did not feel right‟ in 
the gloom of the small forest
2
, so I retreated from the trees and laboriously climbed a steep, 
un-forested hill above them for a good view of the surrounding area. After all, it was one of 
those immensely beautiful, „pristine‟ sunny winter days that occurs after new-fallen snow the 
day before. When I descended back down to the trail I had made on top of the deep soft snow 
into and out of the spruce grove in order to head for home
3
, I saw the track-way of a very 
large cougar that had followed my own snow-shoe track-way for a hundred yards or more out 
                                         
1
 Snowshoes are an ancient northern temperate-zone hunter-gatherer invention consisting of strips of leather 
woven across hooped frames of wood that are strapped to one‟s boots like skis. They enable one to walk on top 
of the snow, no matter how deep it is. 
2
 All hunters will relate such „sixth-sense‟ stories, and also attribute this mental state to other animals. In short, it 
is described as the feeling of „being watched‟. Therefore young Indian hunters were admonished by their elders 
to never look directly at the target animal until ready to fire their arrows.  
3
 One naturally back-trails when snow-shoeing in fresh snow, because it is much easier to travel on the already 
packed-down snow under one‟s former prints. 
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into the open before returning to its lair somewhere in the trees. I could see by its prints 
where it had paused, turned to the side of my trail that faced the steep hill, and then padded 
back through the snow into the trees.  
One story that I gleaned from the combination of our track-ways was that it had sensed my 
entry into and departure from the trees and had checked out my scent trail to make sure that I 
had left the vicinity, pausing when it saw me as I laboured up the steep hill, then returned to 
its lair relieved. Another more dramatic story suggested by the combination of our track-ways 
might have been that it was hunting me because it was unusually hungry due to that year‟s 
prolonged and very cold winter, but gave up because a) I was already well above it on the hill 
and out in the open; b) the deep soft snow put it at a physical disadvantage; c) I was human 
and therefore dangerous to attack. Since I knew cougar attacks on humans were extremely 
rare, I quickly discounted that story.  
Even so, the sense of „self‟ as a young human alone in the wilderness without a gun or a 
hatchet came to my mind very strongly indeed. For I could not help „seeing in my mind‟s 
eye‟ my past-self leaving the trees, and almost immediately afterwards, a very large and very 
hungry cougar finally giving up its ambush waiting-game somewhere in the forest gloom 
(cougar are ambush predators in the main) and rushing out of those same trees, nose to the 
snow, before it visually ascertained that my past-self was already half-way up the steep hill 
above.  
What I was mentally doing in this track-ways-reading event, in essence, was imagining 
„being-in-the-mind-and-body‟ of both characters in a past-narrative of this close encounter 
between two agents, the unseen cougar‟s past-self and my own past-self. And all this mental 
activity was based on my visual analysis of the purely physical signs made in the past in the 
snow that had recorded our track-ways. Like all mammalian predators the cougar was 
following my scent-trail till it saw me, and like all hominin predators I was cognitively 
exploiting track-ways.  
As a trapper I knew that no animals would ever come near my traps until the human scent I 
could not help leaving behind while setting them had disappeared, always within a few hours. 
So the very next day the cougar could have re-crossed my snow-shoe trail again without 
gaining an inkling that I had ever been there. As a tracker I knew that for me or any other 
hunter the above track-ways story (and therefore the cougar‟s possible proximity) would have 
been readable until the next snow-fall or the spring thaw, perhaps a month or more later. I 
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also knew that no other species on the planet used visual analysis of track-ways to find and/or 
hunt each other or other animals. The result of this knowledge, plus my awareness of 
Darwinian evolution and „how humans must have evolved from chimps‟, was a „eureka‟ 
moment a couple of years later, on another expedition looking for new trap-sites.  
It suddenly occurred to me that our ancestors might have been reading the stories told by 
track-ways since before we became human. My next idea was that the stories I was reading 
every day told by footprints and track-ways equated with the stories told by printed words 
and sentences used in the books I „devoured‟ every winter evening (neither electricity nor 
television had reached our wilderness area back then). I realized printed words could be 
viewed as „thought-prints‟.   
The „eureka moment‟ really happened then, because I realized that when hominins became 
smart enough to be able to fully read track-ways, they must have started inventing their own 
track-ways, made up of agreed upon depictive signs like trail markers (stone cairns and so on) 
for others to follow physically. As time went on the gestures of sign languages, the 
vocalizations of linguistic languages and then the printed word were invented in order to tell 
stories for other humans to follow mentally.  
I have recounted the above auto-biographical material for two reasons: 
1) So my readers will know I speak from experience about learning and applying 
tracking-ways reading to hunting and gathering skills, not just as an anthropological 
or ethnological observer. In much of what follows, I shall be drawing on a life-time‟s 
experience of tracking animals when trapping or hunting. 
2) My cougar story is seminal to my evolutionary narrative or thesis: I shall be referring 
back to it quite often in this paper. 
Apart from track-ways reading skill being an absolute necessity for a non-olfactory ape to be 
such a highly successful predator, there are three other major aspects of what it entails to „be 
a human‟, as compared to other animals, that I learnt from living in the wilderness, especially 
by spending a month or so without contact with other humans.  
In the first place, no fur-less, fangless, clawless human can manage to survive alone in the 
wild for any length of time without access to certain tools: sharp cutting edges, some kind of 
digging implement, a club, spear or other projectile weapon, containers or packs for carrying 
equipment and foraged resources, and protective clothing and/or shelter of some sort in 
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colder climates. These items would often have been manufactured by older more skilled 
kinfolk. Hominins had to have been tool-makers and reciprocally co-operative from near the 
very beginning of our evolution. 
Secondly no human can survive in the wilderness for very long without hunting and killing 
animals because all plant-life is seasonal, often poisonous or indigestible without prolonged 
processing (usually requiring fire), and demands co-operative, complex preservation 
techniques in order to provide dependable nutrition over time. Animals of course survive and 
can be exploited for food all year round (especially fish and shellfish), and their flesh is 
always highly nutritious, even when raw.  As far as scavenging is concerned, it is both too 
dangerous and far too „hit-and-miss‟ to be depended upon for survival on a day-to-day basis4. 
So we had to have been hunters and fishers (as well as seasonal gatherers), to at least the 
same degree as chimps are, from the beginning of our lineage‟s evolution.  
And last, but very definitely not least: no human can survive mentally for very long without 
some other human to tell his or her stories to. The human brain never stops creating stories 
about the self and other entities interacting in the past and the future (even when asleep). If 
there is no one else around to talk to (or communicate with in other ways) one quite soon 
finds oneself talking and singing out loud to oneself. After only a few weeks the mind begins 
to create imaginary „companions‟, especially during bad weather when long periods of 
inactivity encourage larger amounts of time spent in the lucid dream state.  
For some people these imaginary „companions‟ can become extremely upsetting, powerful 
mental phenomena. I personally coped with this problem by always carrying a pen and a 
notebook to describe my daily experiences in (for an imagined future audience in the real 
world, although I knew my future self would probably be the only person interested in 
reading about them). Even so, a month alone was definitely long enough to become desperate 
for some form of mental exchange with other humans. 
Barry Crump, a renowned New Zealand bushman and famous author (now deceased) once 
wrote:  “If you spend any longer than three months alone in the bush don‟t bother coming 
out”. Schizophrenia was described in one very early psychological treatise I once read as “a 
                                         
4
 Of course, when we became the most successful, dangerous predator on the planet we could take the best meat 
from other predators whenever we had to. They got the remains, and what we left behind from our kills as well. 
I bet this is how our somewhat symbiotic relationship with dogs and cats began. 
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disease often suffered by lonely shepherds”. We humans cannot function without being 
narrative-minded and therefore have to be eusocial story-telling creatures. We also cannot 
function without an up-to-date self-narrative incorporating personal past memories and future 
plans, as the pathologies of amnesia and Alzheimer‟s disease clearly exemplify.  
Hence I suspect our very earliest ancestors were already beginning to be narrative-minded. 
We could in fact be said to be Homo narrativans, and I believe we became story-thinkers-
and-tellers because we started reading the stories told by track-ways at the very beginning of 
hominin evolution. 
Chapter One: The Triggering Track-ways Theory  
1.0 The Uniquely Hominin Cognitive Niche of Track-ways Reading  
Track-ways reading (TWR) is the goal-directed visual analysis of patterns of indentations 
inadvertently left behind in suitable substrates (sand, soft clay, mud, volcanic ash, new-fallen 
snow) by the physical passage of all land-based animals, including, of course, our own 
species. For example, consider the trails of foot-prints made by humans, dogs, birds such as 
sea-gulls, tire-marks of various vehicles, impressions made by people fishing, sun bathing, 
building sand-castles and so on in the sand that you may have noticed when you last visited a 
beach by a river, lake or sea. Other physical traces are also taken into account, depending on 
the kinds of environments in which one is tracking: faecal matter, bent grass, turned-over 
leaves and up-turned pebbles, torn moss, blood spots, browsed foliage, and so on. 
Many people are not aware that hominins are the only species lineage on this planet that has 
ever taken notice of track-ways, including our closest genetic cousins, chimps and bonobos. 
All other terrestrial predators and scavengers
5
 (such as canids, felids, and hyenas) follow 
scent trails on the ground and scent transported by air-currents until within visual or auditory 
reach of their targets. Others are ambush predators as well, like leopards and cougars. Air 
borne or water borne predators and scavengers use panoramic vision (eagles, vultures), 
scenting (sharks) or echo-location (bats, cetacea).  
According to orthodox niche construction theory, in the case of more complex and 
behaviourally flexible organisms, entering a new cognitive/behavioural niche can lead to 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic changes in genome, morphology and behaviour further along 
                                         
5
 All predators sometimes scavenge, and scavengers will prey on very young or old animals as well.  
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the evolutionary trail (West-Eberhard 2005) (Jablonka 2006). The end result can be one or 
more new species. If that cognitive niche is unique on this planet then surely it follows that 
some aspects of the neuro-cognitive capacities and resultant behavioural attributes of those 
species may also be unique on this planet. Therein lays my view of the fundamental relevance 
of TWR to the evolution of human cognition, culture and communication.  
I take the strong view that no true hominin species would have evolved if pre-hominins had 
not entered the TWR niche. My over-all reasons for this view are these: (a) track-ways are 
very different in important ways from scent-trails, which all other terrestrial mammals use to 
keep track of their own and each other‟s whereabouts and search out targeted animals (and 
plants); and (b) those differences make track-ways reading far more effective than scent-
trailing for achieving those purposes.  Therefore positive selection for the unique cognition 
demanded by track-ways exploitation immediately began to take our ancestors into a 
correspondingly unique cognitive realm.  
To summarize my theoretical stance on how the first true hominins evolved: 
1) The definitive question in the hominin evolution debate is what gave pre-hominins 
the unique cognitive capacity for such an unprecedented cumulative cultural 
adaptation as proto-hominin Oldowan Lithic Technology. 
2) The selective trigger for the evolution of that unique cognitive capacity must have 
been entering a unique cognitive/behavioural niche that in turn demanded a 
unique kind of cognitive development. 
3) That unique niche had to have been entered deep in our evolutionary past because 
the unique cognitive capacity it triggered selection for  had to have been 
genetically and neurologically entrenched well before the abrupt emergence (and 
ongoing continuity
6
) of Oldowan Culture (2.6 Ma). 
4) The emergence of Oldowan Culture was caused by an adaptive cliff, created by 
catastrophic environmental events just after 2.8 mya: a sudden north/south polar 
reverse, associated with a peak in volcanic and earthquake activity in the East 
African Rift and the beginning of extreme glaciations in the Northern Hemisphere. 
5) This proto-hominin cultural adaptation to those catastrophic environmental 
effects, enabled by their unique cognitive competences, constituted a powerful 
fuel for success that engendered selective forces for more of the cognitive capacity 
                                         
6
 I have inserted continuity as a feature here because cut-marked bones dated 3.4 mya have recently been found. 
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for such adaptations; for these were highly effective behavioural/cultural 
adjustments to on-going environmental change throughout the Late Pliocene. 
6) These cultural adaptations created more social and ecological complexity which 
positively fed back into individual and group selection for more cognitive 
capacities as well; the need for more high-quality nutrition to fuel a larger brain 
needed for these cognitive capacities demanded further socio-ecological 
adaptations in turn.  
7) This co-evolutionary spiral caused rapid encephalization, together with 
compensatory morphological and life-history changes (plus a full entry into the 
social co-operative breeding carnivore niche). This process caused the first true 
hominins species habilis and erectus to evolve by around 2 mya, if not before, and 
established the extreme disparities between hominin and ape cognition, culture 
and communication by 1.6 mya. 
8) This gene-culture, niche construction co-evolution, together with increasingly 
dramatic climactic fluctuations (glacial cycles) after the mid-Pleistocene, explains 
all further biological and cultural developments in the hominin lineage. Those 
developments resulted in neandertalis and sapiens, linguistic communication by 
around 300 ky, and finally behavioural modernity by 100 ky. 
I believe entering the unique cognitive niche of TWR was the selective trigger that led to the 
evolution of the first true hominins habilis/erectus, with the help of other pre-adaptive 
morphological and cognitive/behavioural traits, of course. Some of these traits were already 
possessed by all great apes, and I turn to them later in this section. Others were possessed 
only by pre-hominins because they were already specializing in a different socio-ecological 
niche from all other great ape species.  
I refer to the peculiarities of the socio-ecological niche of the very early (5.8 to 4.4 mya) pre-
hominins Ardipithecus kadabbas  and ramidus
7
. Some theorists are now suggesting they were 
the last common ancestor to hominins and australopithecines (McPherron, Alemseged et al. 
2010), and that chimps are an earlier side branch that headed down their own adaptive trail 
                                         
7 We now know a great deal about their paleobiology due to several papers just recently published  by a multi-
disciplinary scientific team (for example Suwa et al 2009). They have been working over the last decade on 
fossils from several individuals (and the nature of the environment they lived in), of which one was fortuitously 
virtually complete.  
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around 6 mya [(Zollikofer and Ponce de León) to be published]. I support their view: the 
ardipithecines occupied the adaptive plateau from which true hominins evolved.   
The great-ape Ardipithecus ramidus was fully bipedal (no knuckle-walking), but had an 
extremely opposable big toe still useful for grasping tree limbs
8
. Male canines were already 
very much reduced compared to those of chimps, indicating that male aggression was not 
important as a sexual signal. Their post-canine molars were also much smaller, indicating 
they were omnivorous, and they foraged in patches of lightly forested flood-plains 
(predominately palm-trees) and open wet-lands within upland closed forests (Suwa, Kono et 
al. 2009), (WoldeGabriel, Ambrose et al. 2009). What this evidence indicates is that they still 
nested in trees at night, but foraged daily for semi-aquatic flora and fauna.  
At about 4.39 mya a huge volcanic event deposited enough ash to destroy evergreen tropical 
forests throughout the East African Rift. This event also cut off the outlet of the Omo River 
from the Turkana Basin to the Indian Ocean due to massive lava flows. I have presented these 
details here because similar events throughout the Late Pliocene and early Pleistocene played 
havoc with wetland resources that I believe were still the staple diet of hominins, thus forcing 
some populations into habitual acquisition and butchery of large mammals. Hence my thesis 
is complemented by the environmental variability hypothesis (Potts 1998).  
I hold the above Mid-Pliocene environmental catastrophe is the beginning of the hominin 
evolutionary story, because it forced some populations of ramidus to adopt a completely 
terrestrial life-style, living and foraging in large expanses of open semi-aquatic highland 
environments. The major pre-Oldowan morphological and behavioural traits that 
consequently had evolved by around a million years later (3.5 mya) were:  
1) Full and obligate bipedalism, with very humanoid feet (completely non-
opposable big toe as proved by Laetoli Fossilized Hominin Footprints) 
2) Two free hands and a gluteal morphology (un-chimp-like buttocks providing 
fulcrum for weight transmission to shoulder and arm for greater throwing force) 
from habitual bipedal wading, coupled with a precision grip and pliable wrists 
(originally for climbing but also useful for foraging under water). These features 
enabled hard, accurate throwing and clubbing and were a pre-adaptation for 
stone knapping. 
                                         
8
 Their feet would have been useful for walking in the soft mud of swampy substrates, but would have made for 
slow bipedal traveling.  
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3) The correspondingly free-handed physical ability to carry things (for example, 
clubs/stones for hunting and defence) for long distances (unlike knuckle-
walking chimps) and therefore have longer behavioural sequences in mind than 
chimps (Osvath and Gärdenfors 2007). 
4) Decreased sexual dimorphism and an incipient form of co-operative breeding 
consisting of communal/kinship care/feeding/transportation of the young, due to 
habitual foraging in watery places, in which the very young could not safely 
forage for themselves (the young of baboons, clinging to their mother‟s fur, 
often drown when water-ways in swamps are being crossed by quadruped 
baboon troupes). 
5) Morphological features of aquatic or semi-aquatic mammals: loss of hair, 
copious sweating capacity, tears, loss of air sacs in the throat (present in all 
other great apes including australopithecines), fatty mammary tissue (breasts), 
breathe control [(Verhaegen, Puech et al. 2002; Cunnane and Stewart 2010) 
foreword by Tobias] 
6) More than an ape-like capability to manufacture simple tools, and to do so in a 
much more anticipatory manner. This view is non-speculative given very recent 
evidence of cut-marked bones from 3.4 mya (McPherron, Alemseged et al. 
2010). 
7) The obligate, habitual exploitation of conspecific track-ways (including their 
own old track-ways), both to ensure safety in boggy swamp-land substrates and 
enable optimal navigation in featureless open environments where the 
predominant vegetation was very tall tropical swamp-grasses and reeds
9
(see 
illustrations next page. The swamp is a seasonal swamp, or in other words a 
lightly forested floodplain. From Photo Share, flickR website) 
In sum then: in this thesis I am presenting a new paradigm by focusing on a uniquely hominin 
routine cognitive behaviour called „track-ways reading‟ (TWR), engendered by the fully 
terrestrial open wetland/floodplain socio-ecological niche occupied by post-ardipithecan 
hominins. I argue that entering the TWR niche selectively triggered the co-evolutionary 
development of the extreme disparities between human cognition and that of other great apes. 
                                         
9
 It may help my readers to think of the words of an old song: “The grass (corn in song) grew as high as an 
elephant‟s eye” to understand the difficulties in navigation our ancestors would have had foraging in such 
environments, given that they were apes with extremely poor olfactory perception. 
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I hold these disparities are caused by a basal qualitative difference between the ape mind-set 
and the human mind-set. Only human brains have a neurally entrenched faculty for fully 
decoupled or elsewhere-and-when cognition, travelling in “the theatre of the mind” through 
imagined narratives made up of participant/event scenarios in the past and the future 
(Suddendorf and Corballis 2007). This faculty enables mental time-travel, for instance. 
The other vital capacity this elsewhere-and-when cognition confers upon humans is the 
ability to take “the first-person and third person point of view” ((Tomasello, Carpenter et al. 
2005). This enables us to imagine „being-in-the-minds-and-bodies‟ of other agents and 
entities, as well as past and future selves, in “the theatre of the mind”. The “first-person” 
view is a meta-representation of oneself (and therefore of others as “third persons”) as an 
intentional agent travelling from the past into the future. This unique social competence 
15 
 
makes us consummate mimics, mind-readers and folk psychologists, and begins to be 
expressed by all normal humans between the age of three and four, when childhood amnesia 
stops and pretend play with peers begins (Atance and O'Neill 2005). 
 Tulving (Tulving 1985) coined the term autonoesis for this unique autobiographical memory 
or „self-knowing‟ capacity, and has more recently stated (2001 for review) that this attribute 
is the key cognitive capacity behind all hominin culture and communication. Therefore one 
cannot explain the evolutionary trajectory of human cognition without explaining how 
autonoesis evolved in our forbears. Without this unique cognitive capacity for a detached or 
objective view of the self, elsewhere-and-when cognition about other entities and the world at 
large could not exist. As we will soon begin to discover (section 1.2), this is fundamentally 
the cognition that is required for full-fledged TWR skills.  
My explanation for the evolution of autonoesis is that habitually following one‟s own old 
track-ways (as well as those of intimate others) for safety and orienteering triggered the 
evolution of autobiographical narrative
10
 memory. I think the initial ability to read track-ways 
must have evolved in the psychological realm of iterated physical separations between 
socially intimate conspecifics: that is, in the social domain proper. When extractive foraging, 
one is always leaving or returning to one‟s most important others: therefore I class this kind 
of TWR as social TWR. 
Only using TWR for finding other animals has ever been considered by other evolutionary 
theorists  [(Liebenberg 1990) for example]. However they restricted TWR‟s evolutionary 
relevance to the advent of behavioural modernity, or subsumed it under the umbrella of 
cognition required for all earlier HG extractive-foraging techniques. I am alone in suggesting 
beginning to read our own and intimate others‟ track-ways is what triggered the evolution of 
uniquely hominin cognition.  
Finally, we need to discuss great ape social competences: I hold that only some great-ape 
species could have entered the TWR niche, because apes are excellent visual pattern readers, 
with very poor olfactory perception compared to non-arboreal mammals. They are also very 
smart mammals, with comparatively good here-and-now social learning skills [(Bates and 
Byrne) in press]. Certain universal great ape here-and-now cognitive competences possessed 
                                         
10
 Tulving (1985) also coined the term episodic (knowing who and when) for what I prefer to call narrative or 
autobiographical memory, to differentiate it from semantic (knowing what) and procedural (knowing how) 
memory, which all other animals have of course (think of cognitive maps of home territories). An episode is 
merely the shortest possible narrative.   
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by A. ramidus had to be the platform for the elsewhere-and-when narrative imagination 
required for social TWR skills. I will argue these were the social competences of here-and-
now exact imitation and theory of mind/intentionality-reading, as exhibited by chimps and 
human toddlers under the age of three (Call, Hare et al. 2004; Call and Tomasello 2008; 
Tomasello 2008).  
In my view this explains why the hominin narrative faculty is overwhelmingly a faculty for 
social cognitive skills. Later on hominins began habitually reading track-ways of other 
animals and all other natural signs (due to environmental forcing, after 2.8 mya) using their 
simple social TWR skills and this qualitatively unique narrative social faculty. Only then 
were they fully on their way to becoming the most successful eusocial predators on the 
planet. 
In the next section I list the disparities between ape and human minds, and claim they are due 
to a qualitative difference: a unique faculty I call the hominin narrative faculty (HNF). 
Section 1.2 will then introduce us to the narrative nature of track-ways as natural signs, and 
their three major differences from scent-trails. The following section then presents my 
reasons for arguing that this faculty could only have evolved in the social navigation domain. 
The final section summarises earlier material very briefly, and then outlines the structure of 
the thesis as a whole. 
1.1 The Qualitative Difference between the Ape and Human Mind-sets. 
After more than 40 years of studying chimpanzees and bonobos in the wild and by laboratory 
research, plus extremely prolonged enculturation of apes such as the  famous Kanzi (who is 
now 30 years old), what has been discovered is that they sometimes appear to incipiently 
exhibit many human cognitive/behavioural traits. However, they also exhibit these glaring 
disparities: 
1) Unlike us they are overwhelmingly cognitively restricted to communicating and 
acting only with the daily here and now in mind.  
2) They make simple tools but do not use tools to make other tools. 
3) While they can truly imitate conspecifics for the sake of attaining immediate 
rewards in the associative here-and-now, they immediately revert to mere goal-
directed emulation if a quicker route to the reward becomes apparent (perhaps 
because they are extremely competitive). They almost never indulge in pretend play 
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formatted on participant/events that have happened or could happen in the elsewhere-
and-when.  
4) They almost never exhibit intentional pedagogy (mothers directly showing their 
young how to crack nuts has only been observed twice in 40 years) or auto-rehearsal 
(imitation of skilled conspecifics when they are absent) necessary for fast-track 
transmission of skills (chimps take several years of trial and error learning to achieve 
nut-cracking expertise).  
5) Even highly enculturated apes with some understanding of symbols or gestures 
make only very simple two-symbol requests, like human toddlers, and cannot use 
symbols to tell stories about events not occurring in the here and now. They do not 
point demonstratively, or even understand demonstrative pointing to third entities by 
their human caretakers. 
6) They exhibit no moralistic punishment (they don‟t have cultural norms) 
7) They exhibit very little co-operative sharing, trade (the only exceptions are a 
„tolerated theft‟ version of sharing of meat and reciprocal grooming) or collaborative 
action towards mutual rewards. 
8) They do not „read‟ or cognitively exploit the natural signs we call footprints and 
track-ways, not even those of their own species when hunting other chimps.  
I argue that the last disparity is the major evolutionary reason the first disparity exists, and the 
first disparity is the over-all cognitive reason why the following six disparities exist. Apes are 
overwhelmingly restricted to here-and-now cognition whereas even the default state of the 
human mind/brain is characterized by narrative elsewhere-and-when cognition. Neuro-
imaging work over the last decade has proved there is a core brain structure that supports this 
narrative mentalizing (Addis, Wong et al. 2007; Schacter and Addis 2007; Addis, Pan et al. 
2009; Schacter and Addis 2009; Spreng and Grady 2010). I call this faculty the hominin 
narrative faculty (HNF); it is so entrenched the human mind-brain is truly a „narrative 
machine‟.   
In the next section we will discover track-ways as natural signs demand this narrative form of 
cognition, about temporal and spatial relationships between characters and events occurring 
in the elsewhere-and-when, in order for them to be very useful for navigation.  
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1.2 The Narrative Nature of Track-ways as a Natural Sign-System 
Gordon Hewes (Hewes 1994) is the only other theorist
11
 I have discovered that has directly 
mentioned the fact that track-ways tell stories, in a manner similar to languages, about agents 
acting towards goals over time: 
“…the total record left by some animal‟s tracks and other trailside signs within a normal 
time frame (such as the main part of a day) might be  regarded as a kind of 
unintentional narrative, in which the tracker develops a profile of the kind of creature 
he is pursuing. The human tracker‟s cognitive achievement in forming such a 
“narrative” does not seem inferior to that required for transmittal of a comparably 
accurate verbal report…the process by which a nonhuman  predator follows a scent 
track to its quarry is much simpler, depending mainly on pursuit of increasingly strong 
stimuli in the same mode.” (my emphasis, p 142). 
So if one follows it for long enough any track-way can naturally tell a story about 1) where an 
absentee agent or „author‟ has been and what it has been up to in the past; 2) where it might 
be and what it might be doing in the present; and 3) where it might be and what it might be 
doing in the future.  
There are three basic differences between track-ways and scent-trails. Firstly, track-ways are 
immediately and inexorably directional because foot-prints physically point to where their 
author was heading when they were made. A dog following a scent-trail will often head away 
from the animal that made it until it perceives that the scent is getting weaker instead of 
stronger. Therefore track-ways reading is immediately more efficient than scent trailing for 
finding a target animal. Track-ways also appear to have an inherent intentionality, or goal-
directedness, due to their directionality.  
Secondly track-ways are far more durable than scent-trails. If a scent-trail can be detected at 
all, it is worth following, for its author cannot be very far away. Track-ways can last for days 
or weeks instead of just a couple of hours or so. Therefore choosing which track-way of a 
targeted animal to follow is arbitrary and depends upon how „fresh‟ it is, or how recently it 
was made. The tracking mind is continually being goaded into thinking about time, into 
                                         
11
 Two other theorists  have mentioned that footprints as natural .indexical (indicatory) signs may have given us 
the ability to “understand the symbolic signs of language”:Calvin, W. H. and D. Bickerton (2000). Lingua ex 
machina : reconciling Darwin and Chomsky with the human brain. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. But they did 
not recognize TWR‟s import as an ancient, uniquely selective cognitive niche.   
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decoupled elsewhere-and-when cognition. The scent-trailing mind remains locked into here-
and-now associative cognition. 
 Thirdly, track-ways are combinatorial. Scent-trails are not at all combinatorial because any 
stronger scent will instantly make an older, weaker scent imperceptible to a scent tracker. 
Several track-ways can overly each other and still be discernible: this means that spatial 
analysis of the order of their authorship supplies combined narratives about a conspecific x 
meeting up with another conspecific y, whether they mated or fought with each other, 
whether they travelled together after that and so on. Combinations of tracks of different 
species are also important. For example, the crossing of a targeted track-way by a nocturnal  
species can tell the tracker whether the target track-way was made today or yesterday, 
depending on whether the nocturnal animal‟s  prints are over or under the targeted prints. 
Again, we see how the tracking mind is goaded into thinking about time. 
The combinatory narratives told by track-ways are recursive in the sense that: 
(1) Complex narratives are comprised from a large but limited array of atomic 
elements: recognizable track-ways of individuals or of species 
(2) The „meaning‟ of the complex narrative depends on the presence and arrangement 
of the individual atomic elements (as with words and sentences). By presence and 
arrangement I mean the following:  
a) Given (say) a meeting between track-ways (x) and (y):  
(b) If any footprint of (x) is overlying any footprint of (y) then we can know 
(x) was travelling behind (y) at that moment in time.  
If (say) the track-ways part and we decide to follow (x) because it might therefore be 
fresher than (y), and yet later we meet (y) again, and this time (y) overlays (x):  
(c) Now we know (x) and (y) were wandering along in the same general 
direction during the same part of the day or night, but at their own speed, 
individually pausing to do various things.  
(d) Since we would already know what (x) had been up to, we might then 
back-track (y) to see what that particular individual had been up to as well. 
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“Having established who was there, the next problem is when and then why. Tracks may 
provide information obtainable in no other way about what actually happened. This 
photograph demonstrates time sequence: the Adder, crawling over an earlier Crow track, was 
in turn succeeded by a Natterjack Toad (top left)”.[ (Ennion and Tinbergen 1967) p. 16] 
 
(3) Hence individual narratives can be embedded within, and as a proper part, of more 
complex narratives. 
(4)  There is no fixed upper ceiling of complexity. 
Hence there is a discrete infinity of track-ways narratives out there in any suitable 
environment to be read, just as there is in the symbolic signs of natural languages, both 
morphophonetic (words) and orthographic (writing). And the information supplied by various 
combinations of them can be useful for HG (hunter-gatherer) foraging and social interactions 
at any point in the future, analogously to human gossip, hunting stories, the daily newspaper, 
and so on.  
The upshot is that even at the most basic level of skill TWR is far more energy-efficient, 
dependable and informational than exploitation of scent trails as a means of foraging or social 
navigation, especially in open and therefore windy lacustrine environments where water-
levels are continually changing. All the paleo-archaeological evidence we have indicates such 
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environments were preferred
12
 by our earliest ancestors (White et al 2009, Plummer 2004 for 
reviews).  
Some environments of course are not conducive to TWR. Examples are rocky riverbeds and 
outcrops in mountainous areas or intertidal sea-side zones, frozen crusted snow in winter, leaf 
litter and hard packed-down game trails in deep, closed forests. This is especially true for 
target species with foot-pads. Hoofed animals however still tend to leave marks if one knows 
what to look for: scrapes on rocks, recently overturned leaves and pebbles with their 
underside still damp, bent grass, and torn moss and so on. 
Track-ways are always useful, no matter how old, for learning about the normal behaviour 
and daily routines of the animals that made them. So reading track-ways narratives 
throughout the day whether hunting or gathering is a „second nature‟ cognitive behaviour for 
all members of an HG band. The track-ways of other humans are the most important track-
ways of all, either for personal socio-psychological reasons, or because strangers might be 
competing for the same resources. Every Kung San child knows their mother‟s footprints 
from all others in the band by as young as the age of four without any directed teaching 
(Thomas 1963).  
There is very good evidence (presented beginning of chapter four) that hominins were 
exploiting conspecific track-ways to some degree 3.6 million years ago and therefore 
probably well before, albeit at a quite simple cognitive level. Given (a) the uniquely narrative 
and information-laden structure of track-ways as a system of natural signs; (b) this very early 
entry into the TWR niche; and (c) TWR‟s necessity for a non-olfactory ape to later become 
such a good exploratory predator;  it is not surprising we evolved into the uniquely narrative-
minded ape. 
In short, tracking cognition is all about narrative mental time-travelling, based on imagining 
being „in the mind-and-body‟ of the author of the track-way being followed. We will gain a 
good understanding of this in chapters two and three, where we will be discussing the way 
TWR narratives are used for extractive foraging. In chapter four we will turn back in 
evolutionary time to our ancestors‟ initial entry into the social TWR niche, for my readers 
will by then have fully understood why social complexity was so heavily amped up when 
they started exploiting their own and each others‟ track-ways for safety and orienteering. In 
                                         
12
 They still were preferred by most prehistoric and modern HGs, but most have been displaced by modern 
civilization into marginal resource-poor areas. 
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the next section I present my reasons for arguing that the evolution of the hominin narrative 
mind was triggered initially by social TWR. 
1.3 Social Cognition: the Hominin Narrative Faculty (HNF). 
The eco-philosopher Paul Shepard (Shepard 1996) has come closer than any other 
philosopher or evolutionary theorist to directly pre-empting my „triggering track-ways 
theory‟: 
“The human mind came into existence tracking, which for us creates a land of named 
places and fosters narration, the tale of adventure. Perhaps the quest began as food 
search. But in scrutinizing the details of the potential prey, competitors, and predators 
upon ourselves, and all the signs they leave, it seems more abstract, like scientific 
curiosity, communicated in art and narrated in myth...The whole sequence of brain 
and mind evolution by attention to animals constitutes a unique twist in the primate 
obsession with the self and society”. (my emphasis, p.78 ) 
My major disagreement is with his extractive-foraging „food search‟ version of the hominin 
TWR story, and is based on the following considerations: 
(1) The crucial importance of social relationship skills to the relative fitness of 
individuals negotiating with the complex social structure of fission-fusion ape 
societies is unquestionable. 
(2) Pre-hominins (including one‟s self, and this fact is crucial to my story) would 
have been leaving recognizable footprints behind everywhere they went in the 
mud and the sand of open wet-land environments. 
(3) Chimps hunt chimp strangers (and colobus monkeys) and forage quite 
successfully without using track-ways in any way. In addition to visual panoramic 
searching they merely listen for calls and foraging noises and sniff at old faeces 
and nests of stranger chimps when hunting, and use their cognitive maps of their 
home territories and well-defined game trails for general foraging purposes. 
(4) Therefore our ancestral entry into the TWR niche probably began in the social 
domain, not in the search for target animals, but for safe passage and orienteering 
through difficult swampy and featureless terrain.  
(5) As the narrative faculty necessary for increased TWR skills co-evolved, social 
TWR became useful for  searching for lost kin-folk, one‟s own way back to the 
safety of the band when returning from foraging expeditions, and finding out what 
everybody else had been up to when they were out of one‟s sight. The first other 
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species‟ footprints to become salient were probably those of local dangerous 
predators (as in my cougar story).  
Humans are self-obsessed, and I argue this hominin self-obsession is at the core of the unique 
hominin narrative faculty for „mind-and-body-hopping‟, time-travelling elsewhere-and-when 
cognition. The opposite side of the coin to self-obsession is a corresponding predilection for 
elsewhere-and-when cognition about other selves: who‟s who in the social structure, where 
are they, what are they up to, how do I find them, what will they want from me when I get 
there, and so on, (let‟s be honest) ad infinitum. So how and why did entering the social TWR 
niche trigger the evolution of such overwhelmingly eusocial cognition in the hominin mind-
set?  
Riding on the back of the above five considerations I present the following scenario: 
 (1) To be obsessed with the self, and to mentally attribute that obsession to other 
creatures, a species must possess an awareness of self and other selves as mentalizing 
intentional beings in the first place. Track-ways are inherently intentional. 
(2) No other ape lineage (or any other species) has ever exploited conspecific track-
ways (forget those of other species for now), that is, used them as recognizable social 
markers. Bipedal hominin track-ways are easily recognizable. One‟s own past track-
ways must of course have been recognizable by one‟s self as well. 
(3) Therefore the uniquely hominin autobiographical awareness of an intentional self 
could have evolved through entering the unique cognitive/behavioural niche of 
exploiting conspecific track-ways as social markers; that is, using TWR for 
communication and navigation in the social domain, much as dogs use their own and 
each other‟s scent-trails and scent-posts: to find their way around in their territories 
and to ascertain each other‟s movements and whereabouts.  
(4)  Social reading of the track-ways of one‟s self and intimate others created a 
society that was far more cognitively complex to live in than any other great-ape 
society because TWR demands a unique narrative form of cognition (as compared to 
the natural signs all other animals including chimps use for social navigation: calling, 
visual searching, and scent-trails). A society is obviously more complex if the agents 
in it are aware of themselves as intentional agents travelling through time. 
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(5) There was selection for this unique form of narrative social cognition because of a 
cognitive arms-race for better TWR skills in the social domain. The narrative faculty 
incrementally became genetically and structurally entrenched in the pre-hominin 
mind/brain. 
(6) The next major impetus in hominin cognitive evolution came from the 
environmentally-forced habitual application of this unique social cognitive faculty to 
tracking other animals in the extractive foraging domain (Shepard‟s insightful story). 
It enabled extremely successful predictive reading of animal behaviours; plus highly 
effective co-operative searching/hunting techniques using TWR plus very simple 
technology (stones, digging sticks as clubs, bare hands). 
 (7) So what was initially mainly a social cognitive faculty became a huge “fuel for 
success”(Godfrey-Smith 1996) when applied in the extractive-foraging domain. 
Selection for rapid encephalization began, in order to provide more developmentally 
plastic neural tissue needed to store knowledge gained from the narrative faculty, and 
the result was the first true hominins by 2 mya. 
(8) Therefore the functioning of all co-evolutionary neural/cognitive and cultural 
developments selected for after the advent of Oldowan Culture still revolved around 
the incremental evolution of social competences conferred by the narrative faculty. 
(9) At the core of the narrative faculty is a cognitive sense of oneself, and therefore 
others, as intentional agents travelling from the past into the future in what is 
essentially a narrative manner. (I repeat: Tulving 1985 coined the term autonoesis for 
this sense of self-knowingness)  
(10) Therefore the core sociological and psychological expression of the modern 
hominin mind/brain is the autonoetic, autobiographical self-narrative, which begins to 
develop between the age of 3 and 4 in all normal humans. Without developing and 
maintaining an up-to-date,  full functioning self-narrative, maturing humans cannot 
possibly cope with the complex cultures they are born into (as proved by the 
pathologies of amnesia and Alzheimer‟s Disease).  
If we accept the above model of our cognitive evolution, no wonder the human primate is so 
“obsessed with self and society”: because our earliest hominin ancestors entered the TWR 
cognitive niche in the social domain.  
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The HNF was and is predominately a faculty for the social cognition that constitutes human 
folk psychology. We are consummate mind-readers, and those readings have a narrative 
structure (just think of gossip). To reiterate: neuroscience has now proved conclusively that 
social narrative mentalizing, in the form of the imagined self interacting with other entities in 
past and future contexts in the “theatre of the mind” is the default state of the human brain 
(Addis, Wong et al. 2007).  
These imagined entities are in the main fellow humans, but as Shepard (Shepard 1996) goes 
on to discuss in depth (in a very Jungian psycho-anthropological manner) they can be totem 
animals, fictional characters, and deities. In this paper I will not discuss these behaviourally 
modern human cultural and psychological attributes. We are mainly interested in the 
evolution of the narrative faculty and the four cornerstone competences that made such 
elsewhere-and-when cognition possible for the mind of Homo sapiens. 
1.4 Summary and Outline of Following Chapters 
The natural signs we call track-ways are vastly different from the signs all other animals use, 
because they are directional, durable, and combinatory. Therefore they can be highly 
decoupled from their referents in space and time, and combinations of them can tell a discrete 
infinity of narratives, like the hominin conventional sign systems we call languages. Only 
hominins have ever cognitively exploited them. That is why I argue that entering the unique 
cognitive/behavioural niche of TWR resulted in the cognitive capacities needed to invent all 
hominin culture and communication. 
My second chapter is all about the demands of TWR cognition when used for extractive 
foraging.  It begins with a brief TWR lesson; then (a) exemplifies how much more 
informational track-ways are than scent trails, and how hunters apply that information; (b) 
provides a calibration for different levels of TWR skill; (c) describes how early habilenes 
may have „thought‟ when beginning to hunt large mammals; and finally (d) discusses early 
forms of communication for transmitting TWR information and hunting plans to younger 
generations. 
In chapter three I argue the earliest Oldowans were hunting large mammals (and were not, at 
first, obligate scavengers) using simple TWR. I then present some highly successful ways of 
exploiting track-ways information for capturing both large and small animals using the 
simple technology early hominins had access to. The last section discusses why no other 
theorists have seen the possible relevance of TWR to our cognitive and cultural evolution. 
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These two chapters therefore concentrate on extractive foraging TWR and its application to 
Oldowan hunting methods. My readers will then understand why the pre-hominin social 
TWR cognitive niche caused more social complexity than in any other ape society.   
In chapter four we turn back in time to our ancestors‟ initial entry into the TWR niche. I 
elaborate on the cognitive arms race triggered by entering the social TWR niche after (a) 
presenting incontrovertible evidence that our forbears were reading conspecific track-ways to 
some degree before 3.6 million years ago; and (b) explaining why only our ancestors entered 
this cognitive niche. Presenting the social and psychological details of this cognitive arms 
race will bring us to just how the hominin narrative faculty (HNF) evolved through social 
track-ways exploitation. I argue universal great-ape capacities for here-and-now exact 
imitation and intentionality-reading made track-ways exploitation possible in the first place.  
In chapter five I illustrate my models of the HNF and the four cornerstone hominin social 
competences and very briefly explain how they work with regard to language in particular. I 
then present developmental evidence that the HNF and these competences begin to come „on 
line‟ between the age of three and four in all normal humans. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of how the cornerstone elsewhere-and-when social competences differ markedly 
from the here-and-now competences of apes and human toddlers under the age of three.   
In my sixth and final chapter I present my story of the enforced application of the HNF to the 
interpretation of other animals‟ track-ways and all other natural signs, as well as planned 
cultural solutions to environmental contingencies. I argue environmental forcing due to 
destruction of wetland resources had a large part to play in the appearance of Oldowan 
Culture after 2.8 mya. Therefore I describe catastrophic environmental events that occurred 
between 2.8 and 1.8 mya in some detail, and explain how iterated destruction of wetland 
resources triggered some hominin populations into habitual tracking and carving of large 
mammals.  
I then discuss certain features of Oldowan and Acheulian Cultures, and present a 
chronological chart of the major developments in our evolutionary trajectory from 4.5 mya to 
100ky. A brief comparison with a similar chart (presented recently by Foley and Gamble 
2010) helps to explain how my narrative differs from most other versions of our evolution: I 
place hunting of large mammals much earlier than many other theorists.  
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So I am an „early rich culture, late language‟ theorist, which is somewhat unorthodox, since 
most other theorists are either „early rich culture, early language‟ or „still-chimpish early 
culture, late language‟ advocates. I will make two broad observations here in initial support 
of my model: (1) the recent discovery of 3.4 mya cut-marked bones (McPherron et al 2010) 
very robustly supports my „early rich culture as compared to apes‟ evolutionary scenario; and 
(2) mimesis is a very simple but highly efficient way of telling simple stories about events 
that happened or may happen in the elsewhere-and-when, demanding no more than the 
„acting-as-if‟ or „make-believe‟ role-taking of children‟s pretend play.  
Like Merlin Donald (Donald 1991) I hold that Oldowan Culture was transmitted by mimetic 
„showing how‟ and „pretending that‟ communication. For an example, let‟s use my cougar 
story. All an Oldowan juvenile hominin returning to his band from a similar close encounter 
with a leopard would have had to do „back at camp‟ was mimic it‟s scary demeanour by 
using his fingers in his mouth for pretend fangs and making a roaring noise, and point up-
river to get his story across to his fellow hominins
13
.  
Before I present my conclusion to the thesis as a whole at the end of chapter six, I briefly 
explore some remarkable similarities between the natural system of signs we call track-ways 
and the conventional systems of symbolic signs we call „natural languages‟. I then touch on 
how these similarities can provide solutions to one or two long-standing problem in the 
evolution of language debate. I also minimally explore some aspects of the massive effect the 
emergence of linguistic communication must have had on the hominin narrative mind, re the 
establishment of what Merlin Donald called mythic culture.  
On that note, before beginning my second chapter by giving my readers a brief lesson in 
track-ways reading, I will end this chapter by stating the perfectly obvious: the natural system 
of narratively arranged track-ways signs has always been out there in the real world „asking‟ 
to be cognitively exploited by some intelligent terrestrial species. The culturally arbitrary, 
invented signs of narratively constructed human languages have not.  
My „triggering track-ways theory‟ is based on the thoroughly common sense notion that we 
could only have gained the narrative cognition underlying accumulated hominin culture and 
                                         
13
 Perhaps a team of adult males would have then collected a barrage of stones and headed up-river to chase the 
big cat out of their territory. After all, chimps have been known to opportunistically mob-attack a female leopard 
in her den and kill her cubs. 
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communication by learning how to read and communicate to others the real stories told by 
track-ways, not the other way around. 
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Chapter 2: The Nature of Track-ways Cognition  
2.0 A Quick Lesson in Track-ways Reading (TWR). 
Below is a good depiction of a simple example of track-ways reading (from Lockley 1999). 
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I have added this photo of the real shelduck tracks in case my readers might think the graphic 
version was unrealistically simple [from (Ennion and Tinbergen 1967), p 23]. 
 
The very first sighting of the combination of shelduck footprints in the sand or mud of a 
beach depicted in the top two-thirds of Lockley‟s illustration would instantly bring to the 
mind of any reasonably skilled human tracker a version of the sort of image depicted in the 
bottom third. This mental representation (image-ination if you like
14
) would consist of a pair 
of shelducks (the largest prints show the male was on the left and the slightly smaller prints 
indicate its female partner on the right) shepherding their young between them across that 
beach to the water.  
Since all narratives have a beginning and an end, and track-ways are immediately directional, 
the next image-ination would probably be the end of this shelduck family‟s journey from land 
to water. The simplest and most likely ending would be a „vision‟ of the family of ducks 
happily feeding out in the marshes somewhere off shore. Then the beginning of the narrative 
would automatically come to mind: a mental picture of their nesting site in the low brush 
                                         
14
 I have introduced image-ination here because I think it is important to realize that the trapping and hunting 
mind (as well as the minds of stone knappers, and all other craftsmen) sees elsewhere-and-when narratives or 
agent/action scenarios and their possible outcomes in mental pictures, as we do when „day-dreaming‟.  
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lining the sand dunes behind the beach somewhere, based on having seen the tracks of the 
ducklings and memories of shelduck nests found in the past. Full-blown TWR involves 
integration of multiple levels of information, from multiple sensory channels. 
With regard to the temporal lineaments of our shelduck „travelers tale‟, if they were made on 
the shore of a sea-side estuary or lagoon, the tracker would know that they had left their nest 
sometime between the time of sighting the track-way and the last high tide. A far more fine-
grained temporal indication, or degree of „freshness‟, could be ascertained by noting how 
much water had seeped into those footprint indentations nearest the water. If little or no water 
has seeped into them from the surrounding very damp substrate they are very fresh indeed. 
 Such a temporal indication would change the tracker‟s imagined narrative. The ducks might 
be hiding in the shore-line swamp reeds just a few feet away because they sensed the tracker 
coming somehow before she saw them. So it could be worth wading out to have a look if the 
tracker is a hungry early hominin hunter-gatherer (or a modern wild-life photographer with 
her camera). In order to find them the tracker would take note of the angle of their last 
footprints relative to the water‟s edge, and wade as quietly as possible in that direction whilst 
crouching down in the reeds of the marsh.  
What might be more likely is that a tracker with any knowledge of shelduck behavior would 
imagine the shelduck family returning to their nest at night-fall. She would then back-track 
their trail to the nest, look for a good spot to hide near-by, and imagine waiting silently in 
ambush a bit before night-fall. Inhibiting one‟s self from heading after the ducks straight 
away in order to mentally simulate a means/end plan of image-inations of one‟s self acting in 
the future, based on memories of one‟s self usually failing to catch or even get close to ducks 
by wading in the water, or even to sight them at all in the reeds in the past, is far more likely 
to have a successful out-come for the hungry hominin or the photographer
15
.  
As far as our narrative predictions of differing out-comes are concerned, the photographer 
will probably be hiding near the nest that very evening because she has imagined getting 
photos or  film-footage of a family of shelducks returning to their nest in the „magic hour‟ of 
evening light in the wild marshes. An inner image-ination of extremely cute ducklings would 
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 Especially in N.E. African waters: likely enough a crocodile or two will be lurking in the reeds. Recent 
evidence however indicates crocodiles were regularly being eaten by hominins at 2mya. Crocodiles tend to be 
inactive during the hottest parts of the day, and dislike alluvial highland watersheds, but they would still have 
been a continual worry for very early hominins.  
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be the guiding motif of her various mental representations re her inner narrative of possibly 
selling said photo to some wildlife magazine at some point in the future.  
The hominin tracker will probably not be waiting by the nest that evening. Being a mature 
HG female trying to feed her children (say), she has a different narrative in mind: returning to 
that same spot in the future with some fellow band-members to capture the young ducks 
when they are much bigger and fatter but still young enough to be tender. She imagines 
arriving back with her mates a few weeks in the future when the young ducks are „flappers‟ 
(practicing but still cannot fly) so they will be easy to capture. On the basis of that kind of 
mental simulation, she may well plant a tall stick in the ground near the nest to make it easier 
to find when she returns, for from her past experience she knows one bit of the beach by the 
lagoon looks very much like all the other bits.  The stick is a marker that will reduce the load 
on her cognitive memory when she returns in the future
16
. 
These larger, recursive narrative simulations or pictorial „thought experiments‟ could have 
been triggered in the minds of our two imagined trackers by the smaller narrative of the 
duck‟s journey from nest to water, which has been triggered in turn by the mere sighting of 
the trail of prints left in the sand or mud of a beach by the feet of a family of shelducks.  
The mental representations in our minds at present have been triggered by my image-inative 
narrative analysis of the illustration at the beginning of this section, expressed by the letters I 
have just typed out. These conventional signs are arbitrary symbols that are put together 
according to a co-operatively agreed-upon system of recursive rules (syntax or grammar) 
needed in order to transmit an image-inative story from one narrative hominin mind to 
another using orthographic representations of linguistic communication.  
But if we ask ourselves what we are doing when translating these letters into the narrative I 
have just presented, I think it is fair to say that we are taking turns imagining our selves being 
in the minds-and-bodies of the ancient hominin, the ducks, and the modern wildlife 
photographer, at some beach beside a marsh or lagoon we once visited in our personal pasts.  
That is how the hominin narrative faculty works, that is how the human mind mostly works, 
and it starts to work like that between the ages of three and four (in all normal humans) when 
we begin to pretend-play with peers. 
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 I think this kind of depictive trail-marking might have begun quite early in hominin evolution. It was an 
important forerunner to invention of all arbitrary or conventional signs, including the printed words we are using 
here. 
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The crux of my thesis is that the kind of cognition needed for reading the narratives told by 
track-ways is fundamentally a precursor to the cognition needed to understand the words or 
„thought-prints‟ on this page. I argue only the hominin mind possesses this kind of narratively 
constructed cognition because only our lineage has ever learned to read the narratives told by 
track-ways. In the next section we shall begin to discover why scent-trails, the signs that all 
other terrestrial species use for finding preferred resources when foraging, could never have 
triggered the evolution of narrative cognition. In the process of this discovery my readers will 
learn much more about how TWR information is exploited when hunting and gathering. 
2.1 Scent-Trailing and TWR: The Cognitive Information Gap 
I will continue to use our shelduck family track-ways narrative, but look at it from the point 
of view of a scent-trailing dog. We will discover that the amount of information scent-trailing 
makes available to a dog is extremely limited compared to the amount available to a tracking 
hominin. There are two physical pathways for scent to be transmitted to the olfactory organs 
of scenting animals: scent trails deposited on the ground or vegetation above it by bodily 
contact, and air-borne scents. The hunter‟s own air-borne scent places a very important 
constraint on tracking and hunting techniques. All applications of TWR information gained 
by a hunting hominin tracker have to be geared to the fact that all other mammals are much 
better at smelling us than we are at smelling them. 
Let‟s return to the point in our tracking story when the tracker has realized the ducks are 
probably hiding in the reeds very close to the shore-line because very little water has seeped 
into the ducks‟ footprints nearest the water‟s edge. If the ducks are very close a dog that had 
followed their scent-trail to the water‟s edge might have the advantage here if there was an 
onshore breeze. Then the ducks‟ air-borne scent could pinpoint their position. But only if the 
breeze was gentle: air-borne scents become highly non-directional in shifting and blustery 
wind conditions. If the breeze is off-shore a dog would have no idea at all where the ducks 
were hiding. The tracking hominin would have two advantages over the dog in that case: a 
greater visual range because of her bipedal posture, and a directional advantage because of 
the angle of the last tracks seen relative to the water‟s edge.  
If they had waded through some very wide and shallow puddles of water on the way, their 
scent trail could have already been completely lost by a scenting dog, especially since water 
would have washed the scent off their feet. For a human tracker the adults‟ tracks may have 
still left indentations on the bottom of shallow puddles and would continue to be readable on 
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the other side. So we can begin to see immediately in this very simple example how TWR has 
some advantages over scent-trailing for finding the whereabouts of unseen target animals. 
The amount of information potentially available to the scent-trailing dog when compared to 
the amount available to a track-reading hominin would be highly limited by the physical 
characteristics of scent: 
1) As I pointed out in section 1.2 scent-trails are not combinatorial because any 
stronger scent overlying, or in close juxtaposition to, a weaker scent makes that 
weaker scent imperceptible. Track-ways do not have this limitation: several track-
ways of different animals can over-lie one another and still be discernible. So the 
dog‟s brain would probably only register „duck!‟ or possibly „two ducks!‟ because 
the young would smell like their parents anyway. The dog could not know there 
were young ducks with the adults that would be very easy to capture because they 
could not fly yet. The tracking hominin would have been immediately aware of 
this possibility, but could also know the young ducks are not worth capturing: the 
size of their tracks shows they are too young to provide a satisfying meal. 
2) The dog might turn and follow the scent-trail backwards for a short distance from 
where it had disappeared at the water‟s edge but as soon as the scent got 
noticeably weaker it would desist. It would then run up and down the water‟s edge 
looking for fresher and therefore stronger scent trails before either giving up and 
moving on or rushing out into the reeds at top speed. It would do the latter if the 
scent were very fresh and strong; in its associative excitement the dog would be 
unable to restrain itself. 
3)  It could well have started following the trail the wrong way in the first place, only 
switching to the right direction when the scent got weaker towards the dunes. 
Unlike track-ways scent trails are not immediately directional. Therefore 
associative here-and-now scent-trailing in general always tends to consume more 
energy than TWR. The upshot is only the hominin tracker possesses the decoupled 
narrative cognitive capacity needed to instigate back-tracking to the nest (and she 
probably would do this as a matter of course).
17
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 Since a duck‟s feet are wet when returning to the nest at night-fall they leave no scent for nocturnal 
beach-ranging carnivores to follow to the nest. So their nests are hard to find for any nocturnal predator 
but easily found by a diurnal tracking hominin no matter what time of day it is. I am imagining early 
hominins with incipient TWR skills foraging for highly nutritious, easily obtainable eggs here.  
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4) If it was raining and/or a storm wind was blowing the hominin tracker would still 
be able to see the prints and hence have a chance of finding the ducks or the nest. 
For the dog there would be no duck-scent to register at all. Scent trails are quickly 
obliterated by such conditions, especially in such open environments. Even 
morning dew in the stillness of dawn is enough to make nocturnally laid-down 
scent trails in open areas imperceptible. In severe conditions of course, track-ways 
are also soon obliterated, but in a way the tracker gains another advantage: any 
track-ways still able to be discerned are sure to be „dead fresh‟ and therefore well 
worth following.  
So scent-trails are very ephemeral and short-lived compared to track-ways. This is why dogs 
so obsessively urinate on certain telephone poles. They are scent-posts for marking out home 
territory and for communication with other dogs: they are social markers.  
To sum this material up, if a scent trail can be perceived, it is always fresh and worth 
following. There is no incentive for temporal cognition. Track-ways are much more durable, 
therefore a tracker can be faced with many different track-ways of the same animal, and the 
choosing of which one is worth following always requires ascertaining when they were made. 
Thinking about time is the base-line cognitive demand of TWR, which takes the tracking 
mind away from here-and-now cognition. 
Most carnivores do not bother to hunt in the rain or very windy conditions because a) scent-
trails are quickly wiped out by water and wind; b) air-borne scents are dispersed by rain and 
highly non-directional in strong blustery winds. Tracking hominins have even more of an 
advantage when hunting in such conditions because 1) their own scent is harder for all other 
scenting animals to perceive, and 2) such conditions make it a lot easier to tell the difference 
between older and newer footprints. I have sometimes stumbled on to target animals by 
chance in such conditions simply because they could not smell me due to wind and rain or 
hear me over the noise of the storm. 
One advantage scent-trails do have over track-ways is they can be sensed at night, so the 
earliest hominin trackers had to have been diurnal foragers in the first place. But hunters with 
torches can be extremely successful hunting with dogs at night. In general the combination of 
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scenting dogs and human trackers is unbeatable when foraging for certain species, but such 
symbiotic behavior is a behaviourally modern sapiens phenomenon.  
Air-borne scents put constraints on both scent-trailing and track-reading (if one is engaged in 
hunting the author of the tracks at the time). Scenting or tracking downwind is not a good 
option for predators of course unless they can move a lot faster than their target animal, for 
their own air-borne scent will precede them. Dogs can move much faster over short distances 
than humans. This is why human hunters and dogs are such a successful combination when 
hunting species that tend to bail up and face the dogs. Wind direction does not matter, and the 
slower human can hone in on the barking of the dogs, run to the scene and dispatch the target 
animal. However, hunting with dogs on relatively windless days is far more likely to have a 
successful outcome because wind disperses scent very quickly. 
So following ground-scent or track-ways up-wind is the best option; scenting animals further 
up the trail cannot detect predators until they can see or hear them. However, up-wind air-
borne scents are only useful if their perpetrator is very close by, due to the vagaries of air-
currents, and only recently laid down scent-trails, even in fairly calm conditions, can be 
useful to scenting animals. Track-ways can easily last for days and weeks (and millions of 
years if they become fossilized). Old track-ways very often lead to fresher prints; if a dog 
does not find a scent trail it has no option but to travel „blind‟ until it finds one. This is 
another reason why dogs and humans make good hunting teams, for the tracking human can 
lead dogs to scent trails fresh enough for them to be able to follow. 
Many animals have far better hearing than humans
18
; this offsets some of the disadvantages 
of scent perception (consider rabbits, for example). Hence a hominin tracker must learn to 
move more and more silently as footprints get fresher
19
, as well as be aware of any sudden 
changes in wind direction. Calibrations of how far the animal is ahead are based on degree of 
water-seepage in damp ground, relative warmth of feces, sharpness of out-line if in sand or 
snow, how bent-over grass still is, and so on. A „gestalt‟ of tell-tale clues as to freshness 
builds up over years of experience, until deciding which track-ways to follow is automatized. 
These fine-grained physical cues are hard to describe in words, for type of substrate and 
climatic conditions on the day need to be taken into account as well.  
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 Hunters in deep closed jungles often use audile perception as much as tracking; our hearing is very directional 
and phonologically acute, and therefore a very effective adjunct to our excellent vision.  Mimicry of a species 
calls is often used to attract prey into close proximity. This could be important re language capability. 
19
 Dogs are a nuisance when hunting many species then, because they do not stalk silently or wait in ambush 
like many feline species; they depend on team-work and speed to capture prey. 
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If the spaces between fresh footprints suddenly get much larger a tracker can know the 
animal has probably detected him and is now running away at top speed. In this case the 
target animal may not be worth pursuing any further. A dog following a scent-trail cannot 
detect this kind of information, but then a dog can travel faster than a human, so may still 
have a chance of catching its prey. Many prey species tend to circle when pursued for they do 
not like entering unknown territory. Hence dogs can be useful for chasing animals back 
towards the waiting hunter, but this is a very modern hit-and-miss hunting method, for the 
target animal will be travelling at speed and only rifles or powerful bows can bring them 
down (and only if the hunter‟s aim is very accurate). 
If a track-way begins to steadily turn down-wind, a hominin hunter can leave it and back-
track down-wind parallel to where he narratively imagines the animal that made the track-
way is heading, then cut across to that imagined route hoping to come onto the animal 
directly across-wind. If he does not come upon the animal immediately and sees none of its 
tracks, he can know he is still downwind of the approaching animal, and simply wait in the 
best place for an ambush. This is only worth doing if the track-way indicated their author or 
agent was still cruising along or in a stop-start relaxed foraging mode.  
The elsewhere-and-when narrative imagination needed for hunting applications based on 
TWR information entails taking Daniel Dennett‟s intentional stance. It is very predictively 
and practically useful to think of the target creature as an intentional agent. A dog of course 
cannot do this for it has no narrative faculty: leaving the scent trail can only instigate a loss of 
associative here-and-now cognitive awareness of the target animal‟s very existence.  
Much of the human/dog difference is not about the difference between TWR and scent-
trailing; skilful TWR depends on our capacity to integrate path-way perception with other 
information about the animal, using narrative social mind-reading cognition.
20
 Dogs differ 
from humans in two ways. Their pathway perception is informationally impoverished 
compared to humans, and they cannot integrate pathway information with other information. 
Obviously a good knowledge of the surrounding territory and the normal behavioural routines 
of target species are of great help with such hominin hunting methods. Therefore reading the 
track-ways of all preferred target animals for some time whenever one comes upon them, not 
just when hunting them, is a very useful practice. For the narratives told by those track-ways 
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 This is the basic reason I argue TWR began in the social/navigation domain, not the hunting domain: the 
narrative faculty is necessary for intentional or goal-directed tracking. 
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can teach one about their author‟s habitual routes of travel, what they have been foraging on 
lately and where.  
All this information can be gained without ever seeing target animals until the moment of 
capture in the distant future. So if TWR has become important in a hominin‟s foraging 
behavior, this will select for other cognitive capacities: mental maps of territory in all 
weathers and time of day based on narrative memory of previous hunting episodes; enlarged 
semantic memory for natural history information; conditional means/end reasoning, and so 
on. 
The track-ways of all larger animals become recognizable quite quickly for good trackers, for 
individuals of the same species have slightly different gaits as well as idiosyncratically 
asymmetrical sized and shaped feet. A kind of informational „gestalt‟ of size and shape of 
track-ways plus other traces such as droppings, angles of damp patches of urination relative 
to hind-foot prints can often delineate age and gender. Just the way the animal walks, 
revealed by spatial analysis of its track-way, can tell you whether it is in good condition, sick 
and old, or wounded and near exhaustion (amount of blood seen, evidence of staggering). 
Signs of foraging such as species and height of browsed flora can reveal slightly different 
food preferences, and so on. One can get to know preferred individual target animals‟ 
behavioural idiosyncrasies by following their track-ways whenever one comes across them, 
not just by direct observation, and observing secretive animals is very difficult
21
. This kind of 
decoupled or else-where-and-when knowledge is not possible to gain without having the 
cognitive narrative faculty to read the stories that individual track-ways reveal about a 
specific animal‟s character and life-style. Such knowledge would also have made it easy to 
dodge areas known to be frequented by dangerous predators at certain times of the day or 
year (remember my cougar story: I avoided that spruce grove for the rest of the winter). 
When I was young I once got to know a young mule deer very well indeed by continually 
reading his track-ways. His territory was also my territory because it was my favourite 
grouse-hunting and rabbit-snaring area. There was also a huge wild blueberry patch in the 
centre of it, so I went there almost daily in berry season.  Consequently I knew where he 
could be found at any time of the day, and where he slept at night. Whenever I went fishing I 
kept an eye out for all tracks of mink in the mud and sand of river beaches. I learned their 
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 Hence conservation rangers in cold climates use winter track-ways of many species to estimate population 
levels. It is a lot easier than trying to observe them.  
39 
 
whereabouts and daily routines through TWR, even though I never got more than a brief 
glimpse of a single specimen. Therefore I knew where to set my traps for them when winter 
came and their skins were worth taking.  
I have recounted this material because it is by continually reading track-ways that juvenile 
HGs become very good „folk-biologists‟ and hone their TWR skills. It takes many years of 
such dedicated learning to become a really successful hunter. Consequently only a few of the 
males in a band may end up supplying the bulk of the meat to that band (Silberbauer 1981; 
Kaplan, Hill et al. 1984; Kaplan and Hill 1985). We will revisit this important consideration 
at the end of the next section. 
Notice that we have come a long way from our shelduck footprints here. Not just footprints, 
but a large raft of physically visible traces of travel, are salient to full-blown TWR. TWR can 
expand incrementally, over ontogeny and phylogeny, from highly visible and distinctive 
footprints to traces that are either less physically obvious, or more heavily dependent on 
background information, or both. In the next section we will discuss calibrations of TWR 
skills. This will help us to estimate the levels of cognitive capacity for TWR possessed by 
hominins at different stages in their evolution. 
2.2 The Calibration of TWR Cognition: Simple, Systematic, Speculative.  
Liebenberg (1990) described three levels of TWR skill, beginning with very simple, even 
though he speculated that even simple TWR could not have occurred until quite recently in 
our evolutionary past
22
: 
1) Simple TWR: the more opportunistic exploitation of track-ways left behind 
by terrestrial preferred target species (such as other pre-hominins) in easily 
read substrates such as damp sand, mud, dust, and snow (plus volcanic ash, as 
we shall discover). A good example would be the track-ways of the shelducks 
illustrated at the beginning of this chapter.  
However, even at this basal level of TWR skill, the amount of information potentially 
available with any increase in cognitive capacity is very open-ended, as my treatment of the 
shelduck family‟s track-way revealed.  
                                         
22
 I believe he has recently adjusted this chronological view towards mine (Lieberberg 2008). 
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At the beginning of chapter four I present extremely robust evidence that the very simplest 
level of TWR cognitive demand began to be manifested when pre-hominins began routinely 
stepping in each other‟s foot-prints (and their own old footprints) for the sake of safety when 
negotiating dangerous ground, such as swampy environments full of pockets of deep mud and 
quick-sand. We modern humans still do this without thinking about it when negotiating 
wilderness trails; we take note of where the last person on the trail has placed his feet. If we 
can see that they slipped or got one boot bogged in the mud we try stepping somewhere else, 
if not we usually imitate them by stepping in their old prints, or very near them.  
Dangerous local predator‟s footprints may have been the first prints of other animals to 
become salient, given that Ardipithecus ramidus brains were still ape-sized. I posit the desire 
to know what other conspecifics were up to and where they were (especially one‟s mother 
when young or vice versa) would have been more of an „every day in every way‟ motivation 
for pre-hominins to begin reading track-ways than hunting other animals, since chimps 
capture prey adequately without using TWR (or scent trailing).  
 
However, this idea does not negate the use of simple TWR to follow conspecifics‟ old track-
ways (and one‟s own) in order to re-find foraging niches in very changeable and featureless 
wet-lands, or safely find one‟s way back to one‟s band when lost. Using one‟s own old tracks 
for safety and orienteering would obviously have been an everyday occurrence. As we shall 
see in chapter four, this is a very important idea.  
 
We also need to remember that social and ecological domains have an intimate relationship re 
competition with other pre-hominin groups and individuals for resources: seeing another 
conspecific‟s track-way when foraging means someone else might have already acquired the 
targeted resource. Seeing your own old track-way means you‟ve already been there, so 
maybe you should go somewhere new (unless it was a good foraging spot of course). My 
main point here is that simple TWR could have been quite adequate for the above purposes 
for the first million or so years of hominin evolution. 
 
2)Systematic TWR: dedicated, goal-directed following of a specific track-way 
through all terrains by also noting bent-over ground-covering foliage, dislodged 
pebbles and leaf-litter, blood spots if its author was wounded, and so on till one 
finds the target animal wherever it may be. So there may have been two roughly 
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different stages in TWR skill development: (a) using much more subtle, less 
obvious clues; and (b) using track-ways information as a core part of planned, 
long-term behavior (rather than opportunistically, „on the fly‟).  
I think social TWR may have stayed at stage (a) for a relatively long time before stage (b) 
emerged, because the second stage is not possible without the narrative faculty. The change 
to (b) would probably have had its first expression in the situation of mothers and allomothers 
tracking lost or misplaced offspring. This is an example of intentional or planned rather than 
simple opportunistic TWR.  
Systematic tracking demands more ability to imagine an agent (the target animal) traveling 
through the environment, because some terrains (rocky riverbeds and outcrops for example) 
are not easy to find footprints in. One has to begin to imagine where the animal might have 
been heading when easily-read tracks disappear. This requires a good memory for normal 
animal behaviours and a theory of mind capacity which can imagine what mental state the 
animal is in- whether it is frightened and therefore heading for its den or a thicket to hide in, 
whether it is relaxed and therefore ambling about just foraging, and so on. The systematic 
tracker is integrating natural history and local geography via Dennett‟s intentional stance.  
The better one is at this kind of narrative imagination, the quicker one is going to find the 
track-way again (and the target animal). This kind of tracking is especially important when 
looking for a wounded animal, which may have happened often given the simple killing tools 
of early hominins. After all, one wants to find the weakening or perhaps already dead animal 
before some other predator or scavenger with a good sense of smell can find it (all carnivores 
are very strongly attracted to the smell of blood).  
A good narrative autobiographical memory for past experiences when hunting becomes vital. 
For example, remembering which species tended to go down-hill into gullies when one 
pursued a wounded member of that species, as apart from those which tended to „head for the 
hills‟ to hole up in some rocky out-crop somewhere. No acquisition of systematic tracking 
skill is possible therefore without possessing the hominin narrative faculty (HNF) to some 
degree. I argue this level of tracking skill was beginning to be attained by early erectus 
hominins, who had brains twice the size of chimps. 
3)Speculative TWR: following a track-way simply and/or systematically for a while 
and then heading directly to where one imagines the target animal might be, right now 
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or by the time one gets there, given one‟s knowledge of its routine behaviours and the 
surrounding terrain.  
This style of tracking above all depends on narrative imagination plus semantic knowledge of 
the local terrain and animal behavior. The target is now an imagined self, not just an agent 
with various remembered habits. Selection for anthropomorphizing is occurring but the HNF 
must already be quite well entrenched. Do not forget that I posit this cognitive level of TWR 
had to have been at least partly reached in the social domain before it could be applied to 
hunting individual large animals, thus engendering positive feedback selection for a better 
narrative faculty. For in the social domain seeing other hominins as intentional agents is not 
anthropomorphizing. I argue selection for social TWR skills selected for the intentional 
stance, which was then exapted to improve foraging skills, in combination with TWR. 
Speculative tracking is a particularly good way to hunt when the wind is not in your favour: 
that is, when using systematical TWR will take you up-wind of the animal so it can smell you 
approaching long before you ever get close enough to capture it. A successful outcome is far 
more likely if you leave the track-way, circle back and sneak up on where you imagine it is 
going to be from down-wind. Even if the wind is in your favour, going directly to the place 
you imagine it might be, rather than systematically keeping to its track-way, can save a lot of 
time and energy. This depends of course on how often you are right, so !Kung San pairs of 
hunters are often made up of a systematic tracker and a speculative tracker: ongoing 
theoretical discussions of possible meanings of track-ways evidence are the norm 
(Liebenberg 1990).  
Speculative tracking obviously demands maximum application of the narrative imagination 
enabled by the HNF. It requires imagining being in-the-mind-and-body of an unseen agent 
(the target animal) moving to an unseen place to perform a routine behavior in that place. It 
also requires imagining one‟s future-self approaching this unseen (but narratively 
remembered) place from a certain direction so one can approach the animal up-wind. Any 
increase in TWR skills and means/ends anticipatory cognition for application of the 
information gained from TWR will create positive feed-back on other cognitive capacities, 
and vice versa. So from the inception of Oldowan Culture onwards we are seeing selection 
for fast-track co-evolutionary expansion of TWR/HNF capacity.  
One may also be imagining the best concealed approach to use, the approach one knows is 
there because one‟s past-self has been in that place before, probably going through roughly 
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similar actions. The whole mental process is highly speculative; the animal might suddenly 
change direction and go somewhere else, or even be attacked by a predator on the way to the 
imagined rendezvous. Such is the nature of hominin narrative cognition: we are all heuristic 
gamblers when it comes down to „how much effort is it going to take, will it still be there 
when I get there, and will I get to exploit it or not‟. Even though we won‟t find out till we get 
there, we still go through all the narrative/imaginative processing of evidence from past 
experiences of the particular situation.  
In general, modern HGs use a combination of systematic/speculative tracking, leaning to one 
or other according to circumstances, their personal inclinations and level of intelligence. In 
fact Liebenberg (1990) equates modern HG levels of TWR cognitive capacities with those 
required for „scientific inductive hypothesizing‟. The possible richness of TWR cognition, 
folk biology, and stalking skills needed for increasingly successful hunting means: 
1) Hunting skills take a long time to learn and are a limiting factor in individual and 
group fitness for large-brained hominins (brain uses 25% of energy) 
2) Plastically neural developmental stages of extended childhood and juvenility 
would be selected for to learn these crucial skills
23
. 
3) Therefore the time and intelligence needed to learn full-blown TWR information-
gathering and its hunting applications should lead to this prediction: the hunting 
prowess of only a portion of the mature hunters in each band should provide the 
bulk of the protein, which is the high-quality nutrition needed for all band-
members to be healthy, fully functional individuals. 
4) The best hunters should have more wives and children, have more status, be better 
social leaders
24
, and so on. 
All ethnographic evidence from extant HG bands shows that points (1), (3) and (4) are the 
norm (Kaplan and Hill 1985). Kim Hill, Hillard Kaplan, Michael Gurven and associated 
theorists have published a lot of material on the co-evolution of extended human childhood, 
male provisioning, and the highly skilled nature of foraging activities. Their views 
complement mine nicely (Lee, DeVore et al. 1969; Kaplan and Hill 1985; Hill, Kaplan et al. 
1987; Lancaster, Kaplan et al. 2000; Gurven, Hill et al. 2002; Kaplan, Gurven et al. 2010).  
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 Here is where I think post-menopausal grandmothers came into our evolutionary story: not for gathering 
tubers, but for the extra alloparenting needed to counteract the long-term dependency of hominin children. 
24
 I mean when it comes to male politics and alliances, here. If not completely egalitarian, many historical HG 
tribes were very matriarchal, especially if some horticulture was practiced (for example the Iroquois). 
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William Laughlin (in Lee and De Vore 1969) long ago argued (under the auspices of big-
game hunting theory) that selection for encephalization and neural restructuring needed for 
hunting skills was the driving force behind human evolution. I partly agree, but we need to 
temper his „big-game hunting theory‟ by (1) arguing for a pre-Oldowan high-quality staple 
diet of wetland flora and fauna and small terrestrial mammals, and (2) positing a much earlier 
entry into the socio-ecological TWR niche as the selective trigger for the neural restructuring 
and encephalization that later made Oldowan hunting and carving of large mammals possible. 
 
I should add here that TWR is not just useful for hunting: it is also important for predator 
avoidance, finding water, easy routes through rough terrain, and gathering (finding tubers by 
following pig tracks for example). Kung San women are consummate trackers, often better at 
tracking than many of the men, and some of them join their husbands in the hunt for that 
reason (Bisiele and Barclay 2001). All TWR information (and information gleaned from 
narratively reading all other natural signs) gathered during the day by women gathering, 
juveniles and old men snaring and trapping, as well as mature male hunters, is communicated 
to the whole band around the fire in the evening. This information is then used to make plans 
for the next day‟s gathering and hunting (Silberbauer 1981, Liebenberg 1990).  
 
2.3 Mental Applications of TWR Information: How Early Hominin Hunters 
‘Thought’. 
What I want to explain now is how habilis/erectus (and earlier hominins navigating through, 
and to and from, the social domain) may have „thought‟. Since I was a professional hunter 
and trapper for many years, I will attempt to do so by speaking for myself when it comes to 
what happens in the mind when trapping. I have chosen trapping because the thought 
required is the ultimate example of narrative mental simulation of possible future outcomes. 
When setting a trap for a certain species I am mentally „seeing‟ (or image-ining) just where a 
member of that species is going to be placing its feet or its head in the future, relative to the 
physical parameters or context of the space in which I am setting the trap and placing the bait 
(if used) to lure the animal into it. The reason I am setting the trap „just there‟ is not just 
because all the track-ways and other physical traces normally left by the daily physical 
passage of the targeted animal are there.  
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The other reason is because the surrounds will physically constrain the animal to place its feet 
or its head exactly where I set the trap. If the surrounds are not „just right‟, I artfully place a 
few twigs in the right place to coax the target animal to physically move in the way I want it 
to. I have to mentally picture the target animal approaching the whole trap site in the future, 
essentially by imagining myself to be in the body and mind of the target animal. The as-if 
role taking is especially pertinent when setting baits and lures above or close to the trap; one 
tries to use a bait that the target animal could hardly refuse, but present it in as natural a way 
as possible so that animal will not become suspicious of the whole scene and head elsewhere.  
The possibilities raised by application of early hominin narrative social skills to the 
exigencies of extracting foraging techniques is amply illustrated by the art and science of 
trapping. It gets quite complicated when one is setting a trap on or near a game trail that all 
animals use. A conscientious trapper will then try to set the trap and present the lure in such a 
way that it will catch only the species targeted. If one wants the animal‟s hide and fur, one 
tries to make sure there are no snags or sharp projections anywhere within reach of its 
struggles to get out of the trap. It is all about visualizing physical outcomes in the „mind‟s 
eye‟. But then, so is building a house, or doing anything practical.  
If one is a very good trapper, and is after highly intelligent and cautious scent-trailing animals 
such as coyotes, lynx and wolves, one will walk in water as much as possible, wear old 
gloves that have been left out in the open for months, etc. In general the modus operandi of 
trapping is to try and leave the whole scene looking as natural as possible, with as little 
human scent left behind as one can manage. To sum up: when setting traps or snares 
everything is done according to the perceptions and possible mental state of the animal I am 
imagining I am being while I am setting the trap.  
Then another important problem presents itself when one is setting out a „line‟ of perhaps 
fifty traps or snares. How does one find all of them the next day, when they have been 
purposefully set so as to be as unobtrusive as possible in the environment? One can use one‟s 
own footprints from yesterday, but the trap sites are not easy to see. Environments look very 
different in different weathers and light conditions. And what if it snows or rains very heavily 
over night? Your footprints from yesterday will have disappeared. 
The best thing to do is leave some sort of easily recognizable markers on the path one has 
followed, and one near each trap-site, of course, to take the load off cognitive memory. But it 
still has to be as unobtrusive as possible from the target animal‟s point of view. And finally, 
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if one is setting traps where other unscrupulous human competitors may be travelling, then 
one tries to invent markers that are only „readable‟ by one‟s self and one‟s closest allies (in 
case something happens to you in the interim between setting and checking the traps). 
I have presented here the whole gamut of narratively imagining being in „the minds-and-
bodies‟ of target animals, unwanted animals, your future searching self, future searching 
friends, and unscrupulous searching competitors or enemies. In the process one is inventing 
conventional signs that are constructed so as to only have meaning for one‟s self and one‟s 
intimate others. In this description of the cognition possibly required for trapping and snaring 
techniques, I believe we have encapsulated the whole story of the evolution of hominin 
cognition, culture and communication. It is all based on using the narrative faculty for as-if 
role playing and the reading of all natural signs, and inventing symbolic deictic (pointing out) 
communicative signs. This example also exemplifies a seamless gradient between the 
ecological and social cognitive domains.   
My readers may protest that this trapping cognition is so sophisticated that only behaviourally 
modern humans could engage in it. They are probably right: it is a very fancy application of 
the intentional stance, and even a snare (a running noose) is quite technologically 
sophisticated
25
. However, consider a pit dug on a game trail: probably the first kind of animal 
trap ever invented because it is technologically the simplest. One would still want to leave a 
sign pointing it out for a foraging band member (perhaps returning to home base with a heavy 
load) so they would not step into it, even though it will be covered over in some way that 
looks as natural as possible so that target animals will step into it. 
Now we will go back to an even simpler, intermediate stage of hunting/trapping cognition. 
Swampy wetlands are full of natural animal traps: muddy holes that are deep enough for a 
large animal to get trapped in, especially after a bit of rain. It is quite possible that a band of 
Oldowan hominins with brains already twice the size of chimp brains would have a network 
of such sites within their home territory that they checked out on a regular basis, on the 
chance that some large ungulate had become mired. Open wetlands are very changeable 
environments due to the effects of rain on water-levels, and very featureless. Leaving marker 
poles stuck in the ground near these natural traps would take the load off cognitive memory. 
                                         
25
 There is good evidence of snaring and trapping in the early MSA in South Africa: Wadley, L. (2010). "Were 
snares and traps used in the Middle Stone Age and does it matter? A review and a case study from Sibudu, 
South Africa." Journal of Human Evolution 58(2): 179-192. 
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“They alter the environment to make tasks easier, taking the load off memory by 
marking a trail and by storing reusable items in the same place. Initially difficult skills 
become more routine, for one form of Tomasello‟s Ratchet is task simplification. 
Hominids make aspects of the physical or social world more salient by marking them 
physically, linguistically, or behaviourally.” 
       [(Sterelny 2003) p.157] 
What I am arguing for here is similar albeit simpler mental simulation capacities for 
habilis/erectus. Narrative imagination based on as-if role playing would have enabled these 
hominins to pick a good site for miring large animals and then form a team for singling 
suitable animals out of passing herds and driving them into it. Or hiding beside a game trail 
until an animal was in just the right position to be pelted with stones and thus re-directed into 
a nearby mud-trap. Or setting bait out in shallow water at a good ambushing spot for 
crocodiles and smaller wetland fauna
26
.  
Though the cognitive process is not as anticipatory as trapping and snaring techniques, and 
the technology is extremely basic, the principle of imagining being target animals, other 
hominins, or one‟s future self is the same. The kind of cognition I speculate Oldowans 
probably had was in the same ballpark as the vivid, action-packed day-dreams children begin 
to have when older than the age of four. If one accepts a bit of „ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny‟ here, this idea would seem plausible.  
The upshot of what I am getting at here is that Oldowans were already a lot smarter than 
chimps. The idea of Oldowan Culture suddenly emerging from a chimp-like mind-set 
because of environmental contingencies does not make sense for a very obvious reason: why 
didn‟t other ape lineages respond to those contingencies with something like Oldowan 
Culture? As Merlin Donald (in Corballis and Lea 1991) points out, such theorizing „puts the 
cultural cart before the cognitive horse‟.  
Narrative reading of all natural and conventional signs is the bottom-line cognitive skill to the 
HG life-way, and its application to social navigation and foraging requires reality-based 
narrative mimetic/depictive mental simulations of where, when and what other agents were, 
are, or will be doing in the else-where-and-when—which includes right now when you 
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 I shall return to this idea in chapter three.  It can explain some very puzzling features of many Oldowan and 
Acheulian stone and bone sites. 
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cannot see or hear them. Perhaps I should delineate here between TWR itself and the 
narrative faculty needed to use track-way information efficiently.  
Much of hunting mental simulation is not TWR, it is using TWR, but spatial analysis of 
track-ways itself requires mental simulation of the target animal‟s physical and mental 
characteristics, as if they were mentally goal-oriented or intentional like us. The elements of 
TWR and HNF cognition work very much in socio-ecological tandem, and so the neural 
capacity for using both would have continued to co-evolve through selection for using mind-
reading skills when tracking and when socializing.  
Mental simulation/attribution or theory of mind
27
 has typically been assumed to be a social 
skill, used in social interaction with other humans. My point here is that it is also, and 
perhaps uniquely, a hominin foraging skill.  San hunters could predict the characters of their 
target animals when observing a herd of animals: whether they would be easy to stalk (how 
cautious or stupid), and how dangerous they would be
28
at the kill (Silberbauer 1981). All this 
was read as well as their sex, age, condition, and so on. They would thereby choose which 
individual to hunt. Silberbauer stated they were never wrong.  
They could also do this to some extent by analyzing track-ways that recorded interactions 
between already targeted animals and their cohorts, in the logical manner referred to in my 
introductory section on TWR cognition. This anthropomorphic reading of animal psychology 
resonates with, and I would argue is derived from, classic folk psychology in the social 
domain, engendered by the HNF. This strongly indicates the HNF in turn was initially 
selected for in the social domain, ever since the original pre-hominins entered the unique 
TWR cognitive niche for the purposes of navigation. 
And last but not least, such mind reading of other animals‟ perceptive abilities and character 
when stalking them and setting traps for them very much includes awareness of yourself in 
the present, as well as in the somewhat remembered past and all the possible futures, for one 
must learn how to make one‟s own physical influence on the local environment as minimal as 
possible. Now we can fully understand why only a few males in any HG band are really good 
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 My view of theory of mind and the intentional stance is very much in the imagination-simulation tradition, as 
distinct from the „theory-theory‟ tradition which sees the intentional stance as semantic knowledge, not 
imagination. Defending my simulationist view is beyond the scope of this thesis, but basically I hold that an 
autonoetic awareness of one‟s own intentionality and mental states is required before one can imagine the 
possible mental states of another agent. 
28
 He said  he counted 18 categories they used for describing the characters of individuals of habitually targeted 
species, but he does not describe them. 
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hunters, and why they also tend to be the best social communicators and politicians, and to 
have more wives and more children. Hunting prowess, based on the intricacies of physical 
and mental application of narrative TWR skills, has been an extremely powerful selective 
factor in the co-evolution of all hominin cognitive capacities. What must have been equally 
important was the capacity to pass as much hunting/gathering knowledge and skills as 
possible on to the next generation. 
2.4 The Pedagogy or Cultural Transmission of TWR Skills 
Since simpler TWR skills could have been taught to ensuing generations by early mimetic 
hominins using physical communicative as-if role-taking methods resembling pretend play 
(for example by pointing to or drawing tracks of dangerous predators and miming their scary 
demeanour) and in fact can only be learnt via similar „showing how‟ methods, my view that 
at least some degree of TWR was a very ancient proto-hominin skill is very plausible indeed.  
HG children are taught how to read track-ways of dangerous predators and important food 
species, by procedural showing and depiction, from the age of three (Morrison 1981). 
Silberbauer (1981) said San juveniles learn most of their TWR skills from auto-rehearsal and 
trial-and-error direct experience however, when they start applying “simple” hunting 
techniques like setting snares, learnt from older peers or the old men of the tribe. As we now 
know, setting snares is not at all simple. 
Like all HG children I started trying to snare and trap small animals after the age of six. I was 
only occasionally directly taught how to read track-ways „on the job‟ as it were, by my father 
and an old trapper that took an interest in my welfare and gave me half a dozen traps when I 
was about eight. I also absorbed some knowledge of what to look for by spending many 
hours listening to hunting stories told by my father and his friends. Such is the efficiency of 
linguistic communication, but miming would have been far more physically informative, and 
theatrical miming of hunting stories is the norm around HG campfires in the evening.  
The real learning came from doing, from experience, over and above being shown how. The 
!Kung San say that it is better for a young hunter to learn to read track-ways on his own just 
by „doing‟ it, for by learning that way “he will know his own mind”  (Liebenberg 1990). No 
matter how they learn it, reading track-ways for all HG children becomes as „second-nature‟, 
or neurally automatized, as comprehending someone else‟s spoken story.  
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The main point here is that TWR cannot be learned or taught by using language, only by 
learning by doing, being shown how via mimetic/deictic teaching while hunting with older 
hominins, watching mimed hunting stories around evening fires, and pedagogical depiction 
of track-ways in suitable substrates. In the case of human track-ways, all !Kung San children 
know their mother‟s footprints from all others in the band by the age of four without directed 
teaching. In fact, trackers can recognize the passage of a known human, from their track-way 
alone, even though they have not seen that person‟s tracks for over twenty years. San hunters 
burst out laughing when Silberbauer (1981) asked them if it was easy to recognize individual 
human track-ways: that is how silly they thought the question was. 
Here is yet another reason I argue TWR began in the social domain: because directed 
teaching or encouragement is not needed when it comes to taking note of all band-members‟ 
track-ways. Perhaps in the beginning only the shape of footprints of dangerous animals was 
drawn or pointed out for very young proto-hominins that were still too protected to have seen 
such animals. One gets the impression from the ethnographic  literature track-drawing 
„lessons‟ were something historical HGs did for the fun and the challenge of drawing realistic 
track-ways, as when sitting around after a good meal. Early hominins probably could not do 
this, but they could point to tracks of different species and mime the animals that made them. 
For example, see these ethnographic descriptions of Australian aboriginal traditional teaching 
behaviours below, followed by some of their remarkably „life-like‟ track-drawings on the 
following page (cited in and borrowed from Morrison 1981): 
“Next to the „catch-cradle‟[cats-cradle], the most general perhaps of all imitative 
games is the drawing of different animal and bird tracks…in the smoothed sand, 
by means of the fingers, finger-nails, palms, small sticks…”   
                                               Walter Roth 1902  
“It appears as though the older more knowledgeable members of the tribe would 
draw tracks of animals in the sand for the young children to identify. Attention 
was paid to such detail as direction of travel and how much time had elapsed since 
the passage of the animal”.(my emphasis)       
       Maria Miller 1983  
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The First Pictographs
  
Conventional depictions of combinations of track-ways were also part of Aboriginal art (see 
below).  
   
  
The pictograph immediately above (they are all borrowed from Morrison 1981) depicts a dog 
following an emu trail, but the dog would be following the emu‟s scent trail of course. In this 
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simple depiction and the top one above, the zig-zagging line is graphically symbolic of the 
concept of „trail‟, a pathway through any environment.  
Conveying TWR information and drawing simple directional maps for hunting plans for 
other early hominin minds was probably the origin of mimetic/depictive signs such as those 
above, made in or on suitable substrates. Combinations of mimetic/depictive and gestural 
signs made with the whole body and/or the hands in the air, referring to specific species (see 
illustration next page, borrowed from Liebenberg 1990) and hunting techniques, would have 
been other forms of the earliest intentional narrative communication. 
 I fully concur with Merlin Donald‟s excellent work (Donald 1991) on how mimetic showing-
how communication had to have been in place to transmitting Oldowan Culture between 
generations. I refer not just to stone- knapping skills. Think of hunting techniques; foot-prints 
of different species; how to make a simple spear; how to make a throwing club weighted by a 
large bulge at one end, a simple carrying sling and so on. Oldowan juveniles in turn must 
have been able to represent action schematas of the self and others in order to imitate older 
more skilled peers when they were not around. They would have needed such mental 
schematas to intentionally auto-rehearse such skills through trial-and-error repetition when on 
their own or with other juveniles (as in pretend play).  
What I add to Merlin Donald‟s argument is that these hierarchical action schemata or 
sequences were narratively constructed, because they also include in the sequence who is 
doing what (the action) to whom. This structure equals the propositional agent-action-goal 
syntax of minimal or thematic grammar. I will not discuss grammar or syntax much further in 
this paper: the theoretical territory is voluminous, and, I believe, fairly irrelevant to human 
evolution if one accepts the HNF is the module for all higher human cognitive domains 
(which are plastically developmental not modular). The particular grammar of the language-
culture one is born into, as well as the lexicon, has to be learnt at an early age when the brain 
is still plastically developmental, just like the most important TWR signs and the folk biology 
of one‟s local ecology.  
All HG hunters use pantomime or mimesis, gestural signs, depictions and mimicked bird 
calls for communication in order to maintain silence while hunting. They do the same when 
acting-out hunting stories around the evening camp fire. Groups of women and older children 
and toddlers talk and sing continuously when out gathering fruit and nuts and digging up 
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small fauna and tubers (Silberbauer 1981). They do this to deter predators. I posit that pre-
linguistic vocalizing was restricted to prosodic singing/chanting exchanges (like Gelada 
baboons continuously vocalizing) and mimicking of other animals and natural sounds when 
hunting or acting out stories.  
The fact that silence is so crucial to hunting success may be one good reason linguistic 
communication did not begin to emerge in the hominin lineage until the Mid-to-Late 
Pleistocene, after fire-control became a cultural foundation around .8 mya. Another may be 
that gestural signs were perfectly adequate for transmitting tracking information, perhaps 
even more efficient than words
29
. Prior to this emergence, like Michael Corballis (Corballis 
1992; Corballis 2002; Corballis 2010) and Armstrong (Armstrong, Stokoe et al. 1995), I think 
gestural sign-languages had been prevalent since around 1.6 mya. This date heralds the 
beginning of hand-axe manufacture, the signature of Acheulian Culture. Prosodic ululating or 
chanting, percussion, dancing and so on probably supplied the social grooming that Robin 
Dunbar so famously attributes to linguistic gossip. 
In sum then re hominin communication: I argue the phonological complexity of hominin 
mimicry of other animals, each other during group chanting sessions, and noises made by the 
world around them (Botha and Knight 2009) was co-opted for speech after fire control was 
invented. Grammar arose out of the narrative construction of the metaphorical/mimetic 
depictive representations already inculcated in the pre-linguistic hominin mind/brain. The 
cognitive capacities for language emergence were provided by the HNF, accumulated co-
operative mimetic/gestural culture, and the plastically developmental neural capacity 
conferred by a brain now much more than twice the size of the ape-brain.  
This co-evolutionary cultural scaffolding scenario is now not at all unorthodox. What I have 
added is the evolution of the HNF as the cognitive prerequisite for the cognitive social 
competences required for all forms of hominin co-operative/intentional culture and 
communication, triggered by our ancestral entry into the unique TWR cognitive niche. 
Learning how to narratively read and apply the track-ways information exhibited by different 
environments and ecologies has always been neurally plastic, just as it is with learning the 
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 The exact speed at which and animal is travelling, as indicated by the gaps between footprints in its track-
way, are communicated very accurately from one San tracker to another by a flicking the palm of one hand with 
the fingers of the other at differing rates (Liebenberg 1990). One cannot verbally describe such fine-grained 
physical phenomena. It is like trying to describe a spiral with words rather than simply draw it in the air. 
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language, conventional orthography, the symbolic rituals and behavioural norms of the 
cultures we moderns are born into. This makes pragmatic sense for a generalist exploratory 
species because of the differing local ecologies and environmental variability they could 
encounter. As explained in this chapter (and in introductory section 1.2) there has always 
been a discrete infinity of track-ways narratives out there in terrestrial environments to be 
read, just as there is in the symbolic signs of natural languages. 
There is no limit to the amount of useful information to be gained from track-ways, especially 
when it comes to learning the habits of conspecifics, as well as all the animals in one‟s local 
ecology. Modern forensic crime investigations still take great heed of any track-ways left by 
miscreants: blood-stained shoe-prints and foot-prints for example. As I have mentioned 
before in passing, conservation officers regularly use track-ways to assess population 
numbers of species in wild-life reserves. The only constraint to gathering TWR information, 
just as in scientific pursuits, is in the eyes
30
, intelligence, and measuring technology of the 
investigator. For a very modern example, just recently an article appeared in my local 
newspaper re new TWR techniques needed to help pest controllers eradicate rats  in nature 
reserves (because they predate on native birds‟ eggs and fledglings).  
The reserve administrators have set up natural-looking false tunnels containing ink-pads and 
blotting paper to record the footprints of the three different species of marauding rats. The 
eyes of a human tracker cannot tell them apart, so these track-ways will be analyzed by 
computer. The reason this is being done is that each rat species has different behavioural 
traits when it comes to navigation and foraging. Knowing which species they are dealing with 
will enable pest eradicators to set their traps more appropriately and therefore efficiently if 
only one rat species is still a problem in the reserve. Their greatest hope is that the computer 
can tell whether a rat is a pregnant female or not, because concentrating on killing pregnant 
females is far more efficacious than killing males if you want to eradicate a species from any 
given area as quickly as possible
31
. 
I think hominins were always hunters, and not just because it is crucial to my narrative about 
the role of TWR in hominin evolution. I argue that co-operative hunting of small wetland 
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 From personal experience I think it is very possible that one unassailable reason HG hunters tend to give up 
hunting in their late forties is due to failing eye-sight. I can buy a pair of glasses at the local chemist; many HGs 
cannot. 
31
 Having once been a professional  hunter and trapper of several species of introduced pest animals I know that 
mature females of any species are much harder to capture than juveniles and mature males, for they are far more 
cautious. Consequently they are usually the last members of a population to be eradicated.  
56 
 
fauna was very ancient, and some hominin populations began habitual intentional hunting 
and carving of medium to large mammals after 2.8 mya due to iterated, large-scale 
destruction of their preferred wetland habitats, not because they suddenly became smart 
enough to do so. In my model they could suddenly do so because they had been smarter than 
chimps for a very long time, due to their very early entry into the TWR niche. The new 
evidence of the cognitive capacity to transport stone tools for 6 kms and carve an animal as 
large as a cow (McPherron et al 2010) strongly supports this chronological view. 
I place intentional tracking and co-operative hunting of large mammals as early as 2.5 mya in 
our evolutionary journey. This view is at present quite unorthodox (for an orthodox 
chronology of hunting see Foley and Gamble 2009). If the chronology of my TWR/HNF 
model is correct, then: 
(1) Task analysis of all paleo-archaeological evidence from 2.6 my onwards should 
indicate the co-operative use of means/ends prospective cognition using narrative 
mimetic/depictive „image-ination‟ and communication, which is not possible 
without the HNF. For as we have seen, intentional, systematic tracking and 
hunting techniques are also not possible without narrative, as-if role playing 
imagination. 
(2) Where hard evidence reflecting such cognitive development is not available, then 
historical and modern HG ethnography should exhibit overwhelming evidence of 
possible applications of the HNF to the invention and communication of co-
operative hunting techniques that require only the kinds of very simple technology 
that early hominins must have had access to (plus some degree of TWR skills). 
(3) The earliest Oldowan endocasts should reflect expansion and restructuring of the 
core brain areas that support narrative mentalizing and the social competences, 
and neuro-imaging should show that the human brain is fundamentally a „narrative 
machine‟ due to our very early entry into the TWR niche. 
To sum up: the natural signs we call track-ways are vastly different from the signs all other 
animals use, mainly because they can be so fully decoupled from their referents in space and 
time, and because combinations of them can tell a discrete infinity of narratives, just like 
languages. Only hominins have ever cognitively exploited them, and that is why we are the 
narrative species. This chapter has concentrated on extractive foraging applications, using the 
HNF, of the information gained from reading the track-ways and associated traces of other 
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animals. I have claimed that applying social TWR and the social competences conferred by 
the HNF to co-operatively tracking, hunting down and carving up large mammals constituted 
an ecological breakthrough for Oldowan hominins. In the next chapter we discuss what 
evidence there is for this. 
    *************************** 
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Chapter Three:  Oldowan Hunters and Gatherers 
3.0 Big Game Hunters or Obligate Scavengers? 
The claim that narrative reading and application of track-ways information was an ecological 
breakthrough for Oldowan hominins does not stand or fall on whether they were large game 
hunters or obligate scavengers. My bottom line is that TWR would have always paid its way 
through some combination of: (a) using conspecific tracks as navigational aids; (b) predator 
avoidance; (c) small game hunting; (d) increasing scavenging efficiency. However, in this 
crucial chapter I present evidence that TWR and the HNF became extremely important soon 
after 2.8 mya for intentionally obtaining and processing large mammals, and they were not 
being acquired by obligate passive or confrontational scavenging from other carnivores on a 
regular basis until near the beginning of  Acheulian Culture at 1.6 mya.  
While tracking large animals on a habitual basis may not have begun until 2.5 mya, 
conspecific TWR was important in the social and ecological domains from the very 
beginning in open featureless wetland environments. I repeat: the social and ecological 
domains must have an intimate relationship re competition with conspecific groups and 
individuals for resources: seeing another hominin‟s track-way when foraging means someone 
else might have already acquired the targeted resource. As we shall see in chapter four, one‟s 
own old track-ways are also extremely important when foraging: for example they reveal that 
one has already foraged in a certain area. Such basic orienteering is important for optimal 
resource extraction.  
Here are my major reasons for placing hunting behaviours much earlier than most other 
theorists: 
1) Chimps group-hunt animals smaller than themselves and many other primates 
consume eggs, fledglings, and small invertebrates, so pre-hominins are likely to 
have done so as well. Only one troupe has ever been seen to scavenge another 
predator‟s fresh kill, and only once (a leopard‟s kill stashed in a tree interestingly 
enough). Robbing a fresh kill directly from baboons has also been observed, but 
again, only once or twice.  
  
2) Like all primates we have an innate disgust reaction to the smell of meat that is 
„off‟, unlike dogs and hyenas. 
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3) Eating the flesh of small aquatic and terrestrial animals would require little or no 
carving (or any form of dangerous competition with other carnivores) and 
therefore would have been the easiest, optimal means of acquiring the high-quality 
nutrients demanded by proto-hominin encephalization from the very beginning 
(Broadhurst, Cunnane et al. 1998), (Cunnane and Stewart 2010) 
 
4) Ethnographic studies prove ((Kaplan and Hill 1985),(Stewart 1994) (Gilmore 
1953)  that simple co-operative hunting techniques using nothing more than bare 
hands or digging sticks doubling as clubs can provide large quantities of protein 
from fish, reptiles and small land-based mammals. 
 
5) A perusal of the original literature shows good evidence of fish, reptile and micro-
mammal exploitation was ignored by theorists because of big-game hunting 
theoretical ideology during the 1970‟s (Verhaegen and Puech 201032, Cunnane 
and Stewart 2010) There were thousands of catfish fossils at Beds I and II, 
Olduvai (Stewart 1994). 
 
6) Recent re-appraisals of hard evidence from some of the earliest stone and bone 
caches (2.6 to 2 mya) indicates the predominant exploitation of small to medium 
ungulates (size 2 and 3 = 26 to 114 kg) as well as some larger size 4 animals, and 
that hominins were definitely processing them before scavengers and other 
predators (Plummer 2004; Diez-Martín, Sánchez et al. 2009; Domínguez-Rodrigo, 
Mabulla et al. 2009). 
 
7) True erectus hominins already had a robust modern human physique and ability to 
dissipate heat by sweating geared to endurance running during the hottest parts of 
the day. No other large mammals possess these traits. Modern and historical HGs 
obtain medium to large game by running them to heat-exhaustion (using TWR to 
find them when temporarily out of sight) and dispatching them with clubs or 
spears ((Liebenberg 2008). I will describe this hunting technique in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
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 They quote  Leakey et al (1971) re the  Olduvai O.H.24 habilis site: „Crocodile remains predominate among 
the faunal material from this site and more than 2,000 teeth were found. Tortoise plates, shells of Urocyclid 
slugs, fish vertebrae and scales, bird bones and pieces of ostrich eggshell were also relatively common‟.  
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8) Scavengers masticate and ingest all remains of smaller animals completely and the 
bones of small ungulates deteriorate rapidly in the open environment. Unless such 
remains are very fortuitously almost immediately covered by suitable fossilizing 
substrates they are much less likely to survive in the archaeological record than 
the bones of very large mammals. One very early site like this has recently been 
discovered, dated 1.95 mya: crocodiles, catfish and turtles were being eaten 
regularly. Another site with large amounts of hominin-derived aquatic fauna 
fossils is dated 1.5 mya (Braun, Harris et al. 2010). 
 
9) Most small fauna would have been consumed in situ before the advent of fire and 
cave-shelters as home bases after 1 Ma; that is, remains of small fauna would 
hardly register in the archaeological record at all until the advent of scavenger-free 
home-based cooking life-ways  
 
10) Most terrestrial tubers are seasonal and inedible (indigestible and/or poisonous) 
without prolonged processing and cooking, whereas many aquatic corms and 
rhizomes are sweet, juicy, easily digestible in their raw state (especially if 
pounded), extremely easy to pull from soft mud, and non-seasonal (for example 
roots of papyrus and cat-tail sedges which are common fare to this day). The very 
few theorists supporting the idea of USOs as a staple diet for early hominins (for 
example (Wrangham and Conklin-Brittain 2003) had to assume that fire was 
under systematic control as early as 2 mya and there is no evidence for this 
assumption (Plummer 2004)(Shipman 2009). Exploitation of nuts is a far safer bet 
before fire and cooking, but nuts are also seasonal. 
 
11) Until quite recently very few theorists have considered the possibility of several 
species of large fresh-water shell-fish, huge seasonal runs of several species of 
large, very fatty cat-fish, and small reptiles and mammals being main-stay dietary 
protein sources in lacustrine/riparian/alluvial areas of the Rift for most of the year 
(Broadhurst et al 1998, Cunnane and Stewart 2010). Hunting of medium and large 
mammals, and the opportunistic scavenging of mired, sick or very young animals, 
probably occurred mostly during the dry season when ungulates were restricted to 
using infrequent remaining water-holes (Broadhurst et al 1998). 
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12) The human tapeworm Taenus solium did not split off phylogenetically from canid, 
felid and hyaenid tapeworms until 1.7 mya at the earliest
33
 (Shipman 2009). Tape-
worms are host-specific and cannot survive in hosts that are not constant meat 
eaters. This switch would surely have occurred much earlier if hominins had been 
fueling their encephalization solely by obligate confrontational or passive 
scavenging from other carnivores since 2.6 mya.  
I think theoretical postulations that early hominins were: (a) predominately big-game hunters; 
(b) obligate scavengers; (c) survived on tubers dug up by post-menopausal grandmothers; (d) 
only hunted big game after 500ka; (e) only gathered shell-fish, turtles and other small aquatic 
fauna during the Late Pleistocene, are all seriously flawed. Like a few other theorists 
(Broadhurst et al 1998 for example), I think wetland fauna and flora was the staple diet of 
early hominins until massive environmental changes in the Rift after 2.8 mya, but I place 
obligate scavenging at least a million years later than they do. 
3.1 When and Why Erectus Became Scavengers. 
I posit the human host-specific tapeworm evolved when some populations of erectus 
hominins became frequent obligate passive and confrontational scavengers of other 
carnivores‟ kills after 1.7 mya. This was because they finally had to, due to a combination of 
these factors: (1) they had become extremely successful, highly competitive, eusocial 
carnivores; (2) their populations had expanded a great deal; and (3) iterated volcanic and 
earthquake effects and increasing aridity ever since 2.6 mya had destroyed a large proportion 
of wetland habitats in the Rift. I describe and present the chronology of some of these 
environmental events in my final chapter. 
Near starvation towards the end of the dry season would have made stealing meat from even 
the most dangerous predators imperative, and the only other food source that is as high 
quality „brain food‟ as fish and shellfish is marrow and brains. Marrow and brains, obtained 
by smashing large bones and skulls, would have very often been the only nutrients available 
from the remnants of large carcasses left behind by lions and other large felids (Schaller and 
Lowther 1969). Leopard kills stashed in trees would have been a far better choice. TWR skill 
combined with knowledge of the routines of local leopards could have made these easy to 
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 And it could have been as late as .7 mya. 
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find, but it would still have been a dangerous form of foraging. There were also several 
species of other huge felids around at the time, such as sabre-tooth tigers. 
Like Schaller and Lowther I think Wild African Dog packs would have been the safest 
carnivores for club-wielding teams of large erectus males to confront and the easiest to find 
because they are diurnal relay pack-hunters. Hyenas, lions and leopards are mainly nocturnal 
predators. We know from the Turkana Boy that erectus (not the habilenes: they were 
probably too small) definitely had the physique of good endurance runners by 1.6 mya. I 
posit the canid tapeworm transferred to hominins as a specific host because these later 
hominins had begun to regularly home in on hunting African dog packs (probably by 
following their tracks). They carved large portions from their fresh kills, and left them the 
butchering remnants.  
In the past there has been a lot of controversy over the evidence, but recent re-analyses of 
some early sites show quite clearly that hominins from 2.6 mya onwards were regularly 
gaining access to medium and large mammals before other carnivores (Plummer 2004 for 
excellent overview). This added to the appearance of the hominin tapeworm a million years 
later strongly indicates Oldowan hominins could not have begun as obligate scavengers. I 
think we must return to a far more nuanced version of big-game hunting theories. I bet that 
teams of habilenes started big-game hunting by using simple TWR to track down large 
mammals (such as hippos) and startle them by throwing stones so they became mired in deep 
mud holes. 
During many years of trapping and hunting as a pest controller around farms I saw countless 
cattle and sheep mired in swamps and muddy creeks. Ungulate herds always follow the same 
trails, so after many animals have used the same crossing of a boggy water-course, the older 
and weaker animals at the tail end of the herd are very prone to becoming mired in the deep 
mud created by those that have gone before. They soon become completely exhausted, cannot 
defend themselves, and would have been easy to dispatch with a club. Bipedal semi-aquatic 
hominins with some TWR skill would have had an advantage over all other scent-trailing, 
quadruped predators in such conditions. 
Like Rose and Marshall (Rose and Marshall 1996) I also think the „origin-myth‟ of timid, 
non-lethal early hominins cowering together from huge predators needs to be placed in the 
theoretical waste-bin in favour of a more balanced view. Of course lone foraging hominins 
and toddlers wandering too far from the band would have been highly vulnerable, and 
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everyone would have been somewhat vulnerable at night before fire control. On the other 
hand, why would predators bother to attack a mob of shouting, stone-throwing, spearing, 
clubbing proto-hominins who could hurt them from a distance?  
Studies have also shown that wetland/riparian environments are remarkably predator free 
compared to open savannah [(Pickering and Bunn 2007) for example]. I think the reason for 
this is quite simple: large scenting carnivores do not like hunting in watery environments, and 
cats in particular do not like getting wet. 
Rose and Marshall (and Plummer 2004) argue for defendable home bases that hominins 
retreated to with large carcass portions. Clark (reply to their 1996 paper) also suggested that 
carving sites were close to good miring spots, and quotes several instances of historical HGs 
habitually driving large animals into swamps and water in certain suitable sites in order to 
immobilize them and kill them.  
TWR would always have been salient to hominin life-ways to some degree for safety and 
socio-ecological navigation to and from home bases or safe refuges. As the narrative faculty 
evolved, their tracking and co-operative hunting techniques would become more intentional 
and less opportunistic. Anticipatory cognition would lead to simple co-operative applications 
of the information gained from their TWR skills, such as finding large mammals and driving 
them into suitable miring sites. 
A recent reworking of one of Leakey‟s Olduvai sites (Dominguez-Rodrigo et al 
2009)(Dominguez-Rodrigo, Bunn et al. 2010)
34
 has shown clearly that small to medium as 
well as a few very large size 4 animals (Pelorovis) were continually being butchered by 
hominins before scavengers had access to them. New sites at Lake Turkana have also shown 
that hippos and giraffes were being carved (Pobiner, Rogers et al. 2008) before scavengers 
had any access to them. When all this new evidence is added to such evidence of carving plus 
recent re-evaluations of the anticipatory cognition needed for creating even the earliest 
Oldowan stone tools (Heinzelin, Clark et al. 1999),(Toth and Schick 2009) it becomes very 
obvious that Oldowan Culture could not have been created by a creature with a still chimpish 
mind-set. 
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 There was a permanent fresh-water spring 200m away. The site was used over many thousands of years, and 
the make up the faunal age-patterns proves they could not have been the kills of other large predators. 
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One of the Pelorovis (giant long-horned buffalo, now extinct) specimens appeared to have 
been mired in a boggy spot right beside the old Leakey site. There are several other sites 
mentioned in the literature where single very large animals were butchered in situ in muddy 
places. I think it is time to put the theory of very early obligate scavenging of large mammals 
to rest.  
Why would the earliest Oldowan hominins risk confronting dangerous predators for their 
kills when they could easily drive large animals into the swamps that were their preferred 
habitat, and where they had the advantage of bipedality and the free-handed use of stones and 
clubs? Mired animals exhaust themselves very quickly due to their own efforts to get free, 
and have no leverage for defensive manoeuvres. 
Another very important consideration is that large quadruped predators and scavengers are 
also at a disadvantage in deep mud. I have already pointed out that large terrestrial carnivores 
dislike hunting or scavenging in wetlands. There would have been little competition from 
other terrestrial carnivores in such places. Crocodiles could not have been much of a problem 
since they were being eaten by hominins at 1.95 mya (Braun et al 2010) and other early sites 
(Verhagen and Puech 2010). Besides, crocodiles do not need to feed nearly as often as 
mammalian predators, and are inactive during the hottest part of the day. 
3.2 Erectus Hominins: Endurance Hunters 
The consideration of TWR skills becoming more intentional or systematic as the HNF 
expanded with encephalization leads us to another important kind of hunting by erectus that 
many theorists have argued for: endurance hunting (Schaller and Lowther 1969, Bramble and 
Lieberman 2004, Liebenberg 2008). We know that erectus/ergaster was very robust and fully 
human sized by 1.6 mya and we know that endurance hunting was habitually practiced by 
some historical and modern HGs.  
Recent studies of the !Kung San by Liebenberg (2008) have shown that endurance hunting is 
not possible without systematic TWR skills. The faster target animal runs out of sight, seeks 
shade to recover from heat exhaustion, then is tracked down as quickly as possible by a team 
of jogging hunters and flushed out from its shady retreat. A specific animal‟s track-way has 
to be followed through all types of terrain for this kind of hunting to be successful. Pickering 
and Bunn (2007) see this as a negative to endurance hunting by erectus, and argue for passive 
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scavenging in riparian forests where carnivore competition is low. However, if TWR began 
as early as I argue, larger-brained
35
 erectus could have had pretty good tracking skills.  
The flushing and then tracking process is repeated until the animal is exhausted and cannot 
run any further or put up any defence. Only humans can physically handle running for hours 
through the hottest part of an African day, because of their morphology, breathe control, and 
capacity to dissipate heat by sweating copiously. After two or three hours the animal finally is 
at the end of its tether and one of the team of hunters simply walks up to it and clubs it on the 
head. Such hunting techniques would have been possible for larger-brained, robust erectus 
hominins, and would have dovetailed nicely with intentional pirating of wild dog kills, since 
they too are diurnal social carnivores that run large animals down in relay teams (usually 
around dawn or dusk). 
3.3 The Cognitive Significance of Carving Large Carcasses 
To reiterate: significant portions of Oldowan evidence indicate that large carcasses were 
being carved right from 2.6 onwards (Plummer 2004 for review). New evidence from the 2.3 
mya site of Bouri  reveals that size 2 (25 to 100 kg) and 3 (114-341kg) ungulates were the 
predominant mammal species taken, and cut-marks show that they were definitely captured 
and butchered by hominins before other predators/scavengers got to gnaw their discarded 
bones. They were also able to carve animals as massive as the extinct long horn buffalo, 
hippos, and giraffes. Task analysis shows that carving such large animals is in itself a major 
feat, even with modern steel knives: ask any experienced hunter. 
Carving of such large animals requires co-operation even between modern hunters. Where I 
grew up no hunter went after the 400 to 500kg moose alone unless they had a well-trained 
horse to help them manipulate the carcass, with a pack-saddle for the meat. My point here is 
if the earliest Oldowan hominins (habilenes) were smart enough to co-operatively carve such 
large beasts, carry that meat back to safe refuges, and defend it and themselves from other 
huge carnivores on the way, they must have been smart enough to read track-ways in order to 
track down and capture large animals by intentionally miring them in deep mud.  
There is also a great deal of new evidence that proves the cores for stone tools were 
somewhat knapped at suitable sources, then carried to another site and used for the further 
knapping of sharp flakes and making cleavers. The distances we are talking about are 
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 Early erectus brains were 850-900cc. Chimp‟s are around 450cc, as were those of the australopithecines. 
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between 3 and 12 kms (Toth and Schick 2010 for review
36
). Oldowans had a lot more 
anticipatory cognition than chimps. 
To sum up my Oldowan big-game hunting scenario here: I think driving animals into swamps 
on a habitual basis would have been the earliest form of big-game hunting. Endurance 
hunting would demand greater tracking skills and a lot more energy expenditure, so it was 
probably a technique used by the more robust erectus, not habilis. 
3.4 TWR and the Hunting of Smaller Animals 
TWR is absolutely necessary when the species targeted is active only at night. A good 
example is the spring hare, a nocturnal animal that the !Kung San regularly track to their 
burrows during the day. They then hook them out with long barbed sticks: this smallish 
animal is easily obtained by such simple means and is therefore a mainstay of their meat 
intake. There are many examples of such effective hunting techniques for capturing smaller 
prey that could have been practiced by early hominins with such simple technology as bare 
hands, simple wooden spears, clubs, stones, and digging sticks. 
Hill and Hawkes (1983) study of the simple but effective hunting techniques of the Ache is a 
very good expose of such methods. Forty percent of their meat intake is gained with no more 
than TWR, co-operative teamwork, and digging sticks doubling as clubs. Another ten percent 
of their fare is fish; these are all caught with their bare hands. Modern Africans still catch 
large catfish this way. I have caught eels and trout with my hands, using the „tickling 
method‟. It is quite easy to do once one develops a light touch, and is especially effective at 
night when they are resting under stream banks.  
A method the Paiute (Nevada Indians) used for hunting rabbits was foolproof but extremely 
simple. Rabbits have to visit waterholes in the evening, so the whole tribe would encircle a 
water-hole at that time of day and slowly and silently close in on the drinking rabbits. Finally 
the gaps between band-members were so narrow that when the rabbits finally panicked and 
tried to escape they were easily knocked out with clubs and throwing sticks. Another simple 
method they used for capturing ducks was to wade very slowly through water at neck height 
with a mat of moss over the head, and simply pull the ducks underwater by their feet and 
crush their skulls with their thumbs (Gilmore 1953). 
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 These theorists posit Oldowans could have suddenly come up with such behaviours while still in a somewhat 
similar cognitive state to chimps. I do not agree with that view of course. 
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The main point I want to make here is that knowledge of animal behaviour
37
 is far more 
important than technological complexity when it comes to many techniques of hunting. 
Therefore the means/ends cognition enabled by the beginnings of a narrative faculty could 
have made very simple and yet highly successful planned co-operative foraging methods 
possible even for very early hominins. With such methods they could have captured large 
quantities of small aquatic fauna and small terrestrial mammals. 
I will now introduce one simple method of catching fish and other wetland fauna that can 
explain the origin of what [(Domínguez-Rodrigo and Martínez-Navarro) 2010, (Shipman, 
Bosler et al. 1981)] call “palimpsest sites”. There are many Oldowan and early Acheulian 
sites containing bones and sometimes hundreds of stone tools, but there are no cut-marks on 
the bones. In Acheulian sites one can see that the hand-axes are still standing vertically in the 
sediment they were preserved in. Invariably these sites were in shallow water on the edges of 
lakes or in slow-running shallow feeder streams nearby. 
When I was camped in the New Zealand wilderness and needed fresh protein, the easiest to 
procure was that from the native eel. The best way to catch them was to throw the bodies of a 
couple of skinned possums (a 1 to 3 kg introduced marsupial from Australia that became a 
terrible environmental pest) in a slow-running shallow pool in a nearby creek or river every 
day or so. All the eels from far downstream would come to feed on them. I could spear a 
fresh eel to eat whenever I liked. Catfish behave just like eels and sharks, they are scavengers 
as well as predators, strongly attracted to meat whether fresh or rotten. Fresh is best, because 
they can easily detect blood, and are as excited by it as sharks. Modern rural Africans still 
obtain a very large species of river catfish by this method.  
I propose this is what hominins were doing at these sites: attracting catfish, snapping turtles, 
and small crocodiles up close to shores of lakes and shallow feeder streams where they could 
be easily speared or clubbed, by throwing the remains from other predators‟ kills in the 
water. Semi-aquatic cane rats would also have been attracted to such bait. 
As I have said, hand-axes have been found still standing vertical where they somehow got 
stuck in the mud at some Acheulian sites. I posit they could be spun into water because of 
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 “Hunters invest more in learning or reading the behaviour of the animal than in technology”.  William 
Laughlin, in “Man the Hunter” (ed. Lee and De Vore 1968, ch. 33., p 313) 
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their shape
38
. Trying to stun or kill cane-rats, big catfish and small crocodiles with them this 
way would have been fun and good practice for juvenile Acheulians. Such baiting techniques 
are a forerunner to trapping techniques, and hence would constitute a sure sign of the 
anticipatory cognition already conferred by the narrative faculty on Oldowan hominin minds. 
 3.5 The Cognitive Competences of Oldowan Hunters and Gatherers 
The simplest, most effective way to thwart scent-trailing predators is to wade into water and 
keep down-wind of them (there is always a breeze heading down streams at night). If the 
dangerous predator is a lion having a climbable tree nearby will provide safety; but if it is a 
leopard a tree will not. Refuges on alluvial islands or peninsulas dotted with climbable trees 
surrounded by water would have been a good option for early hominins (see illustration 
below: from flickR Photo Share website).  
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 Anyone who has ever tried to stun a fish in shallow water with an ordinary round stone (like myself) will be 
inclined to accept this speculative idea. The force of a thrown round stone is immediately nullified on impact 
with water. Hand-axes would cut through the water surface. Besides, eels and catfish will break the surface for 
food. 
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Much paleo-archaeological evidence strongly indicates they were living in such 
environments. Plummer‟s excellent review of Oldowan cultural evidence (2004) provides a 
summary of the paleo-geography of all Oldowan sites between 2.6 and 1.8 Ma. They were all 
situated in lacustrine/riparian/alluvial shallow waters. 
So TWR skills and ancillary narrative cognitive capacities would have conferred an over-all 
selective advantage when competing with other scent-tracking carnivores for prey, 
scavenging opportunities, or being able to dodge those creatures which predated on us.  This 
might include other hominin bands, of course. Although Oldowan population densities might 
not have been very high in the beginning, because male chimps regularly patrol their 
territorial edges and go beyond them to actively hunt or confront other chimp strangers, I am 
assuming that early hominins probably exhibited this co-operative social trait as well. 
Meetings between bands of bonobos are usually friendly, but when whole bands of a hundred 
or more migrate to other parts of their 25 sq. mi. territories in cohesive units, the biggest 
males are at the lead in case they run into another troupe (McNeil 1996 citing Savage-
Rumbaugh).  
As track-reading hominins became more wide-ranging, such social interactions would have 
made TWR skills of paramount importance (not to mention the associated skills of hiding 
one‟s tracks from other hominins). Hence group selection for better narrative information-
gathering from TWR and communication of that information within a troupe of hominins 
would have created an intra-specific cognitive arms race. Even if relations with outsiders 
were not hostile, you would still want to know if strangers were about, simply because they 
might be competing with you for certain resources.  
My bet is that the first narrative communication of earliest hominins was mimed like the 
pretend-play of children, and it was often used to transmit TWR information to help others 
find or dodge other hominins and dangerous predators, and later to make hunting plans. By 
the advent of larger-brained true hominins (erectus) the greatest worry for a band with a good 
narrative faculty and TWR skills may have been other hominin strangers, not scent-trailing 
predators and scavengers. Knowing a stranger‟s footprints were not those of any member of 
one‟s band would have been highly significant.  
All HGs without horticulture ( for example the Ache) were obligate nomads unless they lived 
in extremely resource-rich areas, simply because easily-caught game soon runs out in close 
proximity to a band of hungry hominins (Hill and Hawkes 1983, cited in 1985). The energy 
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spent hunting and gathering rapidly becomes not worth the meagre returns. The best thing to 
do is move on to new territory for awhile and return when populations of game have 
recovered. Here again is another reason I think application of simple TWR skills in the social 
domain, re confrontations with strangers or other dangerous predators, may have been 
somewhat more relevant to our pre-Oldowan ancestral life-ways than TWR for hunting 
animals.   
The best result of all to be gained from searching for new hunting grounds is to find territory 
where no other hominins have been, because the animals there will be much easier to capture. 
Hence there is a natural psychological „gravity‟ of an impulse for exploration in all hunters 
and gatherers. Chimps do not exhibit this exploratory behaviour. Their territories are much 
more fixed, and they rely on resources lower in the trophic pyramid. Again, hominin 
exploratory behaviour would have instigated much more fission-fusion social complexity, 
with TWR being important for keeping track of band-members. 
Of course areas seasonally rich in resources may have allowed temporarily larger social 
gatherings, but such dramatic fission-fusion social events in themselves would select for 
more narrative cognition in order to keep track of many reciprocal and confrontational 
relationships over time. This idea is highly orthodox, since it fits well with the classical social 
brain hypothesis. 
Therefore the exploratory foraging, defensive and social advantages gained by extra TWR 
skills and their application should cause co-evolutionary selection for restructuring of archaic 
portions of the brain to entrench the HNF. This should naturally be followed by expansion of 
the plastically developmental neocortex for flexible storage and planned applications of the 
information obtained by the HNF from TWR (and all other natural signs).  
The first habilene skull found, dated 2.3 mya, clearly shows expansion in the temporal and 
parietal areas (Tobias 1987),(Holloway, Broadfield et al. 2003). Its brain was twice as large 
as an ape brain relative to body size, as was the first erectus skull, which clearly shows 
further expansion in those areas, as well as the medial prefrontal cortex. These areas of the 
neocortex make up the core structure that supports default narrative mentalizing in the human 
brain (Schacter and Addis 2007; Addis, Pan et al. 2009).  
This same core structure supports autobiographical memory, prospection, and theory of mind 
(Spreng and Grady 2009). The right parietal area is dedicated to reading the minds of others, 
71 
 
and the left deals with past and future narrative scenarios concerning the self. All information 
entering the brain and during memory retrieval is ordered by the central ganglia or 
hippocampal/para-hippocampal zone. In all mammals this area deals with navigation in 
space. In hominins it also deals with navigation in time. 
I posit social TWR navigation took the pre-hominin mind into the fourth dimension because 
TWR is all about when as well as who made the footprints making up a track-way. The time-
travelling anticipatory cognition the HNF provided gave us a cognitive advantage over all 
other creatures. Humans narratively navigate in time on a default basis, by projecting the 
imagined self into past and future scenarios (Buckner 2007). People with Alzheimer‟s 
Disease and dementia, who have lost their self narrative and therefore cannot function in 
society, cannot find their way about in novel topographical environments either.  
Human navigation through novel territory is not possible without physical, ego-centric self-
referentiality. Most other animals do not possess this objective physical self-referentiality to 
any degree
39
. This is why they hate leaving their home territory (for example, pig-dogs very 
often get lost if they get too far away from their master). The same principle applies for 
mental-time-travel. Think of time as an ocean: the mental self-referentiality of the autonoetic 
self-narrative is our anchor in the past, our keel in the present, and our steering device 
towards the future. Without it we are soon lost or „all at sea‟.  
All of the above supports the strong claim that if early hominins had not entered the TWR 
cognitive/behavioural niche humans would not have evolved. Contemplating TWR‟s possibly 
colossal relevance to why we are the way we are, an obvious question arises given (a) 
orthodox niche-construction theory, and (b) that ours is the only lineage on this planet that 
has ever exploited track-ways as natural signs. Why have so few cognitive evolutionary 
theorists ever seen the possible evolutionary import of the unique cognition demanded by 
TWR till now?  
3.6 Reasons for Previous Theoretical Disregard for TWR 
No other theorist besides the naturalist/Jungian philosopher Paul Shepard (1996) and myself 
appears to have explored to any depth the possibly very early cognitive evolutionary relations 
between TWR, culture and communication, even though there is fairly wide consensus in 
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 However, mature great apes and dolphins do pass the mirror-recognition test. I posit this occurs because both 
needed 3-D physical self-representation in space, the apes because they are arboreal, the dolphins because they 
are fully aquatic. This may have been another necessary but not sufficient pre-adaptive cognitive trait of our 
Ardipithecan ancestors. 
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some theoretical camps that all true hominin species have been hunter-gatherers (HGs) for at 
least 2 million years.  
The most obvious reason relates to the fact that both Shepard and I grew up tracking and 
trapping: it is due to a very understandable lack of experience because of modern life-ways. 
Paul Shepard (deceased 1998) grew up in the swamplands and waterways of Missouri 
(U.S.A) helping his family trap muskrat for a living. Most theorists who have discussed 
modern HG ethnography re hunting skills and the evolution of human cognition have never 
had any practical experience of using TWR.  
Another reason may be that quite a few HG tribes have been using dogs for hunting, some for 
several thousand years. Perhaps this is why Hewes (1994) suggested that we did not learn to 
use TWR until behaviourally modern sapiens began hunting with dogs. However, 
domesticated dogs do not appear in the archaeological record in the Old World until between 
26 and 15 ky ago
40
 (Leonard, Wayne et al. 2002). Usually they have been intentionally bred 
and trained to hunt only certain species of animals. And make no mistake: the hunter that 
uses dogs will only take them where he has seen track-ways and other signs of the animals in 
question, or someone else has seen such signs and given the hunter the information needed to 
make the effort worthwhile.  
The crucial point here is that hunting dogs have to be used efficiently, for they require a lot of 
intentional breeding and training, as well as feeding when not hunting. They cannot be 
allowed to hunt for themselves, for they soon return to a feral state of uncontrollable 
behaviour and end up killing domesticated animals (and sometimes even attacking humans). 
The use of dogs for hunting is a very modern cultural phenomenon. 
In fact most dogs in historical HG tribes were largely kept around camp to warn of 
approaching danger since their hearing and sense of smell is better than ours by far. They 
were also useful for cleaning up old bones, rotting meat-scraps and human toddlers‟ faeces. 
And they made a good fall-back source of protein when times were tough, animals were 
scarce, and starvation threatened (dog meat is still regularly eaten in some cultures). 
Dogs cannot practice self-inhibition unless exhaustively trained and under the here-and-now 
command of their owner. During the tracking and stalking by humans of many types of 
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 The data is very controversial, some kind of symbiotic „tolerated theft‟ arrangement could have been in place 
significantly earlier, but dogs certainly weren‟t domesticated millions of years ago. 
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animals dogs are worse than useless for they tend to get too excited and noisy, especially 
when used in packs. This is why they are only used to hunt certain species that will quickly 
bail up and confront them, or immediately climb a tree. The dogs then surround the animal 
and make feinting attacks or bark at the base of the tree to keep it in situ until their human 
master can get to the scene and dispatch the target animal.  
We also need to remember here that human foraging has had such huge ecological impacts 
that the targets of ethnographically known foraging are almost certainly very different from 
the targets of early to mid-Pleistocene foragers. The African animals that lend themselves to 
the use of dogs to capture them are large and/or fierce and dangerous because they bail up 
and face their attackers (kudu, buffalo, and warthogs for example). As far as I know these 
species do not regularly appear in the archaeological record until 400 to 500 kya. This is a 
similar date to when the javelin appears in the archaeological record so perhaps there is a 
connection here.  
Now back to theoretical disregard for TWR. Another reason may be that many HG tribes live 
in jungles where track-ways are not nearly as obvious to ethnographers. However, all HGs 
are track-ways readers by „second nature‟, including those living in closed forests41, for just a 
single foot-print in a damp bit of ground on a forest trail can convey a great deal of highly 
salient information.  Terrestial animals in thick forest or scrub largely keep to well-travelled 
routes or „game trails‟. Therefore one only needs to see a few prints now and again where the 
trail crosses damp spots to discover whether a targetted animal has heard you and is bolting 
or is still „cruising‟, how far ahead of you it is and so on.  
Another more generalized reason TWR‟s possible relevance to hominin evolution has not 
been fully explored may be due to the „no thought before language‟ paradigm that has been 
so prevalent until just recently in certain theoretical disciplines
42
, which believed that 
language could not have emerged till 45 ky (when symbolic behaviours first appeared, 
according to a very Eurocentric point of view, now discredited). The few ethnographers and 
evolutionary theorists who have extensively studied modern HG tracking skills, and have 
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 They augment TWR by proceeding in utter silence and using directional listening for audial clues; mimicking 
other animals (mating calls for example) is also a good method for getting them to approach within killing 
distance (see Botha and Knight 2009). The Ache are excellent jungle trackers: Hill and Hawkes (1983) however 
said they could not see the tracks and other traces they were following. 
42
 Personally I have always found this idea extremely bizarre. So have the builders, artists (especially film-
makers), hunters, sportsmen etc. that I have happened to mention it to. How could we forget all the day-
dreaming we did when young, and still do as adults? Why do all the visual media have such a powerful effect on 
our minds and emotions? Our mentally simulated narratives often are and always were very visually mimetic. 
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thus realized how cognitively demanding full-blown TWR can be, may have been influenced 
by this „given wisdom‟. They therefore posited that such cognitive skills could only have 
been a recent acquisition: that is, around 45 ky (for example Hewes 1994, Liebenberg 1990
43
, 
Noble and Davidson 1996).  
Yet another reason may be that many cognitive evolutionary theorists believe, because of 
„simple‟ Oldowan and Acheulian technology, that we must have been restricted to 
scavenging large animals before around 500 ka, and hunted only small animals habitually. 
Whether our ancestors did or did not actively run down large game before 500 ka is 
somewhat irrelevant to my thesis anyway: many smaller animals, especially secretive 
nocturnal species, can only be found by TWR techniques by a carnivorous primate with no 
scent-trailing ability. So by task analysis alone the very weak hominin olfactory sense makes 
habitual TWR and application of its information by habilis/erectus hominins a very safe bet.  
Many theorists however, especially evolutionary psychologists, have never doubted that 
hominins were fully fledged HGs from at least 2 mya onwards. The recent evidence of 3.4 
mya cut-marked bones (McPherron et al 2010) from an animal as large as a cow indicates we 
should probably assume they were on their way to being cognitively capable of a very simple 
HG life-way well before 2mya
44
. I think the reasons these theorists have been disregarding 
TWR are the most understandable (as compared to those already given) and there are three. 
None of them had ever realized that TWR was (a) so informationally rich; (b) cognitively 
demanding; and (c) ecologically and socially so salient (Sterelny pers.comm).  
In my opinion the most telling reason is (c) for it is also true of Paul Shepard (1996): they had 
not seen TWR‟s potential socio-ecological orienteering role. Otherwise the penny would have 
probably dropped due to its obvious relevance to the highly orthodox social brain hypothesis. 
Here we have arrived at the crucial addition to Shepard‟s powerful insight into the hominin 
triggering track-ways story. It is crucial because it provides the final missing piece of our 
cognitive evolution puzzle: our ancestors initially entered the TWR niche in the social 
domain.  
I argue this triggered the incremental evolution of the HNF and associated elsewhere-and-
when social competences. A million or more years later these competences made it possible 
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 I repeat: Liebenberg (2008) now thinks erectus was a persistence hunter, and therefore must have had 
reasonably good TWR skills. 
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 This is one of the reasons I posit habilene/erectus only started regularly obtaining large mammals because 
they had to due to environmental contingencies. 
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to habitually and intentionally apply TWR in the extractive foraging domain by co-
operatively hunting large animals in a very goal-directed, narrative/predictive manner. What 
my readers need to remember here is that there is no lower or upper limit to the cognitive 
acuity demanded by exploitation of track-ways, from very basic to extremely fine-grained. 
Fully developed TWR and its informational use in hunting is both a social „character-reading‟ 
endeavour and an intellectual, scientific pursuit of natural history knowledge.  
Scientists are always talking about „tracking‟ various phenomenological events. In the 
terminology of cognitive linguistics, „tracking‟ is a dead metaphor: it is such a universal 
human way of finding out what is happening in the real world, it has become an unconscious 
„way of speaking‟ in every language you may care to mention. One might even say TWR 
potentially demands the intellectual capacity for inductively understanding everything that 
has happened unobserved in the real world based on empirical evidence, including what the 
mouse droppings lying next to the nibbled cheese in the your cupboard might mean.  TWR is 
not an all or nothing capacity. 
At various points I have reiterated that we must have entered the TWR niche in the social 
domain, mainly because the HNF is above all a faculty for social cognitive competences. 
Now that we have explored the cognitive demands and possible applications of TWR when 
hunting other species, we can begin to understand why social TWR markedly increased pre-
hominin social complexity, thus triggering the evolution of the hominin narrative faculty.  
What we will discuss in the next chapter is (1) where, when and why only our ancestors 
entered this unique cognitive-behavioural niche; and (2) how it affected the pre-hominin 
social domain. Then we will identify (1) the great ape cognitive/behavioural traits that 
provided a window of opportunity for entering the social TWR niche; (2) how simple social 
TWR triggered the evolution of the hominin narrative faculty.      
 
          ***************************** 
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Chapter 4. Social TWR and the Hominin Narrative Faculty 
4.0 The Laetoli Fossilized Footprints  
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About 3.6 million years ago three of our pre-habilene ancestors walked across a flat area 
bordering an upland lake in part of the Rift Valley of Eastern Africa now called Laetoli. Their 
footprints (along with those of many other animals
45
) were perfectly recorded in 10cm of 
volcanic ash, deposited in several layers by a nearby volcano that had been erupting every 
few hours for the last fortnight. Very soon afterwards a thin layer of limestone bearing 
sediment was laid over the ash which indelibly „cemented‟ all extant footprints into fossilized 
track-ways.  
These hominin track-ways were rather fortuitously found in 1976, on the way back to camp 
from an adjacent dig, by an archaeologist working with Mary Leakey. He was bending over 
to pick up a piece of dried elephant dung to throw back at one of his companions. He thus 
saw the indentations of one or two of the recently exposed fossilized footprints due to the 
angle of the fading evening light. 
The Laetoli Track-ways are undoubtedly one of the greatest of all paleo-archaeological finds, 
for they proved incontrovertibly that hominins were fully bipedal by such an early date, well 
before the earliest (until very recently) evidence of stone tools at 2.6 my. But they also tell a 
story (like all track-ways) that provides us with some understanding of their perpetrators‟ 
cognitive capacities.  
As we can see, although two adults and a juvenile made these prints (69 mostly perfectly 
preserved prints over 27 meters), at a cursory glance there appear to be only two sets of 
prints, those of one adult and one juvenile, walking side by side and hand in hand (because 
the gap between them is so consistently the same). This is because, as a close inspection later 
revealed (by Alan Root, a wildlife photographer and an expert tracker), the slightly smaller 
adult was stepping quite exactly in the prints of the larger (Harris 1987). 
Like all track-ways they are extremely informative, and especially so in this case because of 
their age. We are going to tease out that information in the next two sections, and this 
analysis can be taken as another example of full-blown TWR cognition. First we will deal 
with what they tell us about the physical and ecological attributes of their authors, and then 
discuss what they reveal about these hominins‟ cognitive capacities.  
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 All these animals were going to the lake nearby for water. Rabbits were the most plentiful species, followed 
by ostriches (Leakey 1979). 
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I then explain why only our great-ape lineage entered the TWR niche. This is followed by a 
description of the increase in social complexity that was the inevitable result, and caused 
selection for better social TWR skills. The nature of track-ways demanded the co-evolution 
of a unique cognitive faculty for social elsewhere-and-when narrative imagination, which 
later made more intentional systematic tracking of other hominins possible.  
I next turn to the evolution of the HNF, beginning with delineating the great-ape social 
competence that made an initial entry into the social TWR niche possible: the capacity for 
here-and-now true imitation. I then argue that it was this capacity plus great-ape here-and 
now intention reading skills or incipient TOM (theory of mind), combined with the continual 
exploitation by hominins of their own personal track-ways that made the evolution of 
autonoetic (self-knowing) autobiographical narrative memory possible.  
I defined the concept of autonoesis (Tulving 1985) in my introduction (section 1.0). For 
example, autonoesis is the sense of self that enables children over the age of three to know 
that they are pretending to be someone else. I repeat: without this autonoetic sense of an 
intentional personal past there can be no sense of an intentional personal future, and therefore 
none of the mental-time travel required for anticipatory cognition for instance (Suddendorf 
1997; Corballis and Lea 1999; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007).  
Without the autonoetic sense of an intentional self travelling from the past into the future 
there can be no awareness that others have autonoetic intentional selves, and therefore no 
narrative faculty or any of the elsewhere-and-when uniquely hominin social competences. I 
present my model of the hominin narrative faculty and the four cornerstone elsewhere-and-
when social competences in chapter five, and then present developmental evidence that the 
narrative faculty emerges between the ages of three and four in all normal humans. I also 
present comparative evidence that it is this faculty that turns the here-and-now social 
competences of chimps and children younger than the age of three into elsewhere-and-when 
competences of post four-year old humans. 
Most cognitive theorists and neuroscientists would agree that “self knowingness” or 
autonoesis (Tulving 1985), which equates with episodic (also coined by Tulving) or 
autobiographical memory is a cognitive trait peculiar to the hominin lineage (Suddendorf , in 
Corballis and Lea 1999, Suddendorf and Corballis 2007 for review). To reiterate: in his 
review of developments in the human evolution debate since 1985, Tulving (2001) states that 
the evolution of human autonoetic episodic/autobiographical (=what I call self-narrative) 
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memory was obviously the cognitive key to the evolution of all hominin culture and 
communication. The next two chapters in particular fully support that view, and explain why 
social TWR was the trigger for the evolution of autonoesis. 
My impression after much research is that no cognitive evolutionary theorist has directly 
addressed the central problem of when and how this autonoetic or episodic/autobiographical 
cognitive capacity for an intentional self-narrative began to evolve, and why only in our 
great-ape lineage. I believe this is because it has been widely assumed that it could only have 
emerged much later in our evolution. Most theorists, Dennett
46
 included, think it could not 
have been in place before linguistic language. I argue it is the key to our unique social 
competences, including the language capacity; that it has been evolving incrementally ever 
since we entered the social TWR niche; and that it was already somewhat entrenched in the 
mind/brain of the hominins who made the Laetoli track-ways 3.6 million years ago.  
 4.1 Physical and Ecological Attributes of the Laetoli Hominins 
The Laetoli hominins‟ track-ways show they were obligately bipedal, since their feet were 
almost completely „humanoid‟, with a non-opposable big toe. They made prints nearly 
identical to those made by the habitually unshod feet of teen-aged modern HGs. Although 
many theorists have claimed that australopithecines could have made these prints, fossil 
evidence of  their foot structure indicates a still somewhat opposable big toe, useful for 
grasping branches when climbing trees, and quite a bit shorter than the other toes (Tuttle, 
Webb et al. 1990; Tuttle, Webb et al. 1991) (see illustrations next page). 
I tend to agree with Tuttle, but on the other hand, I think the adults‟ prints look more flat-
footed than the Machiguenga teenager‟s foot (see page 74). The prints do not look like they 
were made by the feet of endurance runners, because they do not indicate a high arch or 
instep. We discussed endurance hunting by erectus hominins in my third chapter: it requires 
systematic TWR skills and therefore a fairly well established narrative faculty. Therefore I 
conclude these Laetoli hominins were probably still simple/opportunistic social trackers in 
the main, not yet systematic trackers of other animals. 
When I first saw Laetoli Track-ways illustrations several years ago it immediately occurred 
to me that since (1) the juvenile was undoubtedly hand-in-hand with one of the adults; and (2) 
a juvenile primate would be far more likely to be travelling hand in hand with its mother, it is  
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  In his book „Consciousness Explained’  Dennett describes autonoesis, or „consciousness‟, as “the center of 
narrative gravity”. 
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How could an australopithecine hind-foot with this skeletal structure make the above foot-print? 
 
From Tuttle, Web et al (1990): In illustration immediately above: (a) is Laetoli print, (b) is Machiquenga teenager‟s 
print, and (c) is a photo of his habitually unshod feet. 
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Juvenile‟s left foot clearly shows non-opposable big toe and flat-footedness. However, young 
children do tend to be more flat-footed than older humans.(From Modern Human Origins 
website, photo by John Reader). 
 
extremely likely that the adults were male and female, with the male travelling first. As we 
can see, difference in adult print-size was minimal. 
Since the size of one‟s feet usually corresponds to the size of one‟s body, this indicated to me 
that sexual dimorphism must have already been much reduced. Australopithecines are known 
to have been much more sexually dimorphic than habilene/erectus hominins. I decided they 
were not made by australopithecines for that reason alone. Ardipithecus (4.4 mya) is now 
known to have already been minimally sexually dimorphic, with very reduced male canines 
when compared to both chimps and australopithecines (White et al 2009, Suwa et al 2009), so 
my earlier track-ways interpretation has been thoroughly vindicated.  
In sum, the above TWR physical information indicated to me that some very habilene-like 
hominin species was extant at 3.6 mya, a million years before Oldowan Culture emerged. 
Therefore I began to explore the idea that our ancestors were on the way to some sort of 
cognitive and neurological re-arrangement well before 2.6 mya. Four years later evidence of 
cut-marked bones dated 3.4 mya has just been found (McPherron et al 2010). I repeat: the 
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cut-marked bones were from a cow-sized animal and the nearest source of suitable stone was 
6km away. This certainly indicates cognitive advancement beyond the ape mind-set.  
I also noted that these track-ways were found on what had been an open highland watershed 
on the shore-line of a lake (=lacustrine environment) at the time they were made. It therefore 
occurred to me that the Laetoli hominins might have been habitual foragers of wetland flora 
and fauna, given that much of that fauna does not require sharp stone tools to procure or be 
made edible, especially thin-skinned catfish and easily opened shellfish.  
As it turns out, we now know the back-molars of 4.5 mya Ardipithecus were already quite 
small, indicating a far more omnivorous diet than the more herbivorous australopithecines, 
which had larger molars than habilus/erectus. This strongly indicates the smaller molars of 
the latter true hominins are a primitive feature: they did not evolve because our ancestors 
suddenly starting eating large quantities of meat after 2.6 mya.  
What all this new evidence adds up to is that some habilene-like hominin, already much 
smarter than any other ape, must have been around long before 2.3 mya, and probably had a 
staple diet of wetland flora and fauna, just as I had conjectured. My theory has also been 
further confirmed by incontrovertible evidence that hominins were eating large amounts of 
catfish, turtles, and crocodiles at 1.95 mya (Braun et al 2010) and at other earlier sites 
(Verhaegen and Puech 2010, Stewart 1994 for full reviews).  
My speculative theorizing about the 3.6 mya hominin life-ways has always been based on the 
Laetoli Prints, in addition to: (a) all early hominin fossils were preserved in wetlands or 
floodplains, and stone and/or bone caches were deposited in water or very near to it; (b) my 
own first-hand knowledge of how much easier it is to live by hunting and gathering near 
wetlands or estuaries, due to their resource richness, in the form of fish, shellfish, edible 
succulent plants, bird‟s eggs and so on.  
I also knew the nutrients from a fish and shell-fish diet are far more high-quality than those 
gained from meat (in fact their quality as „brain food‟ is only equalled by those obtained from 
brains and marrow-Broadhurst et al 1998). This wetlands diet idea was then quite 
unorthodox, but quite a few theorists have since realized such a staple diet would have more 
than adequate to fuel an expanding brain, in combination with bird‟s eggs, fledglings, and 
small aquatic mammals such as cane-rats.  
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Shell-fish are easy to open, catfish are so easy to catch with the bare hands even bonobos can 
capture them. Modern Africans still procure them this way. They have thin skin with no 
scales and therefore would have been easy to eat for a fangless hominin without sharp tools. 
In short, the idea of a stable diet of wetlands fauna and flora for early hominins is rapidly 
becoming quite orthodox (Cunnane and Stewart 2010 for review of the literature).
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I have described this speculative journey because it is a very good example of the information 
to be gained from reading the track-ways and other signs left behind by a species, without 
ever seeing it in the flesh, combined with practical knowledge (folk biology) of the typical 
ecologies of differing environments. I posit erectus was able to migrate throughout the 
warmer parts of the Old World by 1.6mya (at the latest) because their mind/brain was already 
capable of this kind of folk-biology plus a degree of systematic TWR cognition. In short, I 
think they were a lot smarter than envisaged by many other evolutionary theorists. As we 
shall now discover, the 3.6 mya Laetoli Prints also provide crucial information about their 
authors‟ cognitive attributes.  
4.2 Cognitive Attributes of the Laetoli Hominins 
It is obvious to any tracker that one of the adults and the juvenile were walking in parallel 
very close together, but not close enough to be arm-in-arm: they were holding hands. The 
adult in question was most likely the second adult who had slightly smaller feet, because as I 
pointed out in section 3.1, a juvenile is more likely to be travelling close to a female, 
probably its mother. Female hominins usually have smaller feet than males. It is highly 
significant therefore that Mary Leakey (Harris 1987) stated that it looked as if the juvenile‟s 
prints were made later than the other dual track-way
48
. 
If the juvenile‟s footprint was made later then the second adult holding the hand of the 
juvenile must have been following the first adult‟s track-way sometime later than it was 
made. Here we have arrived at the most crucial consideration regarding the cognitive 
attributes of our 3.6 mya Laetoli ancestors. It is the lynch-pin of the chronology of my 
triggering track-ways theory. 
Anyone who has ever tried to do what the female (let‟s take the leap) was doing, 
continuously stepping exactly into someone else‟s footprints, will know how difficult a 
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 These theorists, however, think it was a fish and shellfish diet that caused the brain expansion of hominins. I 
do not agree with such a simplistic scenario, of course. 
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 There would undoubtedly have been a great deal of input to her reading of the ancient story told by these 
track-ways from the expert tracker Alan Root. 
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behaviour it is to maintain, especially over such a long distance. The difficulty arises because 
it requires prolonged concentration or mental detachment from other here-and-now 
motivations, and a fine-grained bodily self-awareness, especially if the leader is somewhat 
larger and therefore has a naturally longer gait. Mary Leakey and her fellow paleo-
archaeologists tried to imitate the second adult hominin back at camp and came to the same 
realization. 
Alan Root reported (Harris1987) that he had seen very young chimps doing the same thing 
when playing „follow the leader games‟. This is the only incidence of this behaviour I have 
found mentioned in the primatology/comparative psychology literature. So either chimp 
observers have taken no notice of it (which I doubt very much because it is a very human-like 
behaviour) or it is a fairly rare phenomenon, in which case it is evolutionarily inconsequential 
(in the case of chimp evolution, not ours).  
Very young chimps do spend a lot more time in the bipedal mode than adults, so I suspect 
there is something important about the combination of being able to see one‟s own feet at all 
times, plus the inherently greater complexity of four-footed track-ways, that makes it easier 
to cognitively exploit bipedal prints. It is certainly obvious that one must be able to see one‟s 
own feet to do what these young chimps and the smaller Laetoli adult hominin were doing. 
On my first reading, because it was reported that the juvenile‟s prints looked as if they were 
made later, I decided that the adult female (?) was literally following in the adult male‟s (?) 
footsteps some time later both for safety and in order to find him. Then my supervisor 
(Sterelny pers.comm.) commented that one does not need to step so exactly into footprints for 
safety, so safety is unlikely to be the only motivation.  
I therefore began to think, and still do, that this emulative/imitative behaviour would 
constitute the simplest, cognitively least demanding form of opportunistic social TWR, and 
could have evolved out of the here-and-now imitative cognition young chimps must possess 
in order to step in each other‟s prints in the here-and-now. I am suggesting here that adult 
Ardipithecans had commandeered this young ape behaviour a million years before the Laetoli 
Prints were made, for the sake of safe passage through featureless boggy wetlands. We will 
discuss this idea further in the next section. 
On the other hand she might have only been stepping in the first adult‟s prints so exactly 
because of the utter strangeness of the volcanic ash she was walking in, and normally would 
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not have bothered to do so when searching for someone by following their track-way. It could 
not have been because the ash was still hot, for the following reasons. Leakey (1987) 
describes one point where the juvenile‟s prints appear to lag slightly and turn to the left. She 
described her vision of the juvenile pausing slightly to look at something interesting in the 
distance to the left quite poetically.  
I think what this means is they were in no hurry, so the as was not hot, and the female was 
slowly and very cautiously stepping exactly into the footprints in front of her. When pairs of 
modern !Kung San hunters head off in the morning at a fast trot, whoever is behind places his 
feet fairly exactly in the prints of the „trail-breaking‟ front man (Silberbauer 1981). They say 
they do this for two good reasons: only the front hunter has to concentrate on not snapping 
twigs (which would scare prey) or stepping on thorns with his feet (which would make any 
further jogging very painful) and the man behind does not.  
Why one slightly smaller adult hominin at Laeotili was stepping so exactly into the tracks of 
the larger hominin 3.6 mys ago is most parsimoniously explained in this way, for they were 
walking in 10cms of very recently deposited volcanic ash at the time. However, the 
discoverers of these track-ways have stated the juvenile‟s prints were made later, and they 
had an expert tracker with them, Alan Root.  
Since he was a professional wildlife photographer, I for one do not doubt his tracking skills. 
The juvenile could not have been travelling on his own, because in that case his track-way 
would not be so consistently the same distance from the dual track-way. If he had been, I bet 
his prints would have been in the dual prints as well. I also think if the female had been at the 
leader‟s heels, her prints would not have been so exactly in his (?), simply because she would 
have felt safer in his (?) company. 
The problem I have, being a seasoned tracker myself, is this: the juvenile‟s prints might just 
look fresher than the dual prints. A sure sign of freshness is sharply defined outlines, since the 
edges of prints tend to crumble as they dry and become more blurred after an hour or so. The 
dual prints might look older because they were more blurred at the edges due to the 
impossibility of achieving a perfect match when stepping in another person‟s prints.  
What is needed is a modern forensic examination of to see if there is any material between 
the first and second adult prints, such as ash (it had been falling intermittently for two weeks) 
or pollen. It would only require damaging one dual print, after all. If there is any material 
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then (1) the material will be identical to what is under the juvenile prints; and (2) she will 
definitely have been following the leading adult sometime later in order to find him.  
Now that the new evidence of cut-marked bones at 3.4 mya has turned up (McPherron et al 
2010), my TWR interpretation of these famous footprints has become more positive
49
. As I 
stated in section 3.1, the Laetoli hominins must have already possessed some semblance of 
the narrative faculty in order to be so much more cognitively anticipatory than chimps. This 
indicates to me that goal-directed searching for another band-member by stepping in their 
prints was already passé for our Laetoli 3.6 mya hominins. Therefore normally she would not 
have bothered to step exactly in someone‟s prints when trying to follow their track-way in 
order to find them. She was doing it purely for safety. This last version of our Laetoli track-
ways saga is now the one I think most likely, given that the juvenile‟s track-way was made 
later. 
It is extremely likely that the Laetoli hominins had never experienced such a strange 
phenomenon as volcanic ash before. The female would have been unable to see what was 
underneath, so walked slowly and as exactly as possible in the footprints of the absentee 
adult. For our purposes however, no matter how one interprets the evidence, the Laeotili 
fossil track-ways indicate very robustly indeed some ancestral adult pre-hominins were 
cognitively exploiting conspecific track-ways to some degree before 3.6 mya. I think they 
were probably doing so a million years before this date, for reasons presented in the next 
section. The question that arises now of course, is why only our great-ape lineage entered the 
TWR cognitive-behavioural niche 
4.3 Why Only the Hominin Lineage Entered the Social TWR Niche. 
Chimpanzees in the wild exhibit incipiently many aspects of human behaviour and cognition, 
including making tools like simple spears for impaling bush-babies in hollow trees (Pruetz 
and Bertolani 2007), assembling nut-cracking stones, and fishing-rods for termites (but they 
do not use tools to make other tools). They also regularly kill and eat smaller creatures such 
as colobus monkeys. They exhibit flexible group hunting behaviours analogous to that any 
pack of wolves, wild dogs, or lionesses engage in, learnt by trial and error. However, the only 
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 Others might think one cannot assume the Laetoli hominins were the same species that cut the bones, because 
they think there were probably quite a few hominin species around (Sterelny pers. comm.). I will make two 
points in reply: (1) whichever species cut those bones, it was probably smart enough to follow  conspecifics‟ 
track-ways in order to find them; (2) if there were so many other species of hominins around, why hasn‟t fossil 
evidence of their very humanoid, fully bipedal feet turned up? Many theorists class co-existing 
australopithecines as hominins. I do not, partly because of the very humanoid nature of these footprints. 
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instances in which they appear to exhibit what appear to be truly goal-directed hunting 
behaviours occur when they are hunting conspecifics.   
When a band of males patrols the edge of their territory looking for chimp strangers (which 
they will sometimes attack and kill; they also eat infants, but not adults) they exhibit true 
group cohesion, maintain a communal silence (they will glare at a companion who makes a 
noise) in order to be able to hear unsuspecting strangers foraging. They also take note of 
signs such as old nests and faeces of other chimps, which they sniff, just any other mammal 
would. The one thing they never do, however, is what any human would automatically do: 
look for footprints of strangers.  This is a highly significant difference, for like all primates 
they are very good at visually reading patterns, due to their exploitation of very patchy 
resources such as fruiting trees. Here is where the question „why us‟ naturally arises. 
I think the answer has three major components. The first and most obvious is perceptual: 
besides the same excellent pattern-reading visual primate sensibilities as other apes, our 
earliest ancestors must have had the same impoverished olfactory sense compared to most 
other mammals, which use scent and/or sound as social and territorial markers in the main. 
Even chimps have a better olfactory sense than ours, and obligate bipedalism would have 
physically removed ground-level scent trails from hominins‟ olfactory capability. Olfactory 
perception would have been lost, on the „use it or lose it‟ principle.  
The second is morphological and behavioural: they were fully bipedal with a very humanoid 
foot structure, more suited to walking and running (plus wading and swimming) than 
climbing, by at least 3.6 my ago (as the Laeotili Footprints prove). This means they must 
have spent much more time than any other ape on terra firma, for australopethicine fossil foot 
bones indicate a more opposable, shorter „big toe‟ still somewhat adapted to an arboreal life-
way.  
A recently discovered almost complete fossil skeleton of a 3yr old female A. afarensis (dated 
3.3 mya) has a gorilla-like shoulder structure, its hyoid bone (part of the throat structure) 
shows it had laryngeal (throat-area) air-sacs like all other great apes except for hominins, and 
its hand and foot bones indicate a still very arboreal life-way (Alemseged, Spoor et al. 2006). 
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There is said to be “some evidence” of bipedality50. The skeleton is embedded in sandstone, 
so delineating it for full study will take a few more years of laborious work. 
In the case of the complete hind-limb of a 4.4 mya Ardipithecus ramidus  fossil, there can be 
no doubt left that this likely ancestor to both hominins and australopithecines was fully 
bipedal but still had a foot useful for arboreal activities (Suwa, Asfaw et al. 2009; White, 
Asfaw et al. 2009). Its big toe was far more opposable than those of the later 
australopithecines. One would assume then that the Ardipithecans still nested at night in trees 
in their socio-ecological niche in upland closed forests, but foraged in open 
lacustrine/riparian/alluvial floodplains and swamps during the day within those forests.  
The bipedal stance would also have made tracks more salient, for the head is above the feet, 
not in front of them as with four-legged creatures. One can see one‟s feet making prints if one 
is bipedal. It is being bipedal that makes exact matching of footprints at all possible. Only 
young chimps in the bipedal mode have ever been seen to match foot-prints.  An increase in 
field of view could make patterns of prints more noticeable. Another factor would be that if 
dependent for mobility on only two legs, where one places each foot becomes highly salient 
(especially when carrying heavy loads). Tripping and falling on river stones and/or spraining 
an ankle is threatening to survival for an obligate bipedal species. When one is travelling at 
some speed (jogging) „watching your step‟ becomes even more vital. 
The third reason early hominins entered the social TWR niche is possibly the most important: 
all the archaeological evidence prior to the mid-Pleistocene (stone tool and bone „caches‟) 
indicates that our ancestral preferred environment was lacustrine (lakes, ponds, swamps) 
since the split from the last common ancestor. Recently discovered fossil sites of the earliest 
facultatively bipedal Ardi hominins, from 5.8 Ma onwards, have all been found in what were 
open lacustrine swamps and flood-plains within highland closed forests at the time of 
deposition (White, Asfaw et al. 2009). Unlike in the deep forests chimps tend to live in, track-
ways would be continually present in the mud and sand of swamps and lacustrine/alluvial 
beaches.  
Tracks do not show up nearly as often in closed forests, and most animals, including chimps 
travelling on the ground, use the same well-defined game trails for navigation. The firmness 
of these well-travelled trails means they do not record foot-prints, especially of creatures with 
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 This recent evidence (especially the lack of laryngeal air sacs) also leads me to conclude that they should 
perhaps not be called hominins any longer, as they are in much of the literature. 
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foot-pads (instead of hooves), unless they happen to cross damp places. However damp 
places in deep forest are very often dodged when animals are on the move to new foraging 
spots because the thickness of the understory makes them difficult to traverse. Therefore most 
game trails are on the drier ground of ridges, where travelling is much easier. 
The question naturally arises here as to whether the lacustrine scenario emerges simply 
because fossils are more likely to form in soft muddy substrates. I think this is unlikely for 
four reasons: 
1) All evidence of hominin stone technology and butchering activity is found in such 
sites up to the mid-Pleistocene (including the recent 3.4 mya evidence) 
2) Most modern and historical HGs have preferred to live in or near, and to forage in, 
resource-rich lacustrine, riparian, or estuarine environments 
3) Stone artefacts would not have needed to be in such substrates to be preserved, yet 
all early finds are situated in such substrates  
4) Many of the features of hominin morphology are exhibited only by aquatic or 
semi-aquatic mammals: lack of olfactory glands, sweating, tears, hairlessness, 
fatty enlarged mammary glands, and no laryngeal air-sacs (unlike all other great 
ape species, which I think has to be highly significant, as an indication of under-
water activities).
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Now our excellent primate pattern reading abilities need to be mentioned, but chimps have 
this capacity as well of course. I think the above reasons constitute why they never entered 
the TWR niche: they have always lived in a different socio-ecological niche. 
4.4 The Social Significance of Track-ways. 
All hominids‟ footprints and track-ways are individually recognizable, especially in small 
bands. Age classes (toddlers and juveniles) walk differently from each other on smaller feet 
than adults; adult females have smaller and more slender feet than males; more slender lighter 
people have correspondingly different foot-shapes from larger bulkier people. Within these 
gender, age, and morphology categories, everyone has slightly differently shaped feet from 
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 I think a balanced version of the semi-aquatic ape theory of how we became fully bipedal through wading and 
foraging in watery environments should be taken more seriously by theorists of human evolution. It already is 
by several : e.g. Stringer (1997), Verhaegen and Puech (2000),Tobias (2010). Tobias once championed the „out 
on to the savannah‟ hypothesis. However he has now accepted the semi-aquatic/lacustrine view, after reviewing 
all the evidence collected over the years of a life-time of work in paleo-archaeology.  
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everyone else, with telling asymmetries between feet, idiosyncratic variations in gait, angles 
of heel strike, and so on (see a sample of footprints below. From flickR Photo Share Website) 
 
 
 
 
 
I repeat: (1) San children know their mother‟s footprints from all others by age four without 
being taught how to recognize them; (2) Silberbauer (1981) recounted how Gxwi San hunters 
laughed out loud when asked if it was possible to recognize human footprints because they 
thought the question was absurd; (3) track-ways of all larger animals are just as recognizable 
to a skilled tracker (Liebenberg 1990, Silberbauer 1981).  
 
Being a tracker myself I can state that in the case of humans one can almost always discern 
their age and sex (if they are travelling bare-foot). Even if they are shod one can easily tell 
whether they were just wandering and enjoying the view or headed in a definite direction, 
actively hunting or fishing by a river, or laden with a pack- even whether they were drunk or 
not. I have once or twice amused myself by reading the stories of what went on, under the 
cover of darkness, told by human track-ways on the beach by a motor-camp the next 
morning. 
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When one is going river-fishing or hunting, the very first signs one looks for are fresh  tracks 
of other humans; quite simply because „the early bird gets the worm‟ and tracks made by 
others on the same day means it is probably not worth foraging in that area. If there is no 
„free territory‟ left in the vicinity, then one has no choice but to go „further in‟ or beyond 
where any other human has been if one wants to find whatever one is foraging for.  
Right from the beginning of  our ancestral entry into the social TWR niche the most 
important track-ways for hominins exploring new terrain (besides their own personal track-
ways and those of allies, alloparents and offspring) would have been track-ways of hominin 
strangers whose prints they did not know (as well as those of dangerous predators). In short, 
conspecific track-ways would have been a very important social marker (as canine scent-
posts and scent-trails are social markers). It is crucial here to remember that one‟s own 
recognizable footprints are very important indeed, especially when foraging in boggy areas 
where one cannot see any defining landmarks on the horizon.  
The best way to find one‟s way back to firm ground is to back-track, stepping on your old 
prints. One does this quite naturally with other people‟s prints as well: I did this as a child 
without being told to, when my father began to take me duck-hunting around swamps and 
ponds in marshes. When foraging alone it is taking notice of one‟s own track-ways that 
makes safe and efficient navigation in open featureless wetlands at all possible. This idea of 
continually taking note of one‟s own prints is very important to my thesis, as we shall 
discover in section 4.6.  
4.5 How Social TWR Increased Hominin Social Complexity 
Since all human footprints and track-ways are so individualistic as to be instantly 
recognizable by all members of the same band, and some times last for several days or weeks 
(unlike scents), the possible social complexity ramifications of using footprints as a social 
marker (as cats and dogs use scent) within the daily argy bargy of the earliest hominin social 
domain are enormous. I believe no other version of social complexity theory has ever come 
up with a good reason why the social domain of the earliest hominins should ever have 
become more complex than that of our fission-fusion Machiavellian chimp cousins.  
Any hominin with the ability to recognize and read conspecific track-ways would have 
increased fitness with regard to Machiavellian motives; consider, for instance, dodging 
energy-consuming confrontations with stronger enemies by vacating areas where their fresh 
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track-ways can be seen. And vice versa for setting up optimal co-operative social encounters. 
A sub-dominant hominin male with incipient TWR skill would be able to choose to follow 
the recognizable track-way of an attractive female only when the alpha male‟s track-way is 
nowhere to be seen near hers.  
Being able to follow and find one‟s band when lost or left behind due to environmental 
catastrophe (such as a flash flood or a shower of volcanic ash), or find a strayed ally, sexual 
partner or child in silence when a dangerous predator or other hominin band was nearby, even 
if it was raining „cats and dogs‟, would also be very useful. Tracks will last for quite some 
time in the rain; almost all scents are instantly wiped out by water.  This is why land-based 
carnivores are loathe to hunt in the rain or in very wet swamps, and are so obsessive about re-
marking scent posts in their home territories. Being able to dodge dangerous local predators 
on the basis of recognizing their track-ways would also increase fitness (remember my 
cougar story: I never went near that copse of trees again). 
All the above is plausible, and would also apply to foraging and co-operative interactions. 
The evolutionary upshot is this: even the simplest cognitive level of TWR, having to literally 
step in the old tracks of another individual hominin in order to maintain mental concentration, 
or a working memory of them when trying to find them, would be selected for through both 
sexual and group selection in the social domain alone. However I think initially they began 
stepping in each other‟s prints and their own old prints purely for safety and orienteering. 
The semi-aquatic wetlands socio-ecological niche of the earliest hominins plays a central role 
in my hypothesis here. I argue that stepping in one‟s own and others‟ old prints is what made 
living and foraging in such environments at all possible. Therefore entering the social TWR 
niche at such a simple level immediately increased fitness. Even simple TWR of social 
partners both allows for a more complex form of fission-fusion organization (because you 
can assemble/separate/reassemble in more complex ways) and because you can know 
something of what others have done out of eyeshot. In effect, this elsewhere-and-when 
knowledge constitutes something like gossip. 
Imagine coming upon the month-old tracks of someone who had since died, for instance, one 
of your alloparents say. Or imagine a young male finding a track-way of the female he has 
been currently cohabiting with heading off into the reeds beside the track-way of his closest 
male ally or a more dominant male. I think it is extremely obvious that social TWR would 
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have amped up the social complexity of early hominin societies to an exponentially greater 
degree than the fission/fusion society of chimps.  
The narrative cognitive capacity to figure out what others had been up to from their old track-
ways, during the periods when you hadn‟t been able to see them, would have been heavily 
selected for. However, I think the narrative faculty for intentional tracking of other hominins 
took quite some time to evolve after the initial entry into the social TWR niche. 
4.6 The Initial Entry into the Social TWR Cognitive Niche 
I think somewhere between the 4.4 mya facultatively bipedal Ardipithecans and the 3.6 mya 
obligately bipedal Laetoli hominins our ancestors began habitually stepping into conspecific 
prints for safety and orienteering because they also had become obligate foragers in open 
featureless wetlands. Exploiting conspecific footprints for safety and orienteering when 
foraging is ecological of course, but it would also be social when foraging with others, or re-
finding one‟s band when foraging alone. There is a seamless gradient between the two 
domains. I accent the social aspect in my thesis because I think the HNF and the hominin 
elsewhere-and-when social competences had to have evolved in the psychological „crucible‟ 
of intimate relationships between the self and important others.  
The most intimate relationship of all is one‟s relationship with one‟s self, of course, and one‟s 
own old footprints are like one‟s shadow, impossible to ignore or get away from. They would 
have had a continual mirroring effect, bringing the personal past to mind for any track-ways 
reading hominin. This is a crucial consideration I return to in depth in the next section, for I 
think it can explain how autonoetic autobiographical memory evolved. Right now I want to 
limit our discussion to the initial hominin entry into conspecific track-ways exploitation: 
stepping into someone else‟s prints when walking at their heels. 
Such a here-and-now imitative cognitive effort in physical self-awareness and muscle control 
could have been possible given a still chimp-sized brain, since (1) we have one anecdotal 
report of juvenile chimps stepping in each other‟s prints when playing bipedal „follow the 
leader‟ games; and (2) adult chimps are capable of true associative here-and-now imitation. 
They also have some here-and-now theory of mind or intentionality-reading capability. This 
makes sense, because the two competences are intimately related throughout all social 
interactions between self and others [(Whiten 2008), (Tomasello 2008) for reviews].  
94 
 
I believe these two capacities, when combined with here-and-now stepping in recognizable 
absentee conspecific footprints on a habitual basis, triggered the evolution of the elsewhere-
and-when hominin narrative faculty (HNF). To follow right behind someone and step fairly 
exactly in their footprints is „here and now‟ or associative true imitation. There is no impetus 
towards elsewhere-and-when cognition in such behaviour. As time went on stepping in 
absentee conspecifics‟ footprints for safety and orienteering would have developed quite 
naturally. This would have opened the door to elsewhere-and-when cognition. 
I argue stepping in prints when the author of those prints is nowhere to be seen or heard 
would constitute the beginning of elsewhere-and-when or decoupled true imitation, because 
everyone walks differently, with different gaits, angles of heel-strike, and so on. Therefore 
one has to be imitating the physical mannerisms of an absentee author of a track-way to some 
extent when matching one‟s prints to theirs, not just copying the product of their actions, 
which is emulation. 
Some theorists may disagree, but given the idiosyncratic nature of track-ways, I am still 
inclined to insist matching prints with another absentee hominin is not just elsewhere-and-
when emulation of the product of an action. Although that would be cognitively sophisticated 
in its own right, as Whiten makes clear, the emulation/imitation dichotomy is probably best 
viewed as a continuity anyway (Whiten 2000).  
I therefore hold that true elsewhere-and-when imitation of the past actions of an absentee 
conspecific is what is occurring. That is precisely why matching prints exactly is difficult. 
Prolonged true imitation demands mental concentration and a fine-grained physical 
awareness of one‟s own body. So far we are talking about physical as-if role playing, 
requiring an autonoetic physical sense of self. But mental concentration means detachment 
from other here-and-now motivations, and here is where our window to the sense of an 
intentional self and others as intentional selves opens.  
It opens because of the nature of track-ways. Since track-ways are immediately and 
inexorably directional they appear to be made by an intentional being carrying out various 
activities in a goal-directed manner. They tell stories about what their authors have been up 
to, or aiming for, in the past. Hominin prints and track-ways are also easily recognizable.  
Since male chimps sometimes spend a lot of time alone, and a female and a male sometimes 
disappear to be on their own together for a few days, we can assume that early hominins did 
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the same. For here-and-now minded chimps, they would be „out of mind‟ for the rest of the 
troupe over the time period in which they were absent. This would not remain true for very 
long for early track-ways-exploiting hominins.  
Even if in the beginning absentee band members‟ footprints were only opportunistically 
stepped into for safety or orienteering, hominin track-ways are recognizable, and therefore 
can tell stories about what specific, well-known individuals had been up to. Now for two 
crucial points:  
(1) Stepping in an absentee conspecific‟s track-way of footprints would constitute 
acting out the story of what they had been up to in an as-if role playing manner, 
using the physically self-aware cognition needed for exacting imitation.  
(2) This scenario would often be repeated with one‟s own old recognizable track-
ways, precisely because track-ways are so durable.  
Since stepping in old track-ways for safety and orienteering would have definitely increased 
fitness, the above cognitive scenario would have been happening on a daily basis. In fact, I 
think stepping in one‟s own old track-ways would have happened every day in every way 
when foraging. Some of my readers might be saying here, but this is foraging or ecological 
TWR, not social TWR.  
I have already said the gradient between social and ecological navigation is seamless. The 
main motivation in extractive foraging is to obtain whatever resource one is foraging for and 
then get it back to the safety of home base as quickly and efficiently as possible. If hominins 
were already co-operative breeders to some extent, as Ardipethcans‟ lack of male canines 
would indicate, home base included other band members that were depending on that 
resource for their well-being. This kind of extractive foraging is all about social motivation. 
4.7 The Self-Mirroring Effects of One’s Own Track-ways. 
To reiterate: one‟s own foot-prints are like one‟s shadow, impossible to get away from, have 
a „mirroring‟ effect on what one has been up to in the past, and yet unlike any scent-trail, can 
be extremely decoupled in time from your present self as their referent, simply because of 
their much greater durability.  
Most modern humans have never spent any time alone in the wilderness hunting and 
trapping. Therefore they cannot know just how important one‟s own old track-ways are when 
it comes to efficient daily navigation. This is especially true of open, featureless 
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environments such as swampy wetlands covered in tall grasses and reeds, river-flats covered 
in shrubbery above head height, or dry-land flat areas covered in bush or scrub where one 
cannot see defining landmarks on any near horizon.  
As the angle of the sun changes during the day, or cloud cover ensues and then departs, even 
the very same scene you saw an hour ago can look completely different due to the effects of 
light on foliage. A wise hunter pauses often to look at where they have just been in order to 
more easily recognize it on their way back to camp or home-base. However there is not a 
hunter born who has never been temporarily lost, or what all hunters call euphemistically, 
“turned-around”, especially in the excitement of the hunting and stalking itself. For the 
animal you are tracking leads you on its own possibly winding journey to wherever you 
finally track it down, stalk it, and kill it.  
Hunters are also continually looking for new territory where there is possibly more game, so 
they are often in somewhat unknown surrounds before they find an animal track-way worth 
following. The most changeable environments of all are wetland and riparian/lacustrine 
environments, due to continually changing water-levels, which rise with every rain-fall, and 
lower during every dry period. We are talking of changes that can occur over just a few hours 
here. 
Another factor that anyone who has not hunted large game will not be aware of is this: when 
you are loaded down with a heavy bundle of meat or the gutted carcass of a largish animal, 
finding the quickest and easiest pathway home is vital. To get lost or „turned around‟ then is 
exhausting, and extremely risky in environments where there are dangerous predators and 
scavengers which are very strongly attracted to the smell of blood. I believe this is why 
menstruating females were kept isolated from everyone else in many HG societies 
(Woodburn 1964, 1982 for example).
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 The upshot is that back-tracking home using one‟s own past track-way becomes the bottom-
line modus operandi for returning hunters. One also steps in or very near one‟s old prints for 
the sake of safety when carrying heavy loads. This would also be true for early hominin 
gatherers in featureless wetland environments, of course. One‟s old track-ways also tell 
where one has already been, and this too is very important information. When foraging 
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 This is probably why that famous eccentric in Alaska who tried to live with grizzlies finally got eaten: for the 
first time ever he took a girl-friend in with him for his usual three month stay. About a month later they both got 
eaten. Prey animals are also easily alarmed by the smell of blood: another good reason for the social isolation of 
menstruating females.  
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iteratively in the same territory, I cannot count the times I have suddenly come upon my own 
week-old track-way and realized I had already foraged in that particular area, and therefore it 
was a waste of time to carry on in the direction I had been heading.  
When trapping or snaring one is continually setting traps or snares in new territory (since 
there will obviously be more game in non-trapped areas). Therefore one is continually using 
the track-ways one made yesterday in order to re-find those trap-sites when checking them 
the next day. When gathering one is always using one‟s old tracks to re-find a particularly 
good berry-patch, or bed of water-cress in a swamp, and so on. One is also continually 
exploring new territory when gathering, not just when hunting.  
Scenting animals are very restricted when exploring because their own scent is so ephemeral; 
so they loathe leaving their home-territories when foraging. Ask any pig-hunters: they will 
tell you their dog-packs are forever getting lost when they take them to new territory.
53
 The 
upshot is that foraging early hominins exploiting their own track-ways had a huge 
navigational advantage over all other scenting foragers, especially in changeable wetland 
environments. 
But the main point I want to get to here is this: exploiting one‟s own track-ways on such a 
continual basis means that the stories they tell are continually mirroring what one has been up 
to in the past. The self-tracking hominin discovers that they had stopped to pick a handful of 
berries just there, later stopped to check an old track-way of a deer over there, later still 
stopped to climb a small tree to get their bearings there, and so on. They would also be 
reminded of what their mental states were at the time, especially when combinations of their 
old track-ways and those of other band members (or predators: remember my cougar story) 
told stories about agonistic or positive interactions with other band-members. Similar stories 
would be told by combinations of one‟s most intimate band-members‟ track-ways, as well. 
Therefore I posit that entering the social (socio-ecological if you prefer) TWR cognitive 
niche triggered the evolution of the autonoetic awareness of an intentional self travelling 
through time, and therefore an awareness of other hominins as separate-but-similar time-
travelling intentional selves. This awareness of one‟s own (and therefore others‟) time-
travelling intentional mental states is the cognitive key to the autonoetic self-narrative at the 
core of the hominin narrative faculty, which created the „spin-off‟ hominin cornerstone social 
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 Some pig-hunters put radio collars on their dogs in order to be able to find them again more quickly. 
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cognitive competences. This autobiographical self-awareness also makes second-order 
intentionality possible. 
4.8 The Evolution of Dennett’s Second-Order Intentionality  
Second-order intentionality is the cognitive capacity to know that you know what someone 
else doesn‟t know, because they weren‟t present when you had your personal experience of a 
certain event. It requires autobiographical memory of your own experience of the „who was 
where and when‟ of that event, which dovetails with an elsewhere-and-when theory of mind. 
In other words, one must be able to imagine being „in the mind-and-body‟ of your own past54 
selves in order to have autobiographical memory. Only then can one imagine being „in the 
mind-and-body‟ of the past and present selves of someone else55.  
Dennett (Dennett 1987) stated that how second-order intentionality evolved in the hominin 
mind was the hardest problem in human cognitive evolution to solve, because all primates 
spend most of their time in the company of most members of the troupe. One individual‟s 
experience is nearly always simultaneously everyone‟s experience, or very soon is (consider 
vervet monkeys‟ specific alarm calls for eagles, snakes and, leopards). Anyone who is 
physically absent to a here-and-now mind is very soon mentally absent to that mind. Chimps 
do have some here-and-now theory of mind (TOM), and human toddlers younger than three 
have much more. They are good readers of the intentions of others in the here-and-now. This 
is first-order intentionality, which all higher mammals possess (we will revisit this territory in 
the next chapter). 
I argue here-and-now TOM evolved into the elsewhere-and-when TOM required to imagine 
what someone‟s mental states of desire had been when reading their old track-ways. This 
elsewhere-and-when TOM became second-order intentionality when following one‟s own old 
track-ways, because this is how the autonoetic sense of an autobiographical self-narrative 
evolved. Without the faculty for remembering one‟s past personal experiences, which 
includes what one‟s desires were at the time, one cannot know that one knows something and 
how or why one knows something. If one does have this autonoetic/autobiographical faculty, 
one can know that someone else does not know something one‟s self knows, and why: 
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 If you can have autonoetic autobiographical (=narrative) memory then you can imagine yourself having 
experiences in the future. This enables mental-time-travel (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007). 
55
 As I have said before in an earlier footnote, I am a simulation theorist when it comes to theory of mind 
capability, not a „theory-theorist‟. There is not the space here to discuss this material. 
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because one can remember they weren‟t there when one had the relevant personal experience. 
Only an autonoetic mind can possess second-order intentionality.   
When autobiographical memory or autonoesis evolved it allowed intentional trial-and-error 
auto-rehearsal through comparison of past personal experiences of success or failure. It also 
allowed intentional, autonoetic emulation/imitation of absentee conspecifics, or true pretend-
play. I argue pretend-play is the developmental signature of possession of the narrative 
faculty, and is based on this cognitive competence. Even highly enculturated apes have only 
once or twice exhibited behaviour that could be interpreted as pretend-play. 
Pretend play is based on acting out simple narratives, and as we know, all track-ways tell 
stories. We also know that the way a tracker reads these stories is by imagining being „in the 
minds-and-bodies‟ of the creatures making them. We identify with the characters in a novel 
or a film in the same manner. I suggest the earliest hominins started developing this 
remarkable hominin faculty through imitatively stepping in each other‟s track-ways and their 
own recognizable track-ways as above. As the narrative faculty evolved, imitatively stepping 
bodily in another‟s tracks in order to keep them in mind when trying to find them became 
unnecessary. Tracking hominins became able to narratively imagine being in-the mind-and-
body of the individual that made the recognizable track-way being followed.  
The foot-prints of one‟s child or one‟s mother (including alloparents) are the most important 
track-ways of other band members during the developmental years. Here is our psychological 
motivation for intentional rather than opportunistic social TWR to evolve. I am also still 
digging here for the evolution of elsewhere-and-when mind-reading skills out of the incipient 
here-and-now mind-reading skills of all great-apes.  Reading the mental states of one‟s most 
intimate absentee others would be continually triggered by the else-where-and-when mental 
representations demanded by track-ways analysis, in a co-evolutionary manner. Hrdy has 
pointed out the important fact that with many primates, young juveniles are never out of the 
sight of their mother; and the very young are never out of physical contact (Hrdy 2009).  
If reproductive co-operation is ancient in the hominin lineage, these primate characteristics 
were not true of our ancestors
56
. Therefore finding and re-finding one‟s caregiver was 
important in such a fission/fusion socio-ecological niche. The psychological need to know 
where one‟s child or parent/alloparents were at all times would have driven social TWR skills 
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 We probably had no fur for the young to cling to at a very early stage in our evolution, if we were the semi-
aquatic ape. 
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from opportunistically simple towards intentionally systematic and narratively speculative. 
As I made clear in chapter two the higher cognitive levels of TWR are not possible without 
the narrative faculty. 
The above scenario would dove-tail with developing an autobiographical awareness of one‟s 
own intentionality through reading one‟s own past track-ways. Neural entrenchment of the 
autobiographical narrative memory needed for mental-time travel and the other social 
competences, triggered by reading the stories told by combinations of track-ways that 
included your own past interactions with others, was a definite possibility given the durability 
of track-ways plus social footprint recognition.  
In sum, the every day in every way use of conspecific track-ways in the social domain would 
have led to the evolution of the narrative faculty for imagining agents intentionally acting 
towards goals in the elsewhere-and-when. There are many ways to capture small animals, 
simply but very successfully, without exploiting their track-ways. This is certainly true of 
aquatic fauna, and they of course do not make track-ways.  
But I am including using old-track-ways to re-find good foraging spots in open, featureless 
edaphic flood-plains and swamps, or back-tracking one‟s way to home bases using one‟s own 
prints, in my picture of early, very simple TWR. The selective advantage of these skills is 
obvious; it was probably this ability to navigate using conspecific foot-prints that made 
foraging in such environments possible for a non-olfactory ape. 
 4.9 Summary 
Now we can understand: (1) why entering the social TWR niche caused so much more social 
complexity, creating a cognitive arms-race for better TWR skills, thus triggering the 
evolution of the hominin narrative faculty; and (2) why I put so much weight on the idea that 
TWR must have started in the social domain: the HNF is above all a uniquely hominin social 
faculty. I think hominins were tracking each other long before they had enough of the 
narrative faculty to begin goal-directed tracking of other animals in order to hunt them down.  
The Laetoli Fossilized Footprints indicate that by 3.5 mya some hominins were capable of 
intentionally tracking each other. The 3.4mya cut-marked bones (McPherron et al 2010) also 
point clearly to an anticipatory, narrative cultural and communicative capacity. Hominins 
were already a lot smarter than chimps. Their smartness depended on their capacity for 
intentional planned co-operative behaviours, and as I have laid out in this chapter, this 
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capacity must have been conferred on them by the HNF and associated elsewhere-and-when 
social competences.  
In the next chapter I present my models of the HNF and the four cornerstone cognitive 
competences, and present developmental and comparative evidence that shows: (1) these 
capacities of the hominin mind/brain constitute a qualitative difference from the ape mind; 
(2) they begin to emerge in all normal human children between the age of 3 and 4.  
    *************************** 
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Chapter Five: The Hominin Narrative Faculty and the Cornerstone 
Social Competences. 
5.0 Introduction to the Models 
This section presents and briefly explains my models of the hominin narrative faculty and the 
four cornerstone social cognitive competences (illustrations next page and the following). 
Section two concentrates on the social competence for narrative communication, and hence 
discusses the relevance of the HNF to language invention. The following sections present 
developmental and comparative evidence of (1) the qualitative uniqueness of the HNF and 
the cornerstone social competences, (2) their developmental emergence in all normal humans, 
and (3) their phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins. 
Take the cougar-tracking story presented in my preface for an example: elsewhere-and-when 
cognition was necessary to read the combinatory narrative of my past-self‟s track-way and 
that of the unseen cougar. My twelve-year-old self was momentarily pretending to be „in the 
mind-and-body‟ of an earlier self and the cougar‟s past-self.  I could not do this without an 
autonoetic sense of an intentional self that could know it was projecting that same sense of 
self into the cougar‟s mind, as if the cougar were an intentional being like me. I also could 
not be writing these words in the here-and-now without being able to remember that 
autobiographical experience. It is part of my self-narrative.  
As I write I can see the pristine clarity of sunlight on the sparkling snow, the gloom under the 
spruce trees, the steep bare hill towering behind them. At the centre of this envisioning 
process the „motif‟ image of one of the cougar‟s „huge‟ footprints keeps re-occurring. But in 
my „mind‟s eye‟ I see a substitute cougar for the one I never saw at all. That image is of a 
rather tatty, disgruntled looking cougar I saw two years later in a zoo on the other side of the 
planet. Behind that image looms a sort of „ghostly‟ image of some huge fierce cross between 
a cougar and a sabre-tooth tiger, probably because my mind has recently spent so much time 
imagining the world of the Oldowan hominin.  
In this manner our autobiographical memories are always being partially re-constructed, and 
new narratives are continually being embedded in the larger on-going self-narrative. Re-
adjustments continue as we mature, because new experiences add nuances to old stories, and 
newly-gained semantic knowledge is added to the creative amalgams of images as well. A lot 
of narrative mentalizing is about pretending, or „as-if‟ substitution of characters (for example 
my substitute zoo cougar) and events, in order to make sense or provide narrative continuity. 
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My point here is our autobiographical memories are not episodic like photograph albums, 
with gaps between the photos.  
We have incorrigibly narrative minds. The brain automatically fills the gaps between „snap-
shot‟ episodes with images from other places and times to create a „flowing‟ narrative. 
Baddley calls this functional part of „episodic‟/autobiographical memory the “episodic 
buffer” (Baddeley 2000). This „buffer‟ is also used for „episodic‟ constructions/simulations of 
the future. I think we should call the whole „episodic‟ faculty the narrative faculty (see 
below). 
 
 
We humans understand our self-narratives, the narratives we create ourselves, the stories told 
to us by others, and the stories told by track-ways, by identifying with the characters. In other 
words we iteratively pretend to be the agents involved in the story in a turn-and-turnabout 
manner. These elsewhere-and-when agents include past and future imagined selves.  
Clearly then, there could be no narrative faculty without the autonoetic self-narrative at its 
core. And without the narrative faculty there could be no elsewhere-and-when social 
competences (see below), which all require the projection of the autonoetic self into the 
„minds-and-bodies‟ of elsewhere-and-when entities, including past and future selves.  
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Of course, it is not really possible to separate autobiographical memories of one‟s past and 
future selves from the past and future selves of other entities. Our autobiographical memories 
and future narrative projections all have other significant agents involved. The hominin 
narrative mind is a social organ. That is why we cannot help anthropomorphizing or imputing 
intentionality to other animals when tracking and hunting. 
This is also true when we are studying cognitive attributes of human toddlers and other 
animals. Hence many theorists cannot help giving apes and human toddlers the benefit of the 
doubt when it comes to their possibly exhibiting the elsewhere-and-when social competences 
of humans over the age of four. Lynda McNeil‟s otherwise brilliant paper (McNeil 1996)57 on 
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 She is the only other theorist I have discovered so far who directly views the cognitive phylogeny/ontogeny of 
all hominin culture and communication as being narrative. She calls us Homo inventans.  
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the fundamental narrativity of hominin cognition and its phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
responsibility for the evolution of all hominin culture and communication is a good 
example
58
.   
In sum, I hold the four capacities above are all made possible by the quintessential hominin 
cognitive trick of pretending that something is what it is not. That something must include the 
sense of an intentional autonoetic self, for one must be aware that one is pretending to do or 
be something else. Otherwise one is going to get „lost‟ in narrative, pretending states of mind. 
For example, consider what happens when we have nightmares when asleep
59
. Here we arrive 
at an intellectual water-shed: many other cognitive theorists believe that the autonoetic self-
narrative could not have emerged in our cognitive evolution before linguistic communication 
[for example (Dennett 1991). I now want to turn this view thoroughly on its head. 
5.1 The ‘Evolution of Language’ Debate. 
The absolute necessity for the prior emergence of the autonoetic self-narrative is hardest for 
us to realize in the case of the cultural institution of language. It is so difficult that many 
theorists have believed that language is not a cultural invention: speech evolved somehow 
through some sort of „magic cultural bullet‟ or „monstrous genetic mutation‟, and only then 
could the self-narrative evolve. I believe the reason it is difficult is because our capacity for 
narratively mentalizing together or when alone is encapsulated, not open to introspection.  
Therefore using the remarkable cognitive tool of language for communication, remembering, 
and thinking (we are doing it right now through the printed word) is almost completely 
automatized in the plastically developmental neural pathways of almost all modern human 
mind/brains. However, some us are born deaf and have to learn gestural sign languages: if 
there is no local cultural institution of sign-language, deaf children spontaneously invent their 
own gestural languages between themselves.
60
 This is highly significant, for such ontogeny 
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 For instance, she interprets the hide and chase games of young gorillas as pretend-play. But all young of 
higher mammals, especially predators play these games.  And the branch-breaking of leading male bonobos 
when whole troops are migrating en masse to other parts of their territory is claimed to be intentional trail-
marking. Again, branch-breaking is a universal chimp sign of aggression, and so it is far more likely to be a 
warning to other troops of bonobos strangers. 
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 An old Buddhist saying: “Man is the only animal that dreams while he is awake”. 
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 These gestural languages are always structured SOV (Subject, Object, Verb or Action) rather than the SVO of 
English for instance. Everyone reverts to SOV when communicating in gesture. For the narrative mind, what is 
most important is who is doing what to whom: the characters or agents are imagined and described first, and 
then the action that occurs between them. Historical examples of the spontaneous emergence of sign languages 
(as in Nicaragua) have been viewed as evidence of an innate Chomskyian language-module.  
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could be seen as recapitulating the phylogeny of all modes of hominin narrative 
communication. 
I say that what is going on is that everyone in the same cultural group (a group of deaf 
children, say) in a sense agrees to pretend that an arbitrarily chosen gesture or symbolic 
spoken sound means or refers to a certain entity, state of being, (or another symbolic sign or 
set of symbolic signs). For everyone in that culture that symbol is that referred-to third entity 
or state of mind because they have communally agreed to pretend so.
61
Toddlers are practicing 
this cognitive „trick‟ when they begin to take part in object-pretence games with older 
children and adults. They are collectively pretending an object is something else entirely. But 
they are not yet pretending they themselves are being something else entirely. That comes 
later, sometime after the age of three. I will discuss this qualitative difference further in the 
next section. 
To someone not „in the game‟, just as with someone else born into another culture, the 
symbolic object, gesture or sound is meaningless. It remains so unless they decide to get into 
the mind-set of the culture and learn to pretend in the same ways they do, as when learning a 
second language. The older one gets the harder this is to do, precisely because the hominin 
brain is largely plastically developmental: it is much easier to learn a second language when 
young.  
Footprints and track-ways are not symbolic or arbitrary: they are indexical or indicatory, 
referring directly to their „authors‟, but they are often very decoupled from them in space and 
time. The Laetoli Prints are an extreme example. However, which animals are referred to by 
the footprints of the track-ways in one‟s local ecology have to be learnt when young, 
similarly to the language signs of the culture one is born into. This tracking cognition evolved 
long before the cognition needed to understand language symbols, but it is partly based on 
the same „cognitive trick‟. 
Mimetic/gestural languages (Donald 1991),(Corballis 2003; Corballis 2010) must have been 
in place first for the cumulative culture to evolve that could invent linguistic language. I hold 
the natural sign system we call track-ways provided the cognitive template for those earlier 
forms of communication, which are still used for the sake of silence when hunting. 
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 Take the word “cool” for example: it became a descriptive musical term in jazz culture in the USA in the 
1930‟s. It has now come to mean a style of clothing or a certain state of mind. We are inventing new meanings 
for old words and inventing new words for new inventions or concepts (eg. post-modernism) all the time. 
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Consequently there is still a direct connection between the two sign systems of language and 
track-ways. 
 Track-ways signs are real physical signs, faithfully or inexorably deictic, indicating or 
pointing to their referent. They are not arbitrary/conventional or symbolic, but I posit they 
were the only natural signs out there in the real world of our ancestors that could present a 
cognitive „bridge‟ (or template) to the use of symbolic signs. That bridge was made up of at 
first iconic (more physically real or „part-of‟) Oldowan mimetic or depictive communication, 
and then indexical (much less physically real or part-of) Acheulian gestural languages were 
invented as neural capacity for the narrative faculty expanded. 
Linguistic communication is without a doubt the greatest invention of the eusocially narrative 
hominin mind, and it must have had a huge feedback effect on our self-narratives and our 
cultural institutions (which also have narrative structure). However, only already narrative 
hominin minds, able to communally pretend they were in other places, times, and other 
bodies and/or minds (and therefore able to systematically and speculatively read track-ways) 
could have communally invented language. This explains why linguistic communication had 
to come late, not early. One needs social, shared pretence, before one can have true words. In 
short, reference is the fiction of identity.
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5.2 Overview of the HNF and the Cornerstone Competences 
 To sum up: all four capacities made possible by the hominin narrative faculty therefore are at 
bottom self-aware. I mean self-aware in the sense that one must have a self that knows it is 
pretending in order to travel in time or be in someone else‟s mind, or pretend to be someone 
else or a future self when intentionally practicing any skill (such as learning a new language), 
or communally pretend with other selves that something is what it is not. Full-blown TWR 
requires the same faculty: imagining one‟s self as a cougar depends on self-representation, 
but it is not an instance of self-representation.  
Remember here my metaphor of the autonoetic intentional self-narrative being like a 
steerable boat, in an elsewhere-and-when ocean of possible characters interacting in limitless 
ways in any place or time (including someone else‟s mind in the here-and-now). Therefore 
without possessing an up-to-date holistic self-narrative, no human being can function 
normally, or „steer their life-way‟ through their social worlds, as various pathological mental 
                                         
62
 This phrase is not mine.. It was presented to me as a „slogan summary‟ by my supervisor Kim Sterelny, after 
reading a draft of this section on language evolution. 
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states clearly reveal. In chronic schizophrenia, for example, when the sense of self-autonomy 
is lost, the mind gets taken over by imaginary entities. The sufferer is said to be „not in the 
real world‟, because usually they break many of the social norms or rules of the culture they 
were born into. 
The self-projection (=as-if role taking=emulation/imitation of absent entities) of pretend play 
is made possible by the past and future mental meta-representations of the autonoetic (=self-
knowing) narrative that all normally functioning humans must have. It consists of an 
awareness of an intentional self travelling from the past to the future in company with the 
intentional selves of other hominins. This is the cognitive core of the HNF in my model, and 
makes the cornerstone social competences possible.  
I repeat: this kind of self-referential as-if role-taking also occurs with agents being related to 
in the present. As Rakoscky (Rakoczy 2006) and Tomasello (2008) have pointed out, the 
shared intentionality of turn-and-turnabout, as-if role taking of children‟s pretend play, is 
social rehearsal for later taking up the roles required for all human social institutions to 
function. The point is, without an objective, first-person, autonoetic sense of self they could 
not know they were pretending. 
Pretending to be in the minds-and-bodies of others is the cognitive basis of the hominin 
empathy/theory of mind (=mental state attribution=recursive mind-reading) competence. It 
also describes what is going on when we are telling each other (and listening to) our stories 
and/or making the collaborative plans for future action sequences that are behind all human 
culture. What is occurring between two or more agents in the here-and-now of conversations 
is shared intentionality, or communal projections of similar but separate selves into the future 
or the past.  
I have explained my models of the HNF and the four cognitive competences as much as 
possible given the space available, and have stated there is a qualitative difference between 
the minds of apes, 2.5 year old children, and children aged between 3 and 4. I argue this is 
when the HNF begins to fully function in humans, so now we need to look at the 
developmental and comparative evidence for this qualitative change. To relate back to TWR 
cognition before we do so, forgive me for reminding my readers one more time that all Kung 
San children know their mother‟s footprints from all others in the band by the age of four, 
and therefore must recognize their own. My point is that this could not occur unless their 
autonoetic self-narrative had begun to emerge. 
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5.3 The Qualitative Uniqueness of the Narrative Faculty. 
Apes are extremely good here-and-now behavior readers, as are humans, but only humans 
can share mental experiences that imagine the self and other selves interacting in the past or 
future. Tomasello (2008) calls these exchanges of communication (not just linguistic) about 
elsewhere-and-when agents and events “dialogic cognitive representations”: this is the 
communication by which all culture is cumulatively transferred to peers and ensuing 
generations.  
This transmission of culture cannot occur without what he calls „the first and third person 
bird‟s-eye view‟: this is what the self-referential hominin narrative faculty provides. So adult 
human elsewhere-and-when social skills (the spin-off cornerstone competences) conferred by 
the HNF are qualitatively well beyond the here-and-now social skills of apes and 1.5 to 2.5 
year old children.  
In this section I present developmental and comparative evidence of the signature 
developmental manifestations of the core brain structure behind the uniquely hominin 
narrative faculty. One is external: children‟s turn-and-turnabout pretend play with peers that 
begins between the age of 3 and 4. The other is internal: at the same age the „fog‟ of 
childhood amnesia begins to fade as the child‟s self-narrative starts to take shape. In other 
words an autonoetic (self-knowing) meta-representation of an intentional self with certain 
desires and beliefs, travelling from the past into the future, starts to form in the child‟s 
mind.
63
   
As Suddendorf  (in Corballis and Lea 1999) says, between 3 and 4 is when the child begins to 
remember having personal (autonoetic) experiences at different past times. This makes 
Daniel Dennett‟s (1987) second-order intentionality possible. To reiterate: the child can know 
that it knows something another child doesn‟t know because the child can remember its own 
past experiences. She can remember/imagine her past-self being mentally and physically 
there at the time and in the spatial context of those experiences. Therefore she can know that 
another child, who was not present in that same place at that same past time, cannot know 
what she observed happening at that time.  
That is why normal children only begin to pass false belief tests between the ages of three 
and four, and it is said that they have acquired TOM, or a theory of mind. However, most of 
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 By this age the brain is nearly full-grown and is consuming more glucose than it ever will again in the child‟s 
life-time.  
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these tests are verbally presented. Recent preverbal TOM tests have been interpreted as 
showing that infants of roughly 1.5 years can read minds to some degree [(Baillargeon, Scott 
et al. 2010) for full review]. If true, and some theorists are skeptical (for example Sterelny 
pers. comm.), this indicates that TOM is developing earlier than the autobiographical self. 
I am not skeptical at all, but neither am I impressed because I hold that infants are only 
exhibiting here-and-now TOM: they are better at reading the first-order intentionality of here-
and now body-language than adult apes (but all higher animals can read body-language). I am 
not surprised that even infant humans are better behaviour-readers than adult apes, because 
hominins have probably always been able to hold longer sequences of actions than chimps in 
their minds.  
This cognitive capacity was due to their free-handed capacity to carry things for long 
distances [(Ozvath and Gardenfors 2005), (Osvath and Gärdenfors 2007)]. Morphological 
changes indirectly bring about cognitive changes, because all cognition is inherently 
embodied. I have not the space to expand on this crucial idea here, but see Jeffares (2011 in 
press) for good review. So better here-and-now intentionality-reading was one of a package 
of necessary but not sufficient pre-adaptive traits inherited from the Ardipithecans, and it is 
only a quantitative difference from the ape mind-set. 
I have already argued that the evolutionary window of opportunity for the earliest hominin 
capacity for elsewhere-and-when true imitation needed to read social track-ways narratives 
had to be the great-ape capacity for true here-and-now imitation.
64
 In the same vein, great-
apes possess some here-and-now TOM (Tomasello 2008), and human toddlers have more 
here-and-now TOM, but only hominins over the age of three can have elsewhere-and-when 
TOM. Absentee conspecifics are out of mind to a here-and-now minded ape. They are not out 
of mind to an elsewhere-and-when minded hominin. I believe this is a qualitative cognitive 
difference from every other species on this planet, including chimps. The next section 
presents the developmental and comparative evidence that explains why I hold this view. 
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 Besides, like Suddendorf (1999) I do not think the HNF (he calls his model the “meta-mind”) comes on 
suddenly: I think the way to view its emergence is that it very quickly „comes to fruition‟. 
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5.4 Developmental and Comparative Evidence of Ontogeny of the HNF. 
I wrote “Intentional Autonoetic Self-Narrative” in the centre of my model of the HNF. To 
fully imagine being in the minds-and-bodies of others one must have an awareness of others 
as being intentional beings like one‟s self; that is, having desires that they want to fulfil, and 
beliefs about how they can fulfil them. Here again some theorists may protest, because 
children as young as nine months relate to adult others as being intentional (Carpenter, 
Akhtar et al. 1998)(Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003).  
These two theorists hold that this developmental stage (they call it the “9 month-old 
revolution”) is the most significant change in human cognitive development. In other words, 
they see it as the unique social competence of the human mind. Further to this, they believe 
that it is joint-attentional exchanges with adults and older children, manifested as turn-and-
turn-about games using objects as symbols (pretence) and linguistic communication (pointing 
and naming at first, then introducing propositions that refer to the child‟s own mental states) 
in the ensuing years that creates a second stage of development, which they believe occurs 
between three and four.  
I think „joint attention‟ and „pretence-with-older-others‟ behaviours that Tomasello and 
Rakoscy (2003) (Carpenter, Akhtar et al. 1998) describe in human children between 9 months 
and three years of age merely indicate even human infants might be better readers of here-
and-now intentionality in others (reading their desires) than adult apes (so why not call it 
here-and-now TOM ?). Reading others‟ here-and-now intentionality or present desires (which 
includes the desire of older children and adults to pretend some object or some sound is 
something that it is not) is what infant here-and-now TOM consists of; it is Dennett‟s first-
order intentionality.  
The underlying psychology of here-and-now TOM in both apes and human toddlers is 
emotional empathy and understanding body-language, which effects the here-and-now 
reading of someone else‟s desires. Just as I am not skeptical re evidence of here-and-now 
TOM in 1.5 year old toddlers, I am not skeptical (how could one be?) re evidence of 9 month 
old infants‟ reading of others‟ intentionality. But again I am not impressed.  
Children younger than three or four (and adult apes) don‟t know they are reading others‟ 
intentions, or were reading them in the past; and that autonoesis or self-knowingness is what 
is required for second-order intentionality. Tomasello and Rakoscy think this kind of self-
reflection is only acquired through language. I say this self-referentiality is neurally 
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entrenched, and it became entrenched early in hominin evolution because hominins started 
reading their own old track-ways on an everyday in every way basis. I think the reverse is 
true: children can only begin to understand words used to describe desire/belief mental states 
of the self and others when they have begun to acquire a sense of an autonoetic self.  
I hold that a sure sign that apes and toddlers are in the same here-and-now TOM, 
intentionality-reading, emulation/imitation „boat‟ is they are both notoriously incapable of 
self-inhibition. Only with the elsewhere-and-when cognition of seeing one‟s self objectively 
as an intentional agent travelling through time can one understand that if one inhibits one‟s 
own desire for an immediate reward in the here-and-now, a future „one‟ (a future self) will 
get a much better reward, or at least not get a negative reaction (from others or the 
environment) in the future. What is required is what Tomasello et al (2005) call the “first and 
third person point of view”.  
After the age of three children can be reasoned with on this level; before that age they cannot, 
and that is why parents speak of the „Terrible Twos”. Later on they refer to the “Tiresome 
Threes”: because children have acquired the elsewhere-and-when autonoetic narrative 
faculty, they continually ask “why is it (what is the reason) that I (first person) can‟t have it 
now?” “Because I say so” is very often the answer of the exhausted parent (third person), 
tired of trying to explain why. I agree with Tulving (2001): autonoesis is the key to the 
evolution of everything that is unique about hominin cognition, culture and communication.  
So: apes are good behaviour-readers like toddlers and can read the intentionality of a 
hierarchical sequence of goal-directed actions performed by other apes in the here-and-now. 
This constitutes incipient anticipatory cognition, but only for brief episodes in the here-and-
now. Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) have stated that apes might have a small amount 
episodic memory. I agree, and that is precisely why I prefer to use the word narrative for 
hominin cognitive capacities. I say it makes them good here-and-now imitators for a here-
and-now reward, and somewhat anticipatory in social exchanges. But not nearly as good as 
toddlers, who are rewarded with delighted smiles when they synchronously imitate adults in a 
turn-and-turnabout manner.  
Even human toddlers are able to have longer sequences of behaviour in mind than adult 
chimps. Therefore why wouldn‟t they have more here-and-now TOM (be much better 
intentionality readers) than adult chimps, emerging at a much younger age? What the 
emergence of the autonoetic sense of an intentional time-travelling self at the core of the 
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HNF confers on 3 to 4 year old children is elsewhere-and-when TOM, or elsewhere-and-
when intentionality reading. They can now mentally imagine being in someone else‟s body-
and-mind in the past and the future because they can imagine being in their own body and 
mind at other times, experiencing what their desires and beliefs were or probably will be in 
the future.
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 This is the unique social cognition that only hominins possess. 
In sum then: toddlers can read intentionality or attribute desires to the minds of others, of 
course, better than adult chimps can. But like chimps they are just „being‟ in the here-and 
now. They can also take part in the object-pretence games instigated by adults and children 
older than four, who give facial signals that define their actions as „for fun‟ and not for real. 
They can logically understand the „rules‟ of simple pretense games with objects because they 
are able to keep long action sequences in mind, but they do not spontaneously instigate 
object-pretence games on their own, or with peers of the same age, when adults or older 
children are not around. Tomasello and Rakoscy (2003) admit themselves that children aged 
2.5 years old hardly ever spontaneously instigate pretence games with objects. 
Note that this human developmental age is agreed by most cognitive theorists to be the 
cognitive ceiling for enculturated adult apes, who have only rarely been seen to exhibit what 
can be interpreted as pretence that an object is something else. Chimps know what other 
chimps have seen or not seen, and can tell whether a human is intentionally denying them 
access to food or is „accidentally‟ dropping it (Tomasello and Rakoscy 2003, Tomasello et al 
2005, Tomasello 2008). I think a lot of what is going on with preverbal „false-belief‟ tests is 
about extremely good behaviour-reading by toddlers. However we have not the space here for 
any further discussion on this matter.  
What I must add here though, to get us back on track (excuse the pun) is that I think this 
great-ape here-and-now TOM, just like great-ape here and-now imitation, is what made the 
shift from here-and-now imitational track-ways exploitation to elsewhere-and-when 
imagination of an absentee track-way-author‟s actions, and his or her mental states at the time 
of performing those actions, at all possible. As I have said, the absentee author was very often 
one‟s past self. These great ape social cognitive competences are the reason I think only some 
great-ape lineage could have fully entered the social TWR niche. The reason only our lineage 
entered it was because we got locked in to specializing in a bipedal wetland-foraging niche. 
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I repeat: it is only after the age of three that children begin to indulge in the true „as-if‟ role-
taking of pretend-play, acting out narrative scenarios with one or two of their peers. They are 
also seen to „slavishly‟ exactly imitate a demonstrator‟s physical actions towards a goal or 
reward, when adult chimps revert immediately to emulation if offered an easier route to the 
reward. For example, when 3 to 4 yr-old children were presented with a see-through perspex 
box that very obviously revealed the first two of the three manipulative moves (learnt 
beforehand when dealing with an identical but opaque wooden box) were completely 
unnecessary, they still repeated the first two actions
66
 in order to get the reward.  
Adult chimps imitated the demonstrator‟s three manipulations faithfully without hesitation 
with the opaque box, but immediately „cut to the chase‟ and made only the third manipulation 
when dealing with the clear box (Horner and Whiten 2005). Until recently there has been a 
consensus view (but see Whiten 2000) that apes cannot truly imitate a sequence of actions, 
they can only exhibit goal-directed emulation of the product of those actions. However the 
above and other recent experiments reveal that apes can and do truly imitate associatively in 
order to obtain a tangible reward in the here and now. 
They will do so quickly and quite predictably, especially if the demonstrator is a trained 
conspecific. This bespeaks pretty good here-and-now social learning skills, and is an 
important feature of ape cognitive behaviour in itself, for it indicates they have the cognitive 
capacity for here-and now pragmatic choices between here-and-now emulation and imitation. 
So they are very good behaviour-readers and can make contingency plans in the here-and-
now, but only for an attainable reward in the here-and-now. In terms of the here-and-now, 
then, they are very smart animals (and very competitive). The fact is however, apes never 
exhibit decoupled true imitation, such as occurs in human children‟s auto-rehearsal and 
pretend role-playing. Like toddlers, they are locked into here-and-now cognition.   
Given the opaque/clear box experiment above, human children would appear to be dumber 
than apes in the here-and-now. However, the demonstrator was an adult, and three to four 
year children are inherently loathe to question an unknown adult‟s directions, especially in 
the unavoidably formal, „teacher-ish‟ sociality of experimental situations. The question is, 
why this „slavish‟ imitation. I think the answer is in their capacity for elsewhere-and-when 
cognition. Here is my mind-reading attempt re these children‟s mental states: “I wonder why 
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 I wonder if this experiment has been done with much younger children. I predict they too would „cut straight 
to the chase‟ like adult chimps, if the presenter did not make play-faces, and was someone not  much older than 
them, or better still, a puppet. 
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he made those first two moves? Maybe there was another reason for making those dumb-
looking first two moves? Oh well, I‟m still going to get the sweet anyway, and imitating 
adults pleases them”. 
Pretend-play sequences between post-four year olds become much more elaborate, with 
heated discussion of what the rules of the „game‟ being played are, and who is going to take 
which role in the communally imagined narrative behind the „game‟. This is what Tomasello 
(et al 2005, 2008) calls “recursive role-playing”.  The narratives being acted out are based on 
mythic tales and adult behaviours exhibited in the cultures they are growing into (think of 
„Cowboys and Indians‟ here, or „Doctors and Nurses‟). These pretend-play games are „dress-
rehearsals‟ for later taking up roles in human cultural institutions (Rakoczy 2008). 
Suddendorf‟s model of the “meta-mind” ( in Corballis and Lea, 1999) is very similar to my 
concept of the hominin narrative faculty and he also suggests that its emergence makes 
mental-time-travel, theory of mind, communication about past and future events and 
characters, pretend play and auto-rehearsal possible.  He thinks it was phylogenetically in 
place by 1.5 mya, the beginning of Acheulian Culture, and holds that it ontogenetically 
begins to be manifested between the ages of 3 and 4, when the child begins to be able to 
mentally time-travel. As he says, “the child appears to enter into a new world”, or (1994) “the 
fourth dimension”. I say they begin to develop elsewhere-and-when cognition, based on the 
anchor, keel, and intentional steering-into-the-future capacity of an autonoetic self-narrative. 
5.4 Summary and Overview of Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Narrative 
Faculty. 
I have argued hominin elsewhere-and-when narrative imagination was well on its way to 
being a core faculty by 2.6 mya, the advent of Oldowan Culture, and had been incrementally 
evolving for around 1.5 million years before that date because our earliest ancestors had 
begun cognitively exploiting the track-ways made by band-members and themselves for 
safety and orienteering (for example re-finding rich foraging sites). The very new find of 3.4 
mya cut-marked bones robustly supports this view (as does the 3.6 mya Laetoli dual adult 
track-way). The 3.5 mya pre-Oldowan mind/brain must have been already far more fore-
sighted or cognitively elsewhere-and-when than that of our here-and-now ape cousins. 
Even highly enculturated apes like Kanzi have never been seen to exhibit more than one or 
two instances that could be interpreted as pretend play. Young apes do play the rough and 
tumble and follow-the-leader games that the young of all mammalian predators indulge in, 
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and can imitate their peers exactly in the here-and now, but never indulge in the decoupled  
true imitation of absent („elsewhere-and-when in space and time‟) peers required for pretend-
play. The imitation of elsewhere-and-when more skilled conspecifics demanded for auto-
rehearsal of skills is also beyond them, which is why it takes them eleven years or so to learn 
how to crack nuts. Their social learning competences, while better than most higher 
mammals, are nowhere near as effective as those of humans. 
I have argued this is because apes have no elsewhere-and-when narrative cognitive capacity 
to speak of. All they have is the anticipatory reading of goal-oriented peer behavior in the 
here-and-now required for exact imitation, some TOM/intentionality-reading, probably based 
mostly on brief moments of gaze-reading, for the sake of competitive deception, alliance 
negotiations, group hunting of colobus monkeys and other chimps, and so on. However, they 
are highly competitive, very smart mammals in the here-and-now, great body-language 
readers and so on. They are known, for instance, to exhibit some simple forms of intentional 
mimetic and gestural forms of here-and-now communication (McNeil 1996 for example).  
I hold that human children under the age of three are somewhat similar here-and-now 
creatures, but much smarter behaviour-readers, and with far more TOM ability or first-order 
intentionality-reading in the here-and-now. It is perhaps far too easy for adult developmental 
psychology experimenters to impute cognitive capacities to them which have not developed 
yet, just as occurs with some primatologists and the trainers of highly enculturated apes. On 
the other hand, no creature on this planet is more directly enculturated (by being continually 
emotionally rewarded for playing synchronous reciprocal imitation games) than human 
children. Our mind-brains are culturally developed more than any other creature on this 
planet.  
We should not forget this fact when discussing whether children can „truly pretend‟ before 
the age of three. I think they understand pretence sequences with objects in the here-and-now, 
but do not have the meta-representation of an autonoetic self that is pretending to be someone 
else until somewhere between three and the age of four. There is evidence that even two-
week-old infant hominins are good here-and-now imitators
67
: in fact some imitation theorists 
would say we are imitators by default (Meltzoff and Decety 2003). The idea of humans being  
imitators by default makes perfect sense to me, because we are narrative-minded by default. 
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 There is lots of controversy around these claims, but we have not the space here to enter the fray. 
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So I agree with them
68
, with the proviso that once the HNF was in place and co-operative 
culture could begin, there would have been inexorable positive feedback for excellent here-
and-now and elsewhere-and-when true imitation abilities, in order for that culture to be 
transmitted to ensuing generations in a cumulative manner. The faster an adaptive cultural 
innovation can move through a population, the more likely that population is to out-compete 
other conspecific populations, so powerful group-selection forces would have led to these 
entrenched and therefore default imitation abilities.  
I am thinking here of a very early emergence of group rituals of synchronous mimetic 
dancing and chanting (since some chimp troupes dance when it rains-Whiten 2000), and 
much later on group reward/punishment rituals, marriage contracts, and other social norms, 
not just the control of fire, the spread of linguistic languages, and so on and so forth. Let us 
look at some evidence from neuroscience once more.  
I repeat: an early enlargement and widening of the more medial/posterior parts of the brain 
(temporal/parietal area) is definitely seen in the very earliest (2.3 mya) habilis endocasts 
(Tobias 1987). Neuroscience has proved these areas are part of the core brain structure that 
supports the default-mode as-if role playing, self-projecting „episodic‟ faculty behind the four 
uniquely hominin social cognitive competences (Buckner 2007; Buckner and Carroll 2007; 
Schacter, Addis et al. 2007). To quote the neuroscientists Buckner and Carroll here: 
“When thinking about the future or the upcoming actions of another person, we 
mentally project ourselves into that situation. Accumulating data suggest that 
envisioning the future (prospection), remembering the past, conceiving the viewpoint 
of others (theory of mind) and possibly some forms of navigation reflect the workings 
of the same core brain network. These abilities emerge at a similar age and share a 
common functional anatomy that includes frontal and medial temporal systems that 
are traditionally associated with planning, episodic
69
 memory and default (passive) 
cognitive states….these abilities, most often studied as distinct, rely on a common set 
of processes by which past experiences are used adaptively to imagine perspectives 
and events beyond those that emerge from the immediate environment” (abstract,p49) 
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 I think this imitation by default idea is extremely important when it comes to certain aspects of human culture, 
like meme-exchanges and so on. We have not the space here, but I would like to say this: for me the idea of 
default imitation helps to explain why humans can be so clever and so abysmally stupid at times (especially en 
masse). Only humans could be „brain-washed‟ into becoming teenage suicide bombers, or help think up plans 
for efficiently exterminating 6 million other humans. 
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 I prefer narrative: after all an episode is merely the shortest possible narrative conceivable. 
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Therefore how the autonoetic autobiographical self-narrative could have evolved is the 
definitive question re the nitty-gritty of our cognitive evolution (Tulving 2001). I firmly 
believe my thesis and in particular this chapter has provided a very plausible answer to that 
question: through a couple of million years or so of reading the stories told by one‟s own old 
track-ways.  
Right at the beginning of our evolution simple social track-ways exploitation, consisting of 
continually stepping in one‟s own track-ways (as well as those of others) for the sake of 
safety and orienteering, triggered the evolution of this autonoetic narrative sense of self, 
which conferred second-order intentionality and a mental awareness of others as separate but 
similarly intentional selves on the early hominin mind. Thereafter the narrative faculty and 
hominin elsewhere-and-when social skills continued to co-evolve through selection for better 
social TWR skills, due to inexorable increases in socio-ecological complexity. My „triggering 
track-ways theory‟ is therefore a thoroughly orthodox „social brain hypothesis‟. 
Once the HNF and the cornerstone competences were somewhat entrenched, adaptive 
cumulative co-operative culture could begin, when triggered by environmental contingencies. 
Thereafter positive feed-back into the genetic/cultural co-evolution of the hominin narrative 
capacity for elsewhere-and-when social competences would have been inexorable. These 
elsewhere-and-when social competences, enabled by self-conscious or autonoetic shared 
intentionality (Tulving 2001, Tomasello 2008) created cumulative, collaborative eusocial 
hominin culture and communication. These emerging competences were also what made full-
blown systematic and speculative extractive-foraging TWR skills in the extractive foraging 
domain possible.  
It was entering the simplest, here-and-now cognitive niche of imitation of conspecific track-
ways for safety and orienteering in the first place, riding on the back of other attributes 
conferred by great-ape here-and-now social competences and a semi-aquatic bipedal socio-
ecological niche, that made the evolution of hominin culture, and communication of that 
culture, both horizontally and vertically, at all possible. In the next and final chapter I point 
out the major milestones on the hominin co-evolutionary road towards linguistic language, 
Homo sapiens, and behavioural modernity.  We will find that most of these milestones, 
especially the earlier ones, were due to selective forcing by dramatic environmental changes.  
   ********************************** 
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Chapter Six: The Hominin Evolutionary Trajectory. 
6.0 The Environmental Forcing of Hominin Evolution.  
My chronological story in this final chapter is mainly about how volcanism and earthquakes 
or faulting iteratively and sometimes drastically adversely affected the wetlands on which the 
earliest hominin locals were depending for their highly nutritious staple diet. The Rift was 
extremely volatile throughout the Late Pliocene and Early Pleistocene because it had (and 
still has) a thinner mantle or lithosphere overlying the earth‟s molten inner layer than any 
other land mass on earth. 
Volcanic ash is highly permeable to water, so wherever it is laid down in thick layers on flat 
land aridification immediately ensues. Ash-covered flatland areas that had been prime 
farming land in Mexico were still deserts fifty years later after a local eruption in the 1940‟s. 
Basalt lava flows re-vegetate far more quickly because they retain water, but molten lava 
tends to run downhill before it cools and solidifies into basalt. Therefore lava flows can dam 
even very large rivers completely from one week to the next, or at least make them suddenly 
impassable for the next season‟s spawning fish runs.  
Alluvial action quickly washes ash into all lower lying basins and lacustrine swampy areas. 
This is why fossil deposits are so often associated with volcanic events: volcanic ash 
sedimentation quickly covers up bones before they disintegrate due to exposure to the 
elements, or can get eaten by scavengers. Volcanic ash chemically preserves bone. It also 
affects water chemistry drastically and suffocates all standing water biota in shallow lakes 
and ponds.  
The huge amounts of carbon thus released turn them immediately eutrophic and conditions 
turn poisonous and anaerobic (no oxygen in water for aquatic fauna). This happened to 
several small lakes close to the epicentre of the recent Mt St. Helens eruption in the USA. 
Steeper more energetically alluvial areas are the first areas to recover, because ash is quickly 
washed away down-stream. 
Large basalt depositions, as occurred to the east of the Turkana basin, weigh down the 
lithosphere and cause massive faulting and subsidence in nearby areas. All in all the “cradle 
of humanity” in East Africa was an extremely tempestuous environment to evolve in. 
Therefore my thesis is fully supported by the „environmental variability hypothesis‟ (Potts 
1996). Environmental change triggered the advent of Oldowan Culture and the 
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encephalization that led to two new hominin species: the earlier habilenes and later erectus 
hominins. 
 It is also true that extreme glaciations occurred in the Northern Hemisphere not long 
(geologically-speaking) after the 2.8 polar reversal (Behrensmeyer, Todd et al. 1997) 
[(Thierens, Pirlet et al.) in press]. After an initial era of extremely wet climate, aridification in 
the form of extreme seasonality became more intense from 2.6mya onwards and peaked at 
1.8 mya
70
. Major faunal turnovers occurred in in the Turkana Basin (Hernández Fernández 
and Vrba 2006).  
Areas of savannah expanded throughout the Rift. I think thick layers of volcanic ash would 
have iteratively hastened and intensified these effects (as in our Mexican example above). 
These global and local environmental changes working together would have played havoc 
with the wetland environments preferred by the pre-Oldowans.  
I have pre-empted the chronological narrative structure of this chapter somewhat by 
mentioning the adaptive plateau of the socio-ecological niche of the Ardipithecans between 
5.8 and 4.4 mya in my introductory section to chapter one. However we will begin by 
returning there in the next section because I think the evolution of obligate bipedalism was 
caused by a truly massive volcanic event, also mentioned in that section. Therefore this event 
is the right place in time for our evolutionary chronicle to begin.  
6.1 Leaving the Trees Behind. 
At 4.39 mya a truly enormous volcanic eruption occurred in the Ethiopian Highlands. A 
thousand cubic kilometres of volcanic ash are estimated to have been deposited as far as the 
Sea of Aden to the north of the Rift. Ash was deposited at an average height of 1.7 meters, 
and at this depth all standing forest is destroyed [WoldeGabriel et al in (McCoy and Heiken 
2000)]. The Awash Basin in the Northern Rift, where the 4.4 mya Ardipithecan fossils were 
found, became a huge open fluvial area of lakes and wetlands.  
An extremely large lake (7000 sq.km) was also formed in the Central Rift. This occurred 
because the major river that drained the Ethiopian Highlands south into the Turkana Basin, 
and then ran from the north-east of the Basin to the Indian Ocean, was blocked by massive 
lava flows and subsequent faulting. Around 3.95 mya this river (the Omo) found another 
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 It is interesting that his period of 800 ky of glaciation effects on climate equates well with the period between 
the next polar reversal at .78 mya and the beginning of the Holocene 20 ky ago. 
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channel from the south-east corner of the Basin to the Indian Ocean and this huge lake was 
quite suddenly drained. 
A vast expanse of open fluvial wetlands would have been left behind in the Turkana Basin, 
creating innumerable spawning grounds accessible to huge runs of fish from the Indian 
Ocean. I think these combined dramatic environmental changes forced some local Rift 
populations of Ardipithecus from their adaptive plateau of facultative bipedalism, nesting in 
trees at night, and foraging in flood plains and wetlands within upland closed forests during 
the day.   
Our evolutionary narrative begins here because this is when hominins „left the trees behind‟ 
and became fully terrestrial and bipedal. They therefore had to enter the social TWR niche for 
safety and in order to navigate through vast expanses of open, feature-less upland wetland 
environments. However it probably did not require much beyond social TWR for the 
orienteering needed to procure fish, shellfish, bird‟s eggs and fledglings, amphibians, reptiles 
and micro-mammals such as cane rats. To use an ancient metaphor here: the pre-Oldowan 
hominins were living in the „Garden of Eden‟.  
Around 2.8 mya a second massive peak in volcanic activity almost equal to the 4.4 mya 
eruption occurred, just after the Matayuma-Gausse north/south reversal in the polarity of the 
earth‟s magnetic field (WoldeGabriel in McCoy and Haikin 2000). Such reversals cause 
before-and-after peaks in volcanic and earthquake activity, and extreme glaciations begin.
71
 
Climate after 2.8 appears to have become much cooler and wetter for a short period 
(geologically-speaking). Lakes in the Rift did become very large just afterwards.  
The earliest Oldowan sites (Gona, 2.6 mya, Bouri 2.5) were in low-energy fluvial wetlands 
around large lakes in the Awash River drainage basin in the Northern Rift (Quade, Levin et 
al. 2004). These vast wetlands had been the normal topography there ever since 4.4 mya. A 
recent analysis of carbon isotopes in a large sample of fossil herbivore teeth dating from the 
mid to Late Pliocene (4.4 to 2.4 Ma) indicates a heterogeneous mosaic of wetlands and closed 
(probably riparian) and open woodland areas (montane deciduous trees) that suited browsers, 
far more than obligate grass-eaters. Thereafter there was some increase in savannah, but not 
as pronounced as that which occurred after the next polar reversal at .78 mya. Therefore my 
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 There was another major volcanic event that deposited deep layers of ash as far as the Sea of Aden at the next 
reversal dated .78 mya (called Gausse-Brunhe). It also caused extreme glacial cycles that carried on throughout 
the rest of the Pleistocene. 
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post-2.6 mya Oldowan scenario has far more in common with the „environmental variability 
hypothesis‟ (Richard Potts 1996) than the traditional „forced out onto the savannah‟ model re 
environmental triggers for the encephalization that led to the first true hominins.  
In sum then, extreme global climactic effects and a peak in volcanism and earthquake activity 
causing catastrophic changes in the environment did occur at 2.8 Ma. Their combined effects 
were centred in the East African Rift, the „ancestral cradle‟ of our hominin forbearers. The 
result was that some hominin populations were deprived of their lacustrine „Garden of Eden‟ 
for shorter or longer periods. They had to culturally adapt by habitually applying their 
narrative anticipatory cognition to new extractive foraging techniques whenever their local 
wetland resources were destroyed: the acquisition and lithic butchery of large carcasses. I 
think this why continuous Oldowan Culture began: social TWR skills and the HNF had to be 
applied to consistently hunting large mammals. 
6.2 Leaving the ‘Garden of Eden’. 
I think this metaphor is warranted because I have hunted, fished and gathered in all types of 
environment. The richest and easiest terrain to hunt and gather in is lacustrine and/or 
estuarine wetlands, simply because such environments are full of easily procured aquatic and 
semi-aquatic biota, and almost all terrestrial life needs regular access to fresh water. Hence all 
the first sedentary and more complex pre-modern human „civilizations‟ began in such 
environments during the Holocene: simply because they could, due to resource-richness.  
In the case of the East-African Rift its resource-richness was basally due to vast numbers of 
several species of large (up to 40 kilos) fatty cat-fish (besides eels and several other species 
of fish) that migrated from large inland lakes and/or the Indian Ocean (or the Sea of Aden to 
the north) up large rivers to spawn in the wet season in seasonally flooded wetlands (Cunnane 
and Stewart 2010). They were then trapped in ever-shrinking ponds and swamps as the dry 
season approached. They would have been easily captured by hand and/or with simple spears 
in such conditions. They are still captured by hand in shrinking river pools (see next page). 
Add to this incredibly rich food source innumerable young and eggs of water-fowl, several 
species of very large fresh-water shellfish, countless numbers of frogs, turtles and small 
reptiles, sweet tasting easily obtained bulbs of swamp sedges, and plants like water-cress, 
thriving all-year-round on the edges of permanent water-ways in a tropical climate, and you 
will begin to understand why such an environment would be so attractive to our earliest 
ancestors.  
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A large catfish caught by hand in small pool in a shrinking water-course (from flickr, a photo-sharing website) 
Hominins were fully bipedal by at least 3.6 mys ago, so had a precision grip plus the 
morphological ability to throw stones very forcefully and accurately at any predator who tried 
to bother them. Since they could also run, wade and swim through shallow water (thus hiding 
their scent from land-based predators) faster than any four-legged pursuer, we should be able 
to fully understand my use of the „Eden” metaphor.   
Earthquakes and lava flows can completely block or change the course of rivers overnight, 
making upstream spawning grounds inaccessible to fish. It takes years for a population to 
recover from such devastation, for whole populations can be wiped out when long established 
„home‟ spawning rivers become instantly impassable. This happened on the Frazer River (the 
major river in the province of B.C., Canada) in the 1950‟s when I was a child.  
A gorge known as Hell‟s Gate became impassable just before that year‟s salmon run could 
get through due to a botched road-works explosion, but any earthquake or lava flow could 
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have exactly the same effect. It remained that way for four years before human intervention 
created a fish-ladder for their passage. Salmon only live for four years, so the normal 
population was almost completely wiped out. It took more than a decade of assisted breeding 
and re-stocking from salmon from other rivers to get the population of returning salmon back 
to anywhere near what it had been before this catastrophe.  
Meanwhile, local indigenous tribes that had depended on those salmon supplying their main 
food source for thousands of years, and in historical times their only cash income as well, 
were completely destitute and had to be supported by social welfare. In prehistory they would 
have been forced to migrate or starve. All kinds of animals exploit the „windfall‟ of millions 
of dead and dying salmon in the early autumn, in order to build up fat for the winter, so they 
would not be present to be exploited either if the stock of salmon returning to a certain river 
valley was suddenly destroyed.  
In East Africa catfish trapped in pools on flood plains left by desiccation at the beginning of 
the dry season would also be a wind-fall for all other creatures, so I argue for a similar 
scenario. Therefore loss of such basal resources could well have been ecologically 
catastrophic for hominin locals (as well as other animal populations). Thus an 
environmentally forced nomadic scenario would have been a common occurrence given the 
environmental effects of even quite minor earthquakes and volcanoes. So any cognitive 
ability to plan ahead, in order to culturally adapt to novel territories and/or co-operate with 
(or confront) strangers would have been a major asset to our behavioural repertoire, and 
would have been strongly selected for throughout the Plio/Pleistocene. 
In sum, I argue that after around 2.6 mya environmental catastrophes were dramatically 
destructive to the wetland daily and seasonal socio-ecological niche of local hominins. They 
began tracking down large mammals and systematically manufacturing and transporting 
sharp-edged stone tools to carve them not just because they could, which is the scenario 
posited by many other theorists (Ovsmath and Gardenfors 2005 for example). They had to do 
so to survive.  
In support of this environmental forcing of habitual hunting of large mammals scenario, I 
here present corroborating evidence from the Turkana Basin. This is where the first habilene 
(2.3 mya) and the first erectus fossils (1.8 mya) were found. There are numerous stone tool 
and bone sites throughout the Basin dated between 2.2 to 1.8 mya. Between 2.2 and 2.0 mya 
the Omo River outlet from the SE corner of the Basin was intermittently closed off by lava 
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flows. These lava flows caused extensive faulting as well, resulting in over-all subsidence of 
the Basin (Bruhn et al 2011).  
Finally the outlet to the Indian Ocean was closed off completely. A moderately large lake 
formed in the Turkana Basin, whose size fluctuated wildly with seasonal climactic 
conditions. A 300 km long mosaic of fluvial wetlands and floodplain riparian forest (much 
like the Okavanga Delta is now) along the Omo River drainage system, which would have 
been spawning grounds for huge numbers of fish, was cut off from lakes to the southeast and 
the Indian Ocean. Before 2.2 mya the Turkana Basin would have been a refugia for hominin 
wetland foragers; after 2.2 mya it was not. Further evidence of environmental mayhem is 
provided by the fact that the most dramatic faunal turn-over in the Basin‟s history occurred 
between 2.2 and 2.0 mya. (Bobe and Behrensmeyer 2002, Fernandez and Vrba 2006). 
Close to epicenters of volcanism large numbers of macrofauna are immediately killed as well 
as all smaller fauna (large numbers of elk near the Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption died due 
to volcanic effects). Further away they weaken from starvation (these elk were restricted to a 
nature reserve) and die more slowly. So there also would have been a window of opportunity 
as well as the dire necessity for some populations of 2.5 mya Awash Valley hominins and 2.2 
mya Turkana Basin hominins to find these vulnerable targets using simple TWR. Volcanic 
ash is a perfect substrate for recording foot-prints.  
They began continually carving the meat from large carcasses with sharp stone flakes, 
pounding the meat
72
 to tenderize it (Lieberberg 2009), and smashing the larger bones and 
skulls with rocks to obtain marrow and brains. I repeat: marrow and brains are the only other 
food source besides shellfish and fish that can supply large quantities of the fatty acids 
(lipids) necessary for healthy hominin brain growth (Crawford 1992, Broadhurst et al 1998, 
2002). 
This model of environmental change between 2.6 and 1.8 mya as a spur for an abrupt 
beginning to new foraging applications of simple TWR and the HNF explains the rather 
sudden appearance of habitual large carcass exploitation and the establishment of continuous 
Oldowan lithic technology (Plummer 2004). Further task analysis reveals the following: large 
animals are impossible for fangless, clawless hominin primates to carve or exploit in any way 
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 This explains the large number of spheroid stones found intermingled with flakes and cores at Oldowan sites. 
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without cutting tools, and butchering them
73
 requires co-operative intentional behaviours 
between, at the very least, two individuals. Several more would be needed for co-operative 
transport and defence of the meat and defending such large amounts of it from scavengers 
(Rose and Marshall 1996 for review). 
It does not matter whether the carcass was obtained by confrontational or passive scavenging 
or chased by a group of rock-throwing hominins till it was mired in a swamp and was 
clubbed to death. That said, as I argued in chapter three, the phylogenetic age of the human 
tape worm (1.7 mya) indicates that hominins were probably not habitually scavenging until 
around that date (and I posited that they were probably pirating the kills of wild dogs by 
then).  
Co-operative food-sharing behaviours may well have already arisen in pre-Oldowan 
populations, as well as simple group hunting techniques used for capturing large numbers of 
small wetland animals. What I must emphasize here is that cognitive foraging adaptations can 
be co-opted for social interactions and vice versa. Increasing capacity for back-sight and 
foresight would make reciprocal altruism, more co-operative breeding, division of labour, 
intentional sharing and punishment of cheaters possible. Social punishment techniques such 
as group stone-throwing for control of in-group bullies and cheaters (Bingham 2000), and 
defence from predators and other hominin bands, could already have been a social feature by 
the advent of Oldowan hominin life-ways.  
It is true that we have no paleo-archaeological evidence for this speculative scenario of 
continual co-operative culture made possible by the HNF until Oldowan Culture at 2.6 Ma. 
What we do have now though is the very recent find of cut-marked bones at 3.4 mya 
(McPherron et al 2010). This evidence shows some hominins were able to carve large 
animals a million hears before Oldowan Culture emerged. So why did they wait till 2.6 mya 
to start carving them often enough to form cumulative culture? When added to the 
incontrovertible evidence of a diet of wetland fauna (including crocodiles) at one site dated 
1.95 mya (Braun et al 2010), my story that some populations of hominins began hunting large 
mammals because their normal wetland resources were destroyed becomes very plausible 
indeed. 
                                         
73
 I can testify that butchering a large beast quickly (but carefully so there is less waste) with a steel knife is both 
an art and a science, and takes a while to learn.  
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6.3 The Advent of Oldowan Culture and the ‘Co-operative Explosion’.  
Like Tomasello (2008)  and Ozmath and Gardenfors (2005), I think the major anomaly in the 
narrative of hominin evolution that needs to be explained is the abrupt appearance and 
ongoing continuity of the Oldowan level of knapping expertise and stone resource acquisition 
and transport. Even the earliest sites of all (2.6 my at Gona and 2.5 mya at Bouri) show 
evidence of foresight, or anticipatory cognition (Semaw 2000). These sites reveal stone 
resource transport, knowledge of structural qualities and durability of different types of stone, 
quite complex knapping techniques and so on. Sometimes the nearest suitable stone resource 
was 10 to 13 kms away (Osvmath and Gardenfors 2005, Plummer 2004, Toth and Schick 
2009).  
Toth and Schick (2009) have carried out an experiment comparing stone knapping results 
from enculturated bonobos, first time human learners, and skilled stone-knappers. The results 
show that ape knapping is nowhere near as planned as Oldowan samples and modern results, 
or those tools made by first-timers. However Toth and Schick, like other continuity theorists, 
think our ancestors suddenly started making tools as functional as Oldowan tools while in the 
same socio-ecological niche as apes. I disagree, and hold that such evidence of planning 
abilities indicates that the HNF was quite well entrenched by 2.6 mya.  
The knapping expertise exhibited by Oldowan tools and the 3.4 mya evidence of cut-marked 
bones indicates pre-Oldowan hominins had been making sharp stone edges for a million 
years. They would have been useful items to carry around, useful for sharpening simple 
spears and for hacking up very large catfish and sharing them where they were caught. Their 
bipedal wading and carrying capacities, precision-grip hands, anticipatory transport of 
sharpened stones and co-operative use of simple spears, clubs and stones were the only 
defensive and foraging tools required in their wetlands „Garden of Eden‟.  
I am assuming, as do Toth and Schick (2009), that they had spears and digging sticks because 
we know one troupe of chimps makes very simple spears for impaling bush-babies in hollow 
trees (Pruetz and Bertolani 2007). These chimps (females in this case) sharpen the ends of 
their spears with their teeth. The very earliest pre-Oldowan hominins could have used sharp 
smashed-stone edges to sharpen their simple spears; and this would have developed into more 
controlled stone-knapping as the HNF came on line. 
In sum then, the sudden appearance of Oldowan lithic application and expertise does indicate 
a recently forced change in life-ways, as well as the foresight and planning plus intentional 
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co-operation made possible by the HNF and the cornerstone cognitive competences. Task 
analysis indicates these cognitive capacities must have been already somewhat in place in the 
hominin mind/brain in order to create such remarkable cultural answers to problems 
instigated by contingent environmental changes. So 2.6 mya is where the gene-culture/niche 
construction co-evolutionary „wheel of fortune‟ begins to spin in earnest in our evolutionary 
trajectory.  
The results were dramatic, resulting in two fully hominin sympatric species, Homo habilis 
and erectus, within half a million years, whose brains had doubled in volume relative to adult 
size when compared to chimps, ardipithecans, and australopithecines. They were sympatric 
species in the Turkana Basin: habilis survived there until 1.44 mya (Spoor et al 2007). 
Cortical expansion occurred in the parietial/temporal areas which are dedicated to social 
competences, and the medial prefrontal cortex, which we know is dedicated to planning of 
hierarchically arranged action sequences in all modalities.  
Individual and group selection for expansion of neo-cortical neural plasticity continued to be 
triggered by extreme environmental changes throughout the Plio/Pleistocene and was 
scaffolded by positive feed-back from increasing TWR skill and cumulative social co-
operation (needed to supply high-quality nutrients for development of an ever-increasing 
brain). The neo-cortex continued to incrementally expand during the Pleistocene as more 
application of the anticipatory cognition conferred by the HNF and systematic TWR skills to 
extractive foraging techniques was required.  
I think social contracts such as long-term mating coalitions (Deacon 1997), (Ovsmath and 
Gardenfors 2005) and pedagogical teacher-pupil relationships using pretend-play mimetic 
communication would have been in place. Group-grooming rituals combining synchronous 
mimetic dancing and prosodic chanting would have been the socio-psychological expression 
of Oldowan co-operative culture.  
Habilis, with their somewhat  larger brains (2x the ape brain relative to body size) first appear 
around 2.3 Ma; erectus, with a brain doubled in size and a fully humanoid morphology 
(smaller gut, robust endurance-running human morphology and life history) appears around 
1.8 Ma. In my chronological model we are approaching the end of the mimetic Oldowan Era. 
By 1.6 Ma true hominins had reached N.W. China, and more dexterous Acheulian hand-axe 
technology had emerged in Africa and Eurasia. I think the era of gestural language had 
begun. 
129 
 
6.4 The Gestural Acheulian Era  
A very short track-way of erectus fossilized foot-prints has recently been found at Ileret in 
the Turkana Basin((Bennett, Harris et al. 2009), dated 1.5 Ma (see their illustrations of one of 
the prints next page). One theory these foot-prints have brought consensus to is that erectus 
was definitely a long-distance, wide-ranging endurance runner by 1.5 mya, because the prints 
prove erectus had a fully human high inner arch. Some theorists also think it is fully human 
because there is no gap between the big toe and the second toe 
Habitually unshod feet leave prints like the Laeotili Fossil Footprints and the modern 
Machiguenga footprint (section 4.2). There was undoubtedly a bigger gap between the big toe 
and the second toe in those prints than in the print we see below. However, when you look at 
the illustration of the same print on the next page, one can see why this happened. The depth 
of the print shows its author was stepping into a deep soft substrate. This would have 
naturally forced the big toe inwards as the front of the foot levered itself forwards out of such 
a deep substrate.  
I mention this partly because Bennett and some other theorists think the slightly more splayed 
big toe of the Laetoli Prints indicates they were made by australopithecines. I disagree, and 
would suggest the following: whenever scientists find fossilised footprints like these, they 
should get immediately get expert trackers to have a good look at them in situ. It was the 
wildlife photographer and tracker Alan Root who realized the adult Laetoli track-way was a 
dual track-way, but he was shown them a year after they were found. Full-blown TWR is an 
art and a science.  
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However, I do agree with Bennett and his colleagues that this footprint indicates a much less 
flat-footed morphology than that of the Laetoli hominins. Hence this footprint (one of several 
in a short track-way, but there were no illustrations of the other prints presented) and the 
robust physique indicated by the famous Turkana Boy skeleton (dated 1.6 mya) makes 
endurance hunting a pretty sure bet as being a mainstay hunting technique. We know this 
technique demands systematic TWR, because an individual animal has to be repeatedly 
tracked down (Liebenberg 2008). As I made clear in chapter two, systematic tracking 
requires good narrative imagination-not as much as speculative, but still a fair amount.  
Erectus had colonized all warmer parts of the Old World by 1.6 mya. Migrating „seed-
populations‟ would have had to learn the folk biology of new ecologies. Knowledge of 
animal behaviour is more important than technology. The reason I have made this 
observation and presented the footprint evidence for endurance hunting and systematic 
tracking above is to somewhat counteract theoretical assumptions that there was a hiatus in 
hominin cognitive evolution because Oldowan and Acheulian stone-tool technology both 
lasted for a million years. Like Suddendorf (Corballis and Lea 1999) I think what is basally 
unique about human cognition was fully entrenched by the beginning of the Acheulian Era at 
1.6 mya.  
I posit it marked the beginning of a cultural era of gestural language, the kind of 
communication that is still used for the sake of silence when hunting. The dexterity needed 
for gestural languages would co-evolve with the dexterity needed for hand-axe production 
and perhaps some simple knotting and plaiting technology. A fully developed HG life-style 
incorporating habitual fire control, grinding of nuts to make nut-cakes, and regular 
exploitation of elephant, fallow deer and gazelle (as well as aquatic fauna from the lake 
nearby) was in place at the now famous Gesher Benot Ya‟aqov (GBY) site by the Early/Early 
to Mid-Pleistocene (Goren-Inbar, Feibel et al. 2000).  
This paper dates fire control at 790 kya. Another equally complex site has just been 
discovered in northeast England, similarly dated. Goren-Inbar (2011) states that “all 
archaeological levels show fire-control”, but gives no actual dating besides “Early 
Pleistocene”. These fire-based completely HG cultures could have existed not long after our 
1.5 mya erectus footprint was made. There is some evidence of fire use dated 1.4 mya 
(Bellomo 1994) (Gowlett 1984) but it is controversial. 
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Acheulian Culture was clearly far more cognitively advanced than Oldowan culture, with 
great knapping dexterity, extreme mobility, systematic tracking skills and gestural languages 
being its main cognitive features. Marwick (Marwick 2003) presented good evidence of trade 
or resource-exchange routes of over a hundred kilometres existing after 1mya. Erectus would 
have been using simple but arbitrary path-marking signs, such as stone cairns and blaze-
marks on trees, to reduce the cognitive load on route-finding memory when travelling long 
distances. Marwick argues that a linguistic „proto-language‟ that enabled this trading must 
have already emerged. Goen-Inbar thinks the level of stone-knapping technology at GBY 
also indicates linguistic communication. However, how does one „tell‟ someone else how to 
ride a bicycle? I think all their evidence could also indicate the wide-spread use of gestural 
languages for trading communication, which later on became the template for speech. 
I believe the evidence presented in chapter three and the material above can leave no doubts 
whatsoever that the Oldowan hominins were true hunters and gatherers. Only the prior 
evolution of a unique cognitive capacity or „mechanism‟ for intentional mimetic transmission 
of new extractive foraging techniques, both horizontally and vertically, can explain how pre-
Oldowan hominins could culturally cope with the catastrophic changes in their local 
environments after 2.8 mya (Donald1991).  
To summarize, I argue:  
(1) That fundamental cognitive capacity was the HNF, triggered by social TWR and 
safe orienteering when foraging.  
(2) It had evolved and become somewhat genetically/neurally entrenched over a 
couple of million years in the pre-Oldowan semi-aquatic socio-ecological niche.  
(3)  Environmental catastrophes after 2.8 Ma forced habitual application of TWR and 
the HNF to the extractive foraging domain; in particular, intentionally tracking down, 
killing, and butchering large mammals.  
(4) This hugely successful cultural adaptation selectively triggered full entrenchment 
of the HNF and the neo-cortical expansion that led to the true hominins habilis  and 
erectus  by around 2mya. 
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(5) By then the co-evolutionary gene/culture/niche construction feed-back loop 
(Laland et al 2010) was fully in place, and led inexorably to all further changes in 
hominin evolution (see chronological chart following). 
 
 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL CHART OF HOMININ EVOLUTION 
Date and 
Predominant 
Feature 
Morphological 
Attributes 
Archaeological 
Evidence 
Ethnographic 
Evidence 
Neurological/Cognitive 
Attributes 
4.6 to 2.6 Ma           
Full Terrestrial 
Bipedalism in 
Wetland Open 
Environments 
due to Massive 
Volcanic Events 
around 4.5 Ma 
Free handedness 
Precision Grip, 
Accurate 
Throwing, Long 
Distance Carrying 
Capacity, Some 
Communal 
Provision of 
Young, Loss of 
Laryngeal Air-
sacs, Sweating, 
Hairlessness, due 
to Semi-aquatic 
Foraging 
Lacustrine Sites of 
Earliest Fossilized 
Skeletal Remains 
and All Later Plio-
Pleistocene 
Oldowan Stone 
and Bone Caches; 
Laetoli Fossilized 
Footprints, 3.4 
mya Cut-marked 
Bones, 1.95 site 
with Bones of 
Catfish, Turtles 
and Crocodiles 
Nearly Universal 
Exploitation of 
Aquatic Fauna 
and Flora, 
Historical and 
modern Home 
Bases Usually By 
Resource-Rich 
Water-ways 
 Brain Still Ape-sized, 
Incipient Simple TWR 
Mainly in Social Domain, 
Restructuring And 
Enlargement of Inferior 
Parietal/Hippocampal Area 
re Incorporation of HNF as 
Shown by Later Habilis 
Endocasts. 
Prosodic Vocalizations for 
Identification, Auditory 
Grooming, Territory 
Recognition in Open 
Environments with Greater 
Fission/Fusion Behaviours 
2.6 to 2 Ma 
Oldowan Lithic 
Culture 
Brain Doubled in 
Size, Smaller Gut, 
Enlarged Pre-
Frontal Cortex 
Large Carcass 
Butchering Sites, 
Long-Distance 
Stone Resource 
Acquisition, 
Planned, Highly 
Skilled Stone-
Knapping 
Highly Effective 
Co-operative But 
Technologically 
Simple Hunting 
Techniques for 
Obtaining both 
Large and Small 
Animals due to 
Loss of Wetland 
Resources 
Encephalization Doubled in 
Habilis and Erectus, Mainly 
Due to Expanded Neo-
Cortex, HNF for 
Anticipatory Cognition Fully 
Entrenched and Modular, 
Narrative Mimetic/Depictive 
Communication, Beginning 
of Systematic TWR Skill, 
Refuge Bases 
2.0 to 1.6 Ma 
True Hominins, 
Habilis and 
Erectus, Latter 
Migrates 
Throughout 
Subtropical 
OldWorld 
As Above, With 
Erectus Reaching 
Full Human Size, 
Robust Endurance 
Running  Skeletal 
Structure, 
Altriciality, Post-
Menopausal 
Grandmothers, 
Hidden Oestrus 
Developed 
Oldowan 
throughout Old 
World, Acheulian 
Hand-axes in 
Africa, Erectus 
Very Wide-
Ranging, 1.5 Ma 
Footprint, Turkana 
Boy.  
As above, With 
Addition of 
Habitual 
Confrontational 
Scavenging as 
well as 
Endurance 
Hunting begins 
Around 1.7 mya 
(Tapeworm)  
Systematic TWR for 
Habitual Endurance Hunting 
and  Foraging Navigation in 
Novel Environments, 
Perhaps Opportunistic 
Exploitation of Natural Fires, 
Plaiting and Knotting 
Technology, Chant/Ritual 
Grooming, Neo-cortex 
Continues to Expand   
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1.6 Ma to .8 Ma 
Acheulian 
Culture. 
Fire by .9mya, 
Entry into 
Colder Old 
World, Larger-
Brained 
heidelbergensis  
in Europe, 
England by .9 
mya 
Thick-skulled, 
Highly Robust, 
Full HG Life-way 
indicated by 
Home-Based Fire 
Control, 
Knotting/Plaiting 
Technologies? 
Gesher Site .9 mya 
Proves Fire use, 
Nut-meat 
Grinding, 
Systematic 
Exploitation of 
Fallow Deer and 
Gazelle, Turtle 
and Ostrich Shell 
As above, Plus 
Preservation 
Techniques 
(Drying of Meat), 
Processing of 
Tubers, 
Exploitation of 
Cold 
Environments 
All of the Above, Big-Game 
Hunting for Status and 
Extra-Marital Copulations, 
Marriage and Punishment 
Rituals, Home Base Sociality 
Gestural Languages for 
Trade, Reciprocal 
Relationships with Strangers 
Large fission/fusion tribal 
gatherings? 
800-300 ky 
Fire Control 
Beginnings of 
Language in 
Archaic sapiens 
H. helmei, 
neandertalis, 
sapiens 
Final Brain Surge 
Occurs, but Archaic 
Sapiens less thick 
skulled, Less 
Robust than 
helmei/neandertalis, 
Beginnings of 
Aesthetically 
Pleasing Hand-
Axes, Blade 
technology,  Snares, 
Finest Acheulian in 
Europe, Javelin-like 
Spears 
Enlarged and 
Thinner Skulls, 
Bone Residues 
Show Continuous 
Big-Game 
Procurement, 
Grinding stones 
Ubiquitous=More 
Intensive 
Foraging in Cold 
Environments, 
Hyoid Bone 
Shows Greater 
Phonological 
Complexity of 
Vocalizations 
As above, but 
more intensive, 
Shell-fish 
Middens Near 
Permanent 
Refuge Caves, 
More Role 
Specialization, 
Rituals, Division 
of Labour 
between Hunters 
and Tool-makers, 
etc. as per 
Modern HGs. 
As above, but more 
intensive, 
systematic/speculative TWR, 
Beginnings of Linguistic 
Communication from 
Phonological Prosody 
(Chanting) and Mimicking 
of Animals/Natural Sounds. 
Vocalizations mapped on to 
Narrative Mimetic/depiction 
Modes and Gestural  
Languages 
300 ky to 20 ky 
Full 
Emergence of 
Language 
True Sapiens, 
Neandertals 
Begin to Die 
Out, Extinction 
of Erectus in 
Eastern Old 
World 
 
Fully Modern 
Sapiens at 195 ky, 
Neandertalis dies 
Out  25ky  
Ochre Widely 
Used, Behavioural 
Modernity 
=Symbolic 
artefacts Hafted 
Tools, Fine-blade 
Technology from 
100 ky on 
Full HGs as per 
Historical and 
Modern 
Examples, 
Occupation of 
All 
Environments, 
Intensification 
of all of the 
Above 
Behavioural Modernity, 
Beginning of Second 
Diaspora Out of Africa at 
100 ky, Cave Art at 45 ky, 
Domestication of dogs 
30ky(?) Sedentary Living 
and Beginnings of Pseudo-
Horticulure in Middle East 
20 ky.  
 
 
6.5 Discussion of Chronology 
My chronology differs largely from (Foley and Gamble 2009) in only one major particular: I 
argue that hominins were (a) hunters of small aquatic and terrestrial animals, very infrequent 
opportunistic carvers of large carcasses until 2.6 mya, (b) habitual hunters of medium to large 
animals, probably using the bog-miring technique from then until around 1.8 mya; and (c) 
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persistence or endurance hunters combined with confrontational/obligate scavenging after 1.8 
mya. Intentional acquisition of large carcasses at 2.5mya was due to environmental forcing 
from loss of preferred wetland resources.  
I also add these TWR stages: (1) simple for social/foraging orienteering before 2.6 mya; (2) 
simple to systematic social+hunting 2.6 to 1.6 mya; and (3) systematic to speculative full-
blown TWR thereafter. There was co-evolving neural restructuring and neo-cortical 
expansion for increasing TWR skills and the applications of TWR information by the HNF in 
all facets of the expanding, eusocial carnivore niche of the hominin lineage.  
I also argue for a gestural Acheulian Culture, which is probably not so important a difference. 
Where we agree most strongly is in the timing of the second brain-surge from .8 Ma onwards. 
I argue that this was mainly due to three selective factors: 
1) There was another major adaptive cliff that occurred at .8 Ma, the Matayuma-Brunhes 
Polarity Reversal, which inaugurated the glacial, extremely tempestuous climactic 
character of the mid to late Pleistocene 
2) This triggered every-day systematic control of fire, which made possible more day-
time hours of vocal chanting, dancing and ritual due to safety from predators, plus 
preservation and exploitation of a much larger range of resources, in suddenly much 
colder environments. This innovation opened the door to supplying the necessary 
high-quality diet for another surge in encephalization 
3) Linguistic communication emerged as a way of communicating when not in the light 
of the fire. It rode on the back of a) neural expansion in the neo-cortex; b) the already 
well-developed phonological complexity of prosodic vocalizations (singing and 
chanting) and of animal mimicry when hunting; c) an already well-developed gestural 
language base used for trade with other tribes and silent communication when 
hunting. 
There are many examples of sign-languages that could be understood continent-wide between 
historical HG tribes with discreet linguistic modes of communication, throughout North 
America, Australia, The Middle East, India, and so on.  
To reiterate: all spontaneous sign-languages (like many linguistic languages) have an SOV 
(Subject-Object-Verb) grammar. What is most important in any communicative exchange is 
who the main characters in the narrative being described are, and then comes the action. We 
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are using SVO here, but all six possible combinations occur in the world‟s languages. 
However, people of all languages revert to SOV when asked to communicate in mime or 
gesture. I would argue that this is due to the core structure of the HNF.  However, language 
would have required good phonological complexity as well as cumulative mimetic/depictive 
and gestural cultural support for its invention. 
6.6 The Lacustrine Vocalizing Ape 
This section is not crucial to my thesis, but it completes my narrative of the evolution of 
cognitive capacities for linguistic communication. The other hominin social marker beside 
conspecific track-ways would have been vocal. I speculate that living and foraging in open 
wetland environments selected for highly vocal social communication behaviours. I argue for 
convergent evolution here, analogously to the howling of dogs, singing of killer whales, and 
the continual highly complex vocalizing of Gelada baboons. They live in troupes of up to 250 
individuals in very open habitats, and the complexity and range of their vocalizing is 
remarkably similar to the audile contours of human language (Rendall, Kollias et al. 2005).  
Such vocalizing or „singing‟ is a form of social grooming as well as a navigational/territorial 
location marker in matrilinear Gelada societies. They recognize as each other as individuals 
by the sound of their voices. Since they sleep or roost in small kin-groups in rock overhangs 
on sheer cliffs at night, they begin and end each day with dawn and evening choruses, 
somewhat like birds.  
I am thinking of mimetic ululating Oldowans here, and then Acheulian gestural cultures that 
began dancing and chanting as a form of social grooming, especially in the evening, around 
fires after about .9 mya. The first words were probably onomatopoeic (a word that sounds 
like what it refers to) due to already well-developed vocal mimicry of other animals and 
natural sounds, something we hominins became extremely good at. I repeat: one of our 
favourite hunting techniques is to lure animals to within killing range by mimicking their 
mating calls. 
I bet pre-hominin reciprocal and recognizable vocalizing, especially between mothers and 
infants
74, was a precursor to mimicry of other animal‟s calls, extremely keen voice 
recognition and the culturally signifying dialects within languages. This vocalizing later 
(much later) made the dialogic exchanges of linguistic communication possible, due to its 
                                         
74
 This idea for language evolution is known as the “Motherese Hypothesis”. 
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probable Gelada-like phonological complexity. Hominin infants could not cling to the hair of 
mothers like those of other apes, and open flood-plains and swampy environments habitats 
are characterized by vast expanses of tall reeds, sedges and grasses that are easy to get lost in. 
HG women and children talk or chant continuously when gathering together in order to deter 
predators (Botha and Knight 2009, Silberbauer 1981) 
In short, hominin prosodic vocalizing would have been an important pre-adaptation for 
language invention further down the evolutionary trail, acquired in conjunction with other 
important traits such as simple TWR, through wetland foraging habits. Apart from a need for 
this pre-adaptation for the phonetic complexity of speech, I fully support Merlin Donald‟s 
mimetic and Michael Corballis‟s gesture-first „evolution of language‟ theories. 
6.7 The Socio-Ecological Effects of Linguistic Communication  
There was positive feedback between linguistic communication, the surge in encephalization 
mentioned above, and culture. Speech demands much less physical energy than mime or 
gesture (Armstrong et al 1995). Language also allows for a lot of fine-grained cryptic 
encoding, even within the intimate social structure of an HG band (see Botha and Knight 
2009, Silberbauer 1981 for ethnographic examples). So obviously its inception increased 
social and technological complexity. Donald (in Corballis and Lea 1991) suggests post-
mimetic and depictive hominin culture should be called mythic culture. I agree, if we can 
place a predominantly gestural Acheulian culture in between (we will get back to mythic 
culture later in this section)  
One of the puzzling features of this period of hominin evolution is the numerous sites where 
many of these hand-axes were made and never used; also they became more beautiful and 
aesthetically pleasing as time went on. Wynn (Wynn 2002) suggests that these axes were the 
first symbolic art, and may have been honest sexual signals of dexterity and intelligence. I 
would agree, but would add that axe-knapping may have become more skilled as hands were 
freed from communication; hominins could knap and communicate simultaneously.  
Indeed, speech may have promoted technological innovation more generally, by freeing the 
hands for experiment. One could talk and still need „something to do with the hands‟. 
Armstrong (et al 1995) and Corballis (Corballis 2010) have also presented this idea. There is 
a natural progression to simple games for auto-rehearsal here as well. Cats-cradle (for 
developing weaving skills) and drawing track-ways in sand, dust or snow (for TWR) can be 
placed in this cognitive basket. Group games or „sport‟ incorporate auto-rehearsal of skills as 
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well. However, we must not forget the possible importance of what is being talked about 
during these activities. I refer to Donald‟s mythic culture. 
Mythic culture is constructed around narratives that are endlessly reiterated using 
combinations of mime, gesture, symbolic depictions, and language. These cultural narratives 
attain emotional or social-grooming power through ritualistic „dressing-up‟, dancing and 
chanting, and their story-lines are often expressed through songs or poetry. They provide 
tribal identity: they express group-narratives of „who we are and where we come from‟. 
Cultural myths narratively present normative social roles for individuals to use as „maps‟ for 
a life time of navigation through the social domain. Maturing individuals‟ self-narratives of 
„how do I get to fit in to the group‟ are thereby socially manipulated75 for the good of the 
tribe. Consider marriage contracts and punishment/reward social institutions such as group 
ridicule here. In HG tribes it is the older women who usually apply the social-ridicule 
technique when dealing with younger band-members to „bring them into line‟. They do this 
with exaggerated mimicry of the miscreant and loud, humorous story-telling so all band 
members can hear and join in the laughter (Botha and Knight 2009 for excellent description). 
Smaller mythic tales such as hunting stories and family genealogies are endlessly re-told 
around HG campfires (and modern kitchen tables) at night. There are also the narratives of 
gossip. These smaller narratives, communicated via speech alone or with a few gestures, are a 
subtle form of pedagogy, since they contain useful information for children and juveniles 
about kin-relationships, folk psychology and local ecologies. 
The communication of human culture is therefore narratively constructed. At bottom the 
template for all this narrativity is the primal autonoetic, autobiographical self-narrative. The 
up-shot is that in modern, complex societies the individual autonoetic self-narrative at the 
core of the HNF is in constant narrative discourse with itself and with the „autonoetic self-
narratives‟ of various social groups. We are the autonoetic or self-knowing narrative species. 
The impact of language on symbolic signs of self, tribal identity, and therefore on hominin 
autonoetic self-narratives would have to be the subject of another paper. I will finish this 
section on linguistic forms of narrative communication with (a) a few notes on how my 
„triggering track-ways theory‟ solves certain long-standing problems in the „evolution of 
                                         
75
 Like the self-narrative, these cultural „autobiographical‟ narratives must be adjusted over time. But the 
process can be very „socially messy‟, to say the least. 
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language‟ debate; and (b) a brief comment on why I think the „episodic faculty‟ should be 
called the hominin narrative faculty. 
(Hauser, Chomsky et al. 2002) argued that what was truly unique about language was its 
recursive nature. They stated the cognitive capacity for understanding this recursion (syntax 
or grammar) must have evolved before language could emerge, in the either the social, 
numerical, or navigation domains. My TWR theory explains how and why the most 
important feature of language could only have evolved in the social and navigation domains. 
Deacon (1997) stated there was no natural sign-system in the real world on to which the 
arbitrary sign-systems of language could be mapped. He ended up having to posit a very 
tangled view of the evolution of symbols. This paper has revealed that he was wrong. 
There has always been a discrete infinity of stories to be read in the naturally recursive or 
combinatory sign-system of foot-prints and track-ways, just as there is in the recursively 
embedded conventional or symbolic words and sentences of language. I argue the cognitive 
capacity for language acquisition, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, was built on the 
ancient cognitive capacity for TWR.  
Some arbitrary signs were probably in use very early, to decrease the cognitive load on 
narrative, navigational memory when travelling between important sites. I have in mind such 
structures as stone cairns, blaze-marks on trees, and the like. Early use of such simple signs is 
very probable in open featureless wetland environments. Here too there is a cognitive 
connection between reading track-ways sign systems and „reading‟ or understanding the 
arbitrary, symbolic sign systems of language. This development culminated in orthography 
and all the other depictive signs used in modern culture. So the word-signs you are reading 
right now are „thought-prints‟, and the „track-way‟ they are making is my thesis or 
evolutionary narrative. 
“True beliefs are not pictures, mirrors or maps. But a true belief in the naturalistic 
view we shall discuss, has the same relation to the world that an accurate map has” 
       (Peter Godfrey-Smith 1996) 
My point here is, so does a true story, and I believe the triggering track-ways theory tells a 
true story. Like all true stories, it appeals to common sense: it is not another „just-so‟ story. It 
is also theoretically orthodox in all its facets. I will finish my thesis with a précis of my 
evolutionary narrative. 
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6.8 Conclusion 
Four and a half million years ago a massive volcanic event destroyed forests throughout the 
East Afican Rift. Consequently some of our facultatively bipedal, semi-arboreal Ardipithecan 
ancestors became non-arboreal, obligate bipedal apes, and got locked into specializing in 
their semi-aquatic, wetland socio-ecological niche. Foraging in and under water led to other 
morphological adaptations, such as copious sweating, hairlessness, breathe control, loss of 
laryngeal air-sacs, highly sensitive finger pads, a strong flexible wrist and a precision grip.  
These earliest hominins also, of course, possessed universal great-ape cognitive capacities for 
here-and-now imitation and intentionality-reading. Compared to other higher mammals, they 
were good here-and-now social learners. These pre-adaptive physical and mental traits were 
all necessary for the evolution of hominin cognition, culture and communication, but they 
were not sufficient.  
Wetlands are boggy featureless environments surrounding lakes and rivers. They are covered 
in tall sedges and reeds, and water-levels fluctuate constantly. The ubiquitous sandy and 
muddy substrates in wetlands lend themselves to accurate recording of footprints and track-
ways. These ever-present natural signs induced some populations of wetland-foraging 
hominins to enter a unique cognitive/behavioural niche. In fact, this niche probably had to be 
entered by a bipedal, visually oriented, non-olfactory ape that habitually foraged in such 
environments. 
Consequently the earliest hominins began imitatively stepping in or very near the footprints 
of leading conspecifics, on a routine basis. This behaviour was immediately selected for 
because it increased fitness when foraging. Soon they were also exploiting their own old 
track-ways and those of absentee band-members for safety and orienteering, in the same 
imitative/emulative manner. They also began to use conspecific track-ways as social markers 
because they were individually recognizable. 
Unlike scent trails track-ways are immediately directional, durable, and combinatory. They 
have a narrative structure, and therefore reveal what their authors were doing and 
experiencing when they were made. Hominins walking in the old prints of absentee band-
members and their own old prints were physically re-enacting the stories being told by the 
track-ways being followed. Through this continuous embodied cognition early hominin 
mind/brains slowly began to develop the elsewhere-and-when cognitive capacity for 
imagining „being in the minds-and-bodies‟ of absentee band members and their past selves. 
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Track-ways are immediately and inexorably directional because every footprint points to 
where its author was heading at the time it was made. They therefore kindled an objective 
awareness of the self and others as intentional agents, acting out scenarios in the past in a 
narrative, goal-directed manner. When leaving and returning to the social domain early 
hominins (I do not include australopithecines in the hominin lineage) very often exploited 
their own recognizable old track-ways. Due to this self-mirroring effect of their own track-
ways the faculty for an autonoetic narrative memory and Dennett‟s second-order 
intentionality began to evolve.  
Since the autonoetic self-narrative was constructed of memories of the imagined self 
experiencing the past, it also allowed imagining the intentional self having experiences in the 
future. This provided anticipatory cognition, or Suddendorf‟s mental time-travel. It also 
allowed the attribution of intentional mental states to both present and non-present others. 
The evolution of the unique hominin narrative faculty for elsewhere-and-when social 
competences had been triggered. Hominins were no longer restricted to the here-and-now 
imitation/emulation and intentionality-reading of adult chimps and human toddlers under the 
age of three. 
The outward expression of the hominin narrative faculty was mimetic pretend play, auto-
rehearsal, and communication, via synchronous turn-and-turnabout imitations of the 
imagined actions of absentee entities (including the self) during past and future events. 
Capacities for social learning increased dramatically. Internally hominins began to 
cognitively „live in time‟ due to their evolving neural capacity for mental representations of 
an autonoetic, autobiographical self-narrative. Social complexity increased well beyond that 
of any other great ape societies, and a cognitive arms race ensued.  
The hominin narrative faculty and the concomitant capacity for intentional (rather than 
opportunistic) reading of conspecific track-ways began to co-evolve, in a selective feed-back 
loop. Two million years later, the hominin narrative faculty and its spin-off elsewhere-and-
when social competences were entrenched enough to enable the abrupt emergence of mimetic 
Oldowan Culture. This explosion of co-operative culture enabled hominins to survive drastic 
environmental changes in the East African Rift throughout the Late Pliocene and Early 
Pleistocene.  
These environmental catastrophes were caused by a north-south polar reversal at 2.8 mya. 
Oldowan hominins had to become intentional trackers and co-operative hunters of large 
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mammals, due to destruction of their staple diet of wetland resources. These narratively 
planned and mimetically communicated co-operative foraging techniques were a huge fuel 
for success (Godfrey 1996). Powerful selection forces therefore arose for rapid 
encephalization and earlier birthing/extended juvenility, to increase the plastic neural 
capacity to learn those techniques when young. 
By around 2 mya the true hominins habilis and erectus had evolved, with twice the 
encephalization of other great ape species (including australopithecines). Mimetic Oldowan 
HG culture cumulatively developed into gestural Acheulian Culture by 1.6 mya. By then the 
hominin narrative faculty was fully entrenched. Erectus hominins had become eusocial 
breeders, systematic intentional trackers, wide-ranging endurance hunters and confrontational 
scavengers. They had colonized all warmer parts of the Old World. Their morphology and 
developmental life history was almost human, for extended childhood dependency and 
compensatory alloparenting by post-menopausal grandmothers had fully evolved. Further 
encephalization was occurring, but very incrementally. 
At .78 mya another polar reversal occurred that caused massive glaciations in the Northern 
Hemisphere throughout the rest of the Pleistocene. Erectus responded by taking full control 
of fire. Fire allowed innovative extraction of high-quality nutrients from a wider range of 
environmental resources, more time for noisy socializing, and therefore amped up socio-
ecological complexity. Consequently another surge in encephalization began. Late Acheulian 
hominins became fully fledged systematic/speculative trackers and started to invent language. 
By 400 to 300 ky archaic sapiens and neandertalis had evolved.  
Their brains had become three times as large as that of a chimpanzee, partly due to a 
cognitive arms-race because language was being invented. The result of such energy-efficient 
symbolic communication was complex mythic culture and the emergence of the 
technological and symbolic cultural innovations of behavioural modernity by 100 ky. 
When language emerged we fully became, as Deacon (1997) has so aptly said, the symbolic 
species. What my triggering track-ways theory has added to human evolutionary theory is 
that we had become a somewhat elsewhere-and-when, narrative-minded species long before 
the invention of Oldowan Culture, never mind language, because our earliest ancestors had 
entered the unique cognitive/behavioural niche of exploiting their own track-ways some two 
million years before Oldowan Culture. 
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I argue that if our ancestral ape lineage had not entered this unique cognitive niche at that 
early point in its evolutionary trajectory, cumulative hominin cultures and intentional 
communication would never have emerged, and H. sapiens could not have evolved. This new 
evolutionary narrative is based on these now orthodox evolutionary theories: niche 
construction, environmental variability, social complexity, and selective feedback spiralling 
between biological and cultural evolution in four dimensions: genetic, epigenetic, cultural, 
and communicational. If it is a true story then the „triggering track-ways theory‟ provides the 
missing piece to the evolutionary puzzle of why we are the way we are: the autonoetic 
narrative-minded symbolic species. 
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